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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Michael David Schmidli for the Master of Arts in History
presented February 13,2008.
Title: "Railcars Loaded With Crisp Fresh Vegetables" A study of Agriculture at the
Tule Lake Relocation Center 1942-1946
Inthe Spring and Summer of 1942, the population of West Coast Japanese
were rounded up and forcibly moved from their homes to temporary camps and soon
after to ten permanent relocation camps in the interior Western United States. This
thesis traces the history of one such camp, the Tule Lake Relocation Center. In this
thesis 1argue that from its inception the Tule Lake Center was unique among the ten
camps. The decision to build a permanent center at Tule Lake was based upon the
unique potential the area provided for agriculture on a huge scale. The other
permanent centers were located in remote inhospitable areas where large scale
agricultural operations were impossible.
The introduction outlines my key research questions and the methodology
used. This section identifies my central theme, agriculture at the Tule Lake
Relocation Center, and situates my own research within the existing scholarship on
the Japanese-American Relocation. Chapter one is a review of the factors, including
racial animosity, and wartime hysteria leading up to the decision to relocate every
Japanese individual living on the West Coast. Chapter two discusses the little known
history of how and why Tule Lake was chosen for a permanent relocation center.
Chapter three documents the commitment of the War Relocation Authority to a
massive agricultural project at the Tule Lake Center.
Chapter four recounts the tumultuous registration period at Tule Lake. In the
winter of 1943, the War Relocation Authority and the War Department combined to
administer a loyalty questionnaire to every internee over the age of 17, revealing
shocking disloyalty at Tule Lake. Chapter five discusses the decision of the War
Relocation Authority to segregate Japanese Americans declared disloyal, and the
choice of Tule Lake as the segregation center. Chapter six discusses the events, in
particular the tragic accidental death of a farm worker, which led to the end of large
scale agriculture at Tule Lake.
In conclusion, I assert that War Relocation Authority blunders, including a
lack of cultural sensitivity, led directly to the cessation of the agricultural project at
Tule Lake Segregation Center.
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Introduction
The internment camp experience holds a central position in Japanese
American studies. As historian Paul R. Spickard makes clear, "by far the largest
volume of writing by and about Japanese Americans has focused on the group's
prison camp experience during World War II. It has now become one of the most
frequently described subjects in American history."] Notwithstanding the
voluminous body of work on the internment period, however, key facets of the West
Coast Japanese experience in World War II remain under-explored. This thesis adds
to the existing scholarship on the internment of West Coast Japanese during the
Second World War by illuminating the unique role of large-scale commercial
agricultural production at the Tule Lake Relocation Center.
Unlike any other camp, army and War Relocation Authority (WRA) officials
envisioned the Tule Lake Center as having an immense profit potential that could be
realized by harnessing the agricultural expertise and readily available labor of the
Japanese American internee community. Relocated to an area characterized by
visceral racism, lacking personal mobility, and dependent on the U.S. government
for both protection and basic necessities, internees at Tule Lake faced a unique form
of labor coercion that has been largely overlooked by scholars. This thesis focuses on
three core research questions. First, how did army and (WRA) officials envision the
role of commercial agriculture at Tule Lake? Second, what was the extent of
1 Paul R. Spickard, Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformation of an Ethnic Group
(New York: Prentice Hall international, 1996).
I
internee-based commercial agricultural production? Finally, how did commercial
agriculture at Tille Lake affect the relationship between internees and (WRA)
administration officials?
The existing evidence reveals that in April 1942, army and WRA officials
perceived the proposed relocation center site at Tule Lake, California, as having
immense potential for large-scale commercial agricultural production. Situated in the
heart of a highly-productive agricultural area in close-proximity to the bustling
population center of Klamath Falls, Oregon, Tille Lake did not fit the geographical
criteria developed by the army for any of the other relocation sites. Historian Roger
Daniels describes the majority of relocation sites as "godforsaken places where no
one has lived before or since.,,2 In fact, the Tule Lake Center was not on the original
list of prospective relocation camp sites, and was brought to the attention of the army
by a local area resident, Clark Fensler, whose effort to convince WRA officials of
Tille Lake's suitability linked agricultural production to the coercion of internee
labor.3 Army and WRA officials concurred with Fensler's assessment of the
agricultural potential at Tille Lake. Investigation by WRA representatives revealed
thousands of acres of Bureau of Reclamation land "comparable in richness to that of
the Nile Valley," and available for immediate cultivation by Japanese internees." The
documentary record clearly shows that with American farm profits soaring to a new
2 Roger Daniels, "Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-year Perspective," The History
Teacher, Vol. 35, No.3. (May 2002), 297-310.
3 George D. Dean, Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese
Reception Center Near Tulelake, California. WRA, April 20, 1942. Perkins Library, Duke University.
, Stan Turner, The Years of Harvest: A History of The Tule Lake Basin, (Eugene: Spencer Creek Press
1987), 179.
2
high of $15 billion in 1942, and facing farm labor shortages due to the war, the
decision to build the Tule Lake Camp was directly linked to federal plans for large-
scale commercial agricultural production.i
The initial success of commercial agriculture during the first year at the Tule
Lake Center exceeded even the most optimistic WRA estimates. Remarkably, the
internees put approximately 2,500 acres of prime farm land into production in 1942,
planting a variety of crops, including 827 acres of potatoes and 1,057 acres of
barley/' The result of this massive agricultural undertaking was a bountiful harvest in
the fall, and the profits generated by the sale of vegetables from the project farm
filled the coffers of the WRA. As The Tulean Dispatch, the center newspaper,
reported on September 29, 1942, "a huge pool of funds has accumulated from the
proceeds from the bumper crop.?" The following spring, evacuee farm workers
increased production, and once again the crops were outstanding.t In sum, internee-
based agriculture during the first two years at Tule Lake constituted a huge and
extremely successful venture.
The bountiful harvest of 1942 did little to ameliorate tension, however,
between the Japanese American internee community and WRA officials. Indeed,
from the outset, agriculture at Tule Lake was a source of contention for evacuee farm
workers, who resented low wages, poor living and working conditions, and
inadequate food served in the mess halls. More significantly, labor coercion on the
s "Grain Production at New Peak in "42" Estimated Cash Farm Income Sets a New High of
$15,000,000,000" New York Times, January 3, 1941, Page A64.
6 The Tulean Dispatch, August 3. 1942.
7 "Farm Funds Accumulate," The Tulean Dispatch, September 29, 1942.
• "Harvesting of Vegetables Begin on Project Farm," The Tulean Dispatch, July 21, 1943.
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part of the WRA dramatically increased dissatisfaction among internees at Tule Lake.
The administration consistently threatened internees who refused to work with fee
assessments, and used psychological harassment, often in the form of browbeating
articles published in the camp newspaper.
Despite the unpleasant conditions they labored under, the original residents of
the camp, what I refer to as the "Old Tuleans," continued to report to work on the
project farm and in the packing sheds. Finally, I argue that when all the West Coast
Japanese were asked to affirm their loyalty shortly after New Year's in 1943, the
WRA failed to recognize the relative nature of loyal and disloyal responses. Further,
the WRA failed to recognize the difference in the demography of the Tule Lake
center relative to the other centers. When Tule Lake became the segregation center
the WRA did not bring together like minded internees but rather factions vying for
influence. Within this group was a well organized faction fanatically loyal to Japan.
This inability on the part of the WRA to anticipate the frightening situation that
developed led directly to more hardship for internees and the cessation of
commercial agriculture at Tule Lake.
Sources
Although historians have written about the relocation for sixty years, the
work of early sociologists chronicling day-to-day life in the camps still stands as
some of the best and most important scholarship on the subject. By far the most
insightful example of early scholarship is Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard
4
Nishimoto's 1946 volume.," Thomas was a professor of sociology at the University
of California, Berkeley when the United States entered into the Second World War.
When relocation began she received a federal grant to conduct a study of the effects
of relocation on the West Coast Japanese.
Accordingly, Thomas sent bilingual Japanese American graduate students
trained in field work to assembly centers and later to three relocation camps-
including Tule Lake. Their job was to live at the camps and document the internment
experience without being identified as professional social scientists. The work
involved a substantial degree of danger for the social scientists involved. Such
activities as typing reports late a night, cashing checks from the University of
California, and receiving 'mail labeled Resettlement Study could result in being
branded an Inu-literally "dog" in Japanese, but in camp jargon loosely translating
as "informer" or "stool pigeon." The Spoilage is a direct result of such intrepid field
work, and it offers an invaluable "worm's eye view" ofJife in the camps. Because
they were the first to document protest and tragedy, as in the case ofthe troubles at
Tule Lake, the observations of Japanese American graduate students imbedded in the
camps are a vital resource, giving a clear and often frightening picture of the
camps. 10
9 Dorothy S.Thomas and Richard Nishimoto, The Spoilage: Japanese American Evacuation and
Resettlement during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press 1946). Richard
Nishimoto received his Ph.D. from Berkeley, where he had studied under Thomas. His work in the
field at Poston Arizona Relocation Center was excellent With the ability to move in camp society
without causing suspicion, Nishimoto became Thomas's key contact at Poston.
10 Thomas's methodology is not without a good deal of controversy. She had little interest in the
safety or comfort of her field workers, except as it related to their ability to do the job. She was
interested in production. She pushed her people in the field constantly for more and more detailed
information, Moreover, recent research by historian Lane Ryo Hirabayashi shows Thomas and
5
A second early source on the relocation period was produced by the WRA
itself. Bureau of Sociological Research Director Alexander H. Leighton's
"Community Analysis Research Studies" series is a particularly valuable historical
resource. Although taking an entirely different perspective than Thomas's informants,
these studies published by the WRA chronicling camp life and the views and
attitudes of the internees from the perspective of professional sociologists are often
highly insightful and useful. Leighton also subsequently wrote a volume entitled The
Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on the
Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp, revealing a rare understanding of
internees' attitudes and views. I I
Much of the work on relocation both in the early years after World War II
and to this day, tends to look at the West Coast Japanese as victims ofan unfortunate
incident which they were able to overcome through their hard work and patriotism.
Although many of these works-which scholars generally refer to as the
"unfortunate incident genre"-are very useful in providing a broad overview of the
Japanese experience, they tend to present a picture of a virtuous people performing
in a noble manner under trying circumstances. Perhaps the earliest example of this
Nishimoto used the excellent work of Tamie Tsuchiyama, imbedded at Poston, with hardly an
acknowledgement. In his 1999 biography of Tsuchiyama, The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an
American Concentration Camp, Hirabayashi exposes a serious lack of professional credit on the part
of Thomas and Nishimoto, and underscores the pressure Thomas put on social scientists in the field.
Indeed, after nearly three years of clandestine sociological work in the camps, Tsuchiyama dropped
out of the graduate program at the University of California, Berkeley, and never published any ofber
work from that period. See Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an
American Concentration Camp (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).
11 Alexander H. Leighton, The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based
on the Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1945).
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literature is Mine Okubo's 1946 work Citizen 13660.J2 A brilliant cartoonist and
writer, Okubo's drawings and stories from the Tanforan Assembly Center and the
Topaz Relocation Center exemplify the type of narrative that celebrates the courage
and spirit that sustained the Japanese Americans throughout the internment.
One of the earliest works on the internment by a historian is Morton
Grodzins's 1949 book, Americans Betrayed: Politics of the Japanese American
Evacuation. Grodzins set the tone for a generation of scholars seeking to debunk the
so called "military necessity" theory, that West Coast Japanese posed a serious threat
of sabotage, and espionage, arguing instead that the internment was perpetrated by
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt allied with West Coast politicians, the media and
economic interest groups."
Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis's 1967 volume; The Great Betrayal: The
Evacuation of the Japanese Americans during World WarII, looked at some topics
which earlier writers on the subject had failed to explore. For example, Girdner and
Loftis offer an excellent discussion oflabor coercion and protest at the Santa Anita
Assembly Center where internees, especially women, were pushed into working on a
camouflage net project. 14 Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was able to brag in his
12 Mini Okubo, Citizen /3660 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946). See also: Allan R.
Bosworth. Americas Concentration Camps (New York: Norton, 1967). Sandra C. Taylor. Jewel of
The Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
13 Grodzins, Morton. Americans Betrayed: Politics of the Japanese American Evacuation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949).
14 Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese Americans
during World War II (New York; Macmillian, 1969).
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Final Report, Japanese Evacuationfrom the West Coast, that profit from the
camouflage net project paid for feeding the entire Santa Anita Assembly Center. 15
The preeminent historian of the relocation of West Coast Japanese is Roger
Daniels. Paul R. Spickard asserts that Daniel's first book, Concentration Camps USA
(1971), "is the most widely read volume on the World War II era, and the best
treatment of the political aspects of the internment.t''" Building on and revising the
work of Grodzins, Daniels uses the documentary evidence to give a clear picture of
the government forces at work after Pearl Harbor leading to intermnent. Daniels digs
deeply into govermnent documents to conclude that Colonel Karl Bendetsen and
Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion were most complicit in the decision to
relocate the entire population of West Coast Japanese Americans. Daniels also is
unafraid to single out President Franklin Roosevelt for the ultimate responsibility.
Daniels looks at the relocation from a broad perspective giving us a basis within the
relocation as a whole to study specific aspects. Daniels has also contributed excellent
scholarship to several fine compilations of essays by historians on the subject.17
Years of Infamy by Michi Weglyn is a volume which I found useful for my
work. Among other important aspects of relocation, Weglyn discusses many of the
"Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Final Report, Japanese Evacuauon from the West Coast, 1941,
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.1943), 205-206.
16 Paul R. Spickard. Japanese Americans: The Formations and Transformations of an Ethnic group
(New York: Prentice Hall 1996). This volume offers a fascinating study of Japanese American
diaspora.
I7 Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War 1/ (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in
World War 1/ (New York Hill and Wang, 2004). Roger Daniels. The Politics ofPre}udice (New York:
Arno Press, 1969). Roger Daniels, "Western Reaction to the Relocated Japanese Americans: The Case
of Wyoming," in Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, Rodger Daniels, Sandra C.
Taylor, and Harry H. L. Kitano, 008. (Seattle and London; University of Washington 1991).
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situations that developed specifically at Tule Lake, including revolt and riot. Weglyn
was sent to a relocation camp with her family as a young woman. Although Years of
Infamy is not autobiographical or a memoir, Weglyn often draws upon her own
experience in the camps to add insight to a specific point she is discussing. For
example her discussion of the loyalty registration period is the best I have read on the
subject. 18
Methodology
I have been aware of the existence of the Tule Lake Center since early
childhood. I grew up in a farm family approximately five miles from the camp. I
remember driving by the camp countless times with my father on our way to irrigate
potatoes on Bureau of Reclamation land he was leasing within site of the camp. I had
no knowledge of the situation which brought the internees to TtiIe Lake. A young
boy's inquiries were met with vague responses from adults who knew very little
about the episode.
I was in about sixth or seventh grade when I realized that the internees were
Japanese Americans and not prisoners ofwar from Japan. A few years later, I was
shocked when a wise old English teacher recounted her experience as a substitute
teacher at the Tule Lake Center, and offered the theory that the relocation of West
Coast Japanese in World War II had been urmecessary and morally wrong. This was
a startling idea to a patriotic, ignorant country boy in 1965. My country was wrong?
18 Michi Weglyn,Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps. (New York:
Morrow Quill, 1976).
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Decades later, I returned to the subject of Japanese American relocation as an
undergraduate at Southern Oregon University. The idea for this thesis started in fall
2002 when I wrote a paper on the barracks buildings of the Tule Lake Center. At first
I thought the research for the project would involve mostly oral history interviews.
Many of the buildings were moved from the original site of the camp to locations all
around the area soon after the war. My idea was to document how and why the
buildings were moved to their current locations. This was no easy proposition
considering that fifty-five years had passed since any of the buildings had been at the
original camp site.
Inquiries among the local old-timers led me to residents who had been
involved in moving the buildings from the camp to their present locations.
Subsequent interviews produced a flood of memories about the buildings and the
first few years after the war. This made for an extremely compelling social history of
young men and women who moved to the area or were returning after the traumatic
yearsofWorid War II.
Buoyed by my success in the area of oral history, a random thought occurred
to me: could I expand the research to focus on the Tule Lake relocation camp
experience? Suddenly, the random thought became an epiphany. If these buildings
made for interesting social history after they were moved, what about the history of
why and how they came to be built in this little comer of the U.S.A? Many specific
questions about the buildings came to mind: What were they made of? Who built
them? And what was life like for the first residents of the barracks buildings?
10
The micro-film collection at the Klamath County Library in Klamath Falls,
Oregon, revealed a treasure trove of source material, especially from the local
newspaper, The Herald and News. It is from this research that I became familiar with
the history of the Tule Lake Center. I remember my surprise as I read about Tule
Lake becoming the segregation center for disloyal Japanese Americans in the
September of 1943. Likewise, the reports of the riot in November of 1943 had me
riveted. It was as if the events were happening as I was reading instead of almost
sixty years ago. Significantly, my early research clearly revealed that Tule Lake was
remarkably distinct from any other relocation center.
My last formal class in the graduate program at Portland StateJJniversity was
titled Twentieth Century Western United States. For the final oral presentation I
resumed my work on the Tule Lake Center. In doing research for the oral
presentation, I came across a bit of random information on the Tule Lake camp. Ina
report a few days after the Tule Lake riot of November 4, 1943, WRA National
Director Dillon Myer mentioned that $500,000 worth of vegetables still needed to be
harvested at the Tule Lake Center farm, a huge sum of money in 1943.
Remembering the Girdner and Loftis discussion of labor coercion in the camouflage
net project at Santa Anita, I wanted to know the extent of agriculture at Tule Lake.
Any farming operation which could produce that sort of income would have to be
extensive.
To my surprise, secondary sources turned up absolutely nothing about
agriculture on a large scale at Tule Lake. However, I knew two important facts: first,
11
Myer had used the figure of $500,000; and second, the farm land around the site of
the Tule Lake Center is some of the finest in the world, certainly capable of
producing bountiful crops. Ihad a hunch that there must have been a huge
agricultural operation at Tule Lake if Icould just find the documentation.
In the winter of2006, I conducted a 6-week research trip to Ithaca, New York,
to examine the "Japanese-American Relocation Centers Records, 1935-1953" held at
Cornell University .19 With 22.9 cubic feet of documents on the relocation, ranging
from WRA reports to internee paintings, the collection is one of the finest in the
United States. Ivowed to look at every document in the archive.
After about a week Ihad found many useful documents on relocation in
general but very little on Tule Lake. Then Imade my first big discovery. One day I
\
was looking at some WRA reports which were in such bad condition that they were
almost unreadable. Among them was a document titled: Report on attitude of citizens
and officials in Tule Lake area and Klamath County, Oregon to Japanese Reception
Center near Tule Lake California." This report confirmed something Ihad not
expected, that the Tule Lake Center was built specifically for its agricultural
potential. Examining the extremely rare center newspaper The Tulean Dispatch on
micro-film, Ifound statistics on the incredible size of the agricultural operation, and
documentation of labor coercion at Tule Lake. From these two key sources and many
others including WRA community analysis reports, and the Klamath Falls newspaper
19 "Japanese-American Relocation Centers Records, 1935-1953," Collection Number 3830, Division
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
20 John D. Dean WRA Report on attitude of citizens and officials in Tule Lake area and Klamath
County, Oregon to Japaese Reception Center near Tulelake California War RelocationAdministration,
Aprl126, 1942Perkins Library, Duke University.
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The Herald and News, and many fine secondary sources I was able to complete this
thesis.
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Chapter 1
A Citizen is a Citizen: Unless?
The racial tension was old and bitter. In the aftermath of the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor the animosity of the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper
Association toward the minority population of Japanese farmers in the area was
palpable. Composed of a few large-scale white growers, the association produced
lettuce, carrots and other fresh vegetables year-round in the Salinas, Imperial and
Salt River valleys of California for the eastern U.S. markets. "The salad bowl of the
nation," as the area came to be known, often grew half the head lettuce sold in the
country's markets.' By the I940s, however, long standing resentment had reached a
boiling point. In the early years of the Great Depression, reflecting a deeply
ingrained racial hierarchy, dust bowl migrants from the Southwest filled out the
upper levels of the production process, while Japanese laborers were relegated to
work in the fields. "White men and women, largely Oklahomans, handled packing
l'
plants, but they were never able to endure the back-breaking stoop work in the
fields," the Saturday Evening Post told its readers. "Only the short-legged Japs could
take that.,,2
IFrank J. Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," The Saturday Evening Post, May 9, 1942, transcribed
by Wa:r Relocation Administration, Japanese Americans Relocation Centers Records, Cornell
University, hereafter referred to as, WRA, JARCR/CU, Box II, File 33, page 6.
l Ibid, 6. Such racial tension between Caucasian and Japanese workers inCalifornia illustrated how
the process of migration was dramatically reshaping American labor patterns. Between 1914 and
1970, an estimated 15 million Americans from the Mid-West migrated to the North and Far West.
See James N. Gregory, American Exodus: The Dust Migration and Okie Culture in California (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), xvii.
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Notwithstanding daunting racial obstacles, many thousands of Japanese had
managed to go out one by one to farm on their own. Mostly cultivating small plots of
land, they had become moderately successful. More importantly, they had become
competitors in a market previously dominated by white growers. Japanese farm
operators controlled about 226,000 acres on 5,000 farms in California in 1940. The
average Japanese farmer operated about forty-three acres.' Japanese operators used
what today would be called micro-management, cultivating every inch of their small
holdings with intense care.
A few Japanese farmers had become very successful. In the spring of 1942
Takeo Yuchi was one of the most successful farmers in the Salinas Valley. Takeo's
father died shortly after he graduated from Salinas High where he had been a track
star. The younger Yuchi, still in his early 30s in 1942, built the family's 100- acre
farm, cultivated by one small tractor, into an empire of over 2,000 acres with 50
tractors and 125 employees.
In 1941, Yuchi's farms produced an array of fruits and vegetables, including
300 acres of sugar beets refined by Spreckles Sugar Company. Yuchi's beets
produced approximately two million pounds of sugar every year. His farms also
produced an astounding 2,700 railcars oflettuce in and 70,000 hundred pound bags
of Australian brown ouions in 1941. The Australian Browns were especially prized
by the American Navy for their tough skin, which allowed for good keeping quality
on long voyages. Indeed, the Navy bought Yuchi's whole crop in 1941, and wanted
3 John Bird, "Our Japs Have Gone To Work," Country Gentleman 3 August, 1942, WRA JARCR/CU
Box 11, File 23.
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more Australian Browns in 1942. Accordingly, in the spring of 1942, Yuchi heeded
the Navy's request, and planted even more Australian Browns.4
Not surprisingly, members of the grower-shipper association viewed the
gains of individuals like Takeo Yuchi and thousands of other Japanese farmers with
growing animosity. In many respects, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and the
subsequent U.S. declaration of war on Japan provided the opportunity white growers
had been waiting for. Shortly after December 7, the grower-shipper association's
managing secretary, Austin E. Anson, traveled to Washington to urge federal
authorities to remove alI Japanese from the area. Anson pointed out to the War and
Navy departments, the Attorney General, and to every congressman who would
listen to him that Monterey Bay was a perfect landing place for the Japanese army,
and led directly to the Salinas valley-an area full of Japanese farmers waiting to
rush to the aid of their invading countrymen. With their equipment and knowledge of
4 Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," The Saturday Evening Post, 2. West Coast Japanese were not
only successful in farming. Before the Navy froze their fleet, based at Terminal Island, in Los Angeles
Harbor, the fishing industry in Southern California was heavily influenced by the Japanese. The 500
or so Japanese fiunilies living on Terminal Island were treated particnJarly callously by the U.S. Navy.
The Navy posted notices on February 14, 1942 advising Japanese residents they wonld have to leave
the Island by March 14, 1942. But on February 25 new signs were posted advising them they had to
be out in just two days by the 27th of February. Residents fled to friends and relatives' around Los
Angles, to wait and see what would happen next. See also, Sandra C. Taylor, "Evacuation and
Economic Loss: Questions and Perspectives," in Japanese Americans: From Relocation To Redress,
Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor and Harry H. L. Kitano, eds. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press), 166. In Seattle, Japanese operated more than half the city's hotels. In Portland, one-third of the
hotels were Japanese run. Seattle, Tacoma, Yakima, Portland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Francisco,
Salinas, Monterey, Los Angeles, San Diego and EI Centro all had Japanese enclaves and their
commercial interests were estimated at the time to be worth from $55 million to $75 million.
Estimates of uncompensated Japanese losses from relocation are between $1.2 billion and $3.1 billion.
This estimate is in 1942 doUars. Adjusted for inflation it would be much more. See also William
Robinson, "Outcast Americans" The American Magazine, April I, 1942, transcribed by WRA,
JARCRlCU, Box II, File 23, page I. Although much scholarly attention has been directed at working
class Japanese Americans in the agricultural sector, and urban entrepreneurs and blue collar workers,
Japanese professionals were also caught in the dragnet. Robinson points out the plight of a promineut
San Francisco Surgeon, given 48 hours to wind up his affairs and report to the assembly center.
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the area, Anson argued, the West Coast Japanese could do tremendous mischief in
support of the attacking army, including such acts as blowing up bridges, disrupting
traffic and sabotaging defense sites.
Anson was more candid about the association's motives in a subsequent
interview. "We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons." He
told the Saturday Evening Post, "We might as well be honest. We do. It's a question
of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man ... And we
don't want them back when the war ends, either."s In the spring of 1942, the Salinas
Vegetable Grower-Shipper Association published a brochure entitled, No Japs
Needed, to counter the impression that the country would go hungry without the
Japanese farmers. With the brochure, the grower-shipper association sought to instill
confidence in the public, that things would be fine without a few bothersome, and
probably disloyal Japanese. The brochure pointed out to the nation that, "Only four
and a half per cent of all the vegetables grown in the United States are produced by
California Japanese ... If all vegetable acreage produced, controlled or influenced by
Japanese were completely eliminated, the loss in available fresh food supply to the
United States and Canada would be insignificant.?"
In the hostile, reactionary environment following Pearl Harbor, it was almost
impossible to find a government official, elected or appointed, or anyone for that
matter, particularly in the media, with a good word to say about individuals of
Japanese descent. Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, law
'Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," The Saturday Evening Post, 7.
6 Ibid, 8.
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enforcement and military agencies arrested West Coast Japanese aliens and Japanese
Americans considered suspicious. The arrests continued, terrorizing the Japanese
community. In a meeting of Califomia law enforcement officers in Sacramento
during the first week in February of 1942, a high official made the statement,
apparently in all seriousness, that he favored shooting all Japanese residents of the
state on sight," Debate regarding what to do with the West Coast Japanese swirled
throughout the nation, including at the highest levels of government.
On the West Coast, immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army headquartered
in San Francisco, lobbied for some kind of exclusion of alien enemies. DeWitt
became head of the Western Defense Command (WDC) when the West Coast was
designated a Theater of Operations, just days after Pearl Harbor. He had the ear of a
most important ally in the federal government, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. It was Stimson who convinced President
Roosevelt of the military necessity of Japanese relocation.
The entire population of West Coast Japanese would be excluded and
evacuated from their homes in the soon-to-be prescribed military area. A comparison
is often made with Hawaii, which was obviously more vulnerable to attack than the
mainland, and where Japanese outnumbered the white population. If ever there were
a strong case for military necessity, it was Hawaii. Yet no mass relocation of people
of Japanese ancestry was undertaken. However, the situation in Hawaii was quite
7Alice Yang Murry, "The Decision for Mass Evacuation," in What Did the Internment of Japanese
Americans Mean?, Murray, ed, (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000), 50.
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different from the West Coast. Hawaii was not permeated with the same virulent
anti-Asian racism as the West Coast/' As historian Wendy Ng pointed out in her
2002 volume, Japanese American Internment During World War II, "Japanese labor
was needed to rebuild the damaged facilities. If the Japanese were removed, they
would have to be replaced by and equivalent skilled labor force from the mainland.t"
The economy of Hawaii, including, importantly, military industry, would have been
severally crippled by evacuation of the Japanese population.!" Ironically, by contrast,
the economic considerations that helped save the Hawaiian Japanese from
evacuation helped seal the fate of West Coast Japanese with the opposite effect.
John L. DeWitt believed strongly that Japanese living on the West Coast had
not severed cultural ties with Japan. Furthermore, he saw the war with Japan as a
race war. Inhis final recommendation to the Secretary of War, we get an insight into
his mindset. He wrote to Stimson on February 14, 1942:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by
migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and
third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have become "Americanized", the racial strains are
undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white
parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese
subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the
nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this
struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from
assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United
States, will not tum against this nation when the final test ofloyalty comes. It
therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential
• Gary Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii. 1865-1945 (philadelphia:
temple University Press, 1991). Okihiro also points out that the commanding officer in Hawaii
General Delos Emmons held a more rational and less negative view of the Japanese on the islands
than DeWitt's view of West Coast Japanese.
• Wendy Ng, Japanese American Internment During World War 11(London: Greenwood Press, 2002),
25.
10 Brian M. Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 38.
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enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that
these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity.
De Witt concluded with a statement with the following, seemingly paranoid,
supposition: "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing
and confirming indication that such action will take place. "II
DeWitt had like-minded military allies in Provost Marshal General (pMG)
Major General Allen W. Gullion, the army's top legal-affairs officer, and Gullion's
chief of the Aliens Division of the PMG's office, Major Karl R. Bendetsen. During
the two month debate, DeWitt vacillated at times, regarding relocation, depending
upon the direction of the political wind, but with his important allies in Washington,
his draconian view carried the day. 12
Military necessity espoused by DeWitt, Gullion, Bendetsen and the media,
justified the mass forced relocation of West Coast Japanese. In the panicked
atmosphere after Pearl Harbor, certainly many believed there was an urgent military
necessity. Fear of Japanese sabotage and latent racism fused with the economic
interests and overt racism of groups such as the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper
Association.
Roosevelt's Executive Order #9066 represented the end of the debate over
what to do with the West Coast Japanese. On February 20,1942, Secretary of War
11 DeWitt, Final Report. 34.
12 Peter Irons, Justice At War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases, (Berkeley:
University of Cali fomi a Press: 1993),25-47. Bendetson was assigned to DeWitt's staff, and he would
subsequently oversee the nuts and bolts operation of rounding up West Coast Japanese and putting
them in assembly camps, and later more permanent relocation camps. He also is credited with
choosing the sights of the relocation camps. The job would win Bendetson the rank of colonel. Until
his death in 1989 Karl R. Bendetson staunchly defended the relocation of West Coast Japanese as
totally justified and proper. See his testimony before the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) as a good example of his unrepentant attitude.
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Stimson sent a letter to General De Witt authorizing him, "as Military Commander to
carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order (#9066) ...
Accordingly I designate you to prescribe military areas for the protection of vital
installations against sabotage and espionage."
For the next ten days DeWitt busied himself putting together his staff and
discussing plans for an expedient relocation. Historian Roger Daniels writes that
DeWitt was confused and disorganized, and thus took no action for ten days after
receiving the mandate from Secretary of War Stimson." Daniels's assertion is not
born out by the documentary evidence. DeWitt was, if nothing else, a logistics expert.
In hindsight, he is a totally unsympathetic character. He was a racist. He was a
pivotal player in one of the greatest travesties in American history. He was not,
however, confused or disorganized. The record shows, it was not until March 2, 1942,
in another letter from Stimson, that DeWitt was allocated funds to move on his plan.
The Secretary of War wrote, "You are also authorized to employ the service of any
association, firm, company, or corporation in furtherance of your mission ...In order
to remove any doubt as to your authority to obligate funds, I specifically authorize
you to obligate funds in such amounts as you deem necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Executive Order.,,14 DeWitt had the mandate, and finally the money.
He did not wait for another day to pass.
On March 2,1942, he issued Proclamation No. I, establishing prohibited and
restricted zones in roughly the western half of Oregon, Washington, and California,
13 Rodger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial, 51.
14 Letter, Henry L. Stimson to Joim L. DeWitt, March 10, 1942, reproduced in Final Report, 32.
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an area designated as Military Area Nos. 1 and 2.1S From March 2 onward the
dragnet, which would snare almost all the Japanese living on the West Coast, moved
with amazing speed. DeWitt first sent military detachments to mark the restricted
territory: "in order to insure proper public notice of the location and extent of each
area, zone signs were posted at every entrance to each of them". 16
In truth, March 1942 was a time when fear and panic gripped the Japanese
community. Inhis final report, General DeWitt called this period "Voluntary
Evacuation, Phase 1 of the program.,,17 During this period, West Coast Japanese
could voluntarily leave the military area. Many families made hasty plans, sold their
holdings for pennies on the dollar and loaded whatever conveyances they had and
headed east. This strange and sad migration was, for the most part, a terrible failure
doomed from the start, and an episode the West Coast Japanese would never forget.
Some people, mostly those with friends or family established inland, found
sanctuary." The great majority, however, were met with cruel hostility when they
traveled east. When Japanese pilgrims tried to stop at service businesses, such as
grocery stores, restaurants, gas stations, and motels, they were met with ugly racial
epithets, in the form of strategically placed signs, and verbal abuse. Signs were
simple, not very creative and to the point: "We don't serve Japs," "No gas for Japs,"
and "Move on Tojo." Often Japanese daring to stop were sent off at gun point.
l' John L. DeWitt, "Proclamation No. I," On March 2,1942, reproduced in Final Report, 32.
" Ibid.
17 Ibid, 44.
1. Robert C. Sims, "The 'Free Zone': Nikkei, Japanese Americans in Idaho and Eastern Oregon in
World War II, in Nikkei In The Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in
the Twentieth Century, Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, eds, (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 2004), 236.
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Antagonism toward Japanese migrants also took official forms. Hostility
often manifested itself in the form of highway patrol officers putting up road blocks
at the border of their respective states instructing Japanese travelers to turn around.
They were literally forced to return to the West Coast to await their fate. The
traumatized bitter travelers then recounted their stories to friends and family of
frightening encounters with hakujin (whites) to the east.19
DeWitt sununed up the voluntary evacuation period by writing, "The
program met with measurable success .... However, the attitude of the interior states
was hostile ... Incidents developed with increasing intensity .... By proclamation No.
4 dated March 27, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to remain
within Military Area No.1 and were not permitted to change their places of
residence .... It was stimulated essentially by reason of the need for protecting the
evacuees themselves. ,,20 Proclamation No.4 ended the voluntary evacuation.
DeWitt never had much faith in voluntary evacuation, and the general used
the month of March to plan the forced migration which he felt was inevitable. The
plan evolved into a two-part evacuation. First, evacuees would be herded into fifteen
hastily improvised and constructed "Assembly Centers," typically at race tracks and
19 Jim Marshall, "The Problem People," Colliers, April I, 1942, transcribed by WRA, JARCRlCU,
Box II, File 23. Marshall's article for Collier's points out that the most notable exception 10the
hostility faced by West Coast Japanese was in Colorado which had a sizable Japanese population of
around seven thousand before WWII. Governor Ralph Carr offered to take in Japanese escaping the
West Coast. Almost two thousand West Coast Japanese made their way to Colorado and spent the
duration of WWII in freedom. Ironically Governor Carr ran for Congress in the fall of 1942, and was
defeated by Edward C. Johnson who ran a campaign stressing that Colorado should not become the
dumping ground for the Pacific Coast states.
20 DeWitt, Final Report, 43, 44. In subsequent years many have wondered why the Japanese
popolation submitted peacefully to relocation. The most important factor is; they believed relocation
was being carried out for their protection.
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fair grounds near their homes." In conjunction with the assembly center period,
DeWitt and a team headed by his right hand man Major Carl Bendetson, began to
consider possible sites for permanent "Relocation Centers."
The formation of a new government agency, the War Relocation Authority
(WRA), coincided with Proclamation No.4. The WRA was formally created by
President Roosevelt on March 18, 1942, with Executive Order 9102.22 Although
there was a difference of opinion as to the extent of the role of the military in the
permanent centers, the exigencies of the war effort led DeWitt and Secretary of War
Stimson to conclude that the day-to-day administration of the permanent centers
should be carried out by a civilian (assumed to be Caucasian) authority.23
The President concurred with this assessment, and relocation plans were
quickly underway. Accordingly, a military presence would be maintained at all ten
permanent centers, but its function would be limited to guarding the evacuees and
monitoring proper documentation of those leaving or entering the centers. All
movement of the Japanese would be controlled, with the army available at a
moment's notice if summoned by the WRA administration.
Roosevelt appointed Milton S. Eisenhower as the first director of the War
Relocation Authority. Eisenhower, brother of the future president, was a relatively
21 Ibid, 151. Of the fifteen Assembly Centers there were three exceptions to the use of either race
tracks or fairgrounds. Interestingly in Portland the Pacific International Live Stock Exposition was
turned into an Assembly Center, where ply-wood was hastily thrown over poorly cleaned dirt floors
of live stock pens. Through the summer of 1942 the Japanese lived in these atrocious conditions.
22 Ibid, 219.
23 Ibid, 237. DeWitt wrote in his final report: "Obviously the evacuation would lead to the creation of
long-range social and economic problems. These problems were essentialIy non-military in nature and
it was considered unwise to require the military establishment to exert its energies in that direction but
rather too conserve them for the aspects of the war effort intensely related to the defeat of the enemy."
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young bureaucrat from the Department of Agriculture. An extremely liberal New
Dealer, Eisenhower took a progressive view of the West Coast Japanese situation,
envisioning a minimum of stress and restraint on the Japanese in the permanent
centers, followed by prompt relocation to civilian communities inland. Accordingly,
one of Eisenhower's first acts as head of the WRA was to call a meeting in Salt Lake
City during the first week of April 1942 to present the early stages of his plan for the
permanent centers to the governors of inland western states.
Eisenhower proposed self-government for the centers with only minimal
influence from the WRA staff, and relative freedom of movement for the Japanese
around the areas where the centers would be located. He outlined the wage scale
proposed for the work done by the evacuees, and the types of work they would be
encouraged to undertake. Inside the relocation centers they would pursue public
works, such as reclamation, agriculture, and manufacturing. Outside the centers there
would be the opportunity for private employment, and self-supporting communities
could be set up outside the centers to provide work for the evacuees."
The western governors attending the meeting met these proposals with a
hostility that shocked Eisenhower. Herbert B. Maw of Utah, Chase Clark of Idaho,
and Nels Smith of Wyoming each took a turn ridiculing Eisenhower's plan.2s The
bottom line for the governors was simple: if West Coast Japanese were to be moved
'" Roger Daniels, "Western Reaction to the Relocated Japaoese Americans: The Case of Wyoming,"
in Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H. L.
Kitano, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington, 1991), 113-115.
25 Eric L. Muller, "The Minidoka Draft Resisters in a Federal Kangaroo Court," in Nikkei In The
Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans And Japanese Canadians In The Twentieth Century, Louis
Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, eds. (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2005), 177.
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to their states they should be put in concentration camps under close confinement
and armed guard. Above all, the Governors wanted assurances that after the war the
Japanese would not be allowed to stay in the areas of the respective concentration
camps, that they would be moved out, in other words, just as they were to be moved
in. Thoroughly disillusioned with the governors' intransigence, Eisenhower
subsequently moved his staff to San Francisco where they could work closely with
the Anny.26
Inhis final report on Japanese evacuation, DeWitt mentioned one noteworthy
aspect of the Salt Lake City meeting. "A large group of sugar beet growers and sugar
refiners were present at the conference, and shortly thereafter a crystallized program
emerged," DeWitt wrote. The general added, "although most of the governors
present at the conference indicated that they would permit no evacuee labor to enter
their respective states, a complete change of heart soon became evident in that
suitable arrangements were executed in writing covering the use of group evacuee
labor parties in the sugar beet fields. ,,27 Inother words, DeWitt and the governors
agreed that Japanese internees would be allowed to leave the camps to work for
private sugar beet and other farmers in the interior west.
In subsequent months, the army and the WRA worked together on the
selection of sites for the permanent centers. This vast logistical puzzle was carried
out by the army with efficiency and enthusiasm. The military was also responsible
26 Hayashi, Democratizing The Enemy, 108.
27 DeWitt, Final Report 244.
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for the original provisioning of the relocation centers." By June 1, 1942, virtually
every Japanese person living on the West Coast was in a temporary assembly
center.29
The army and the WRA compiled and sifted through a list of prospective
sites for permanent centers. They chose, in the words of historian Roger Daniels,
"godforsaken places where no one has lived before or since.,,3o From Poston in the
Arizona desert, to Heart Mountain in arid Wyoming, the relocation camps were
virtually identical: differing only in size, they were uniformly bleak and Spartan. The
center at Tule Lake, situated in a windswept corner of Northern California was no
exception, and internees were forced to live in poorly-constructed barracks that
offered little shelter from the area's unforgiving climate. Unlike any other camps
however, Tule Lake was located in an immensely fertile agricultural region. With
wartime prices for foodstuffs soaring and overseeing a readily-available pool of
'" DeWitt, Final Report. 239. The "Memorandum of Agreement Between the War Department and
WRA" dated April 17, 1942, states: "The acquisition of sites for Relocation Centers is a War
Department function Construction of initial facilities at Relocation Centers will be accomplished by
the War Department The War Department will procure and supply the initial equipment of the
Relocation Centers, vis., kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack equipment, hospital
equipment and ten days' supply of non-perishable subsistence based on the date on which the WRA
initiates the operation ofany Relocation Center."
29 Carey McWilliams, "Moving the West-Coast Japanese," Harpers Magazine, September 1942,
transcribed by WRA, JARCR/CU, Box 11, file 33. McWilliams visited the Santa Anita Assembly
Center on June 25'" 1942. His observations are fascinating, "When 1 visited the center it had a
population of 18,562." "The occupants of Santa Anita consume 70,000 pounds offood a day." "The
center boasts of a one-hundred-and-fifty bed hospital, staffed by Japanese doctors, nurses, and
attendants. Some twenty-one babies have been born in the camp, the first, Katherine Anita, being the
daughter ofDr.Mitonori Kimura, a distinguished scholar, whose attainments are chronicled in the
British Dictionary ofNationaI Biography." McWilliams was an outspoken advocate for immigrant
rights in the years leading up to WWII, and he states in this article that "I was opposed to mass
evacuation." However, mirroring the prevailing attitude of the era, the general tone of the article
becomes conciliatory to the military necessity theory, and the humane manor in which it was being
carried out.
30 Roger Daniels, Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective. The History
Teacher, Vol 35, No.3. (May, 2002), 297-310.
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captive labor, the WRA quickly recognized a unique potential at Tule Lake for large-
scale commercial agricultural production.
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Chapter 2
Dollar Patriotism and Beet Culture
"Dollar patriotism" is a term which came into use shortly after Pearl Harbor.
It inferred that an individual or group was hiding its profit motive behind a guise of
patriotism. This chapter tells the story of how one man's dollar patriotism intersected
with beet culture and brought thousands of West Coast Japanese to Tule Lake the
largest of the ten relocation centers.
Tulelake, California, was an agricultura1 community located roughly 200
miles inland in north-central California near the Oregon border. In 1941, Tulelake
had a population of roughly 1,000 much the same as today, give or take a few dozen.
Klamath Falls, Oregon, located approximately thirty miles to the northwest, was a
small city of approximately 10,000 in 1941, and the nearest population center to the
small agricultural communities of Malin and Merrill, Oregon, and Tulelake,
California, clustered in a triangle in the southern comer of the huge valley known as
the Klamath Basin. As its name implies, Tulelake sits on the former bed of Tule
Lake.
Like much of the American West, the Klamath Basin is to a great extent a
creation of the federal government. On June 17, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt
signed into law the Newlands Reclamation Act. This law, authored by Nevada
Congressman Francis G. Newlands, would have a profound effect on the arid west in
general and the Klamath Basin in particular, since the law provided for funds from
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the sale of federal lands to be held in an account for the purpose of creating irrigation
projects, and for land reclaimed from lakes and marshes under the provisions of the
Newlands Act to be opened to homesteading.' The Bureau of Reclamation began the
Klamath Reclamation project in 1905. Moving in stages over a period of thirty years,
the Reclamation Service built an intricate and amazingly efficient irrigation system,
bringing water to over 100,000 acres of farm land. Draining offTule Lake and
reclaiming the former lake bed for agriculture was an integral component of the
project.
As land was reclaimed, in accordance with the Newlands Act, it was opened
up to homesteading. By 1941, the Tule Lake division of the Klamath Project
consisted of approximately four hundred homesteads, on slightly over 25,000 acres
of reclaimed land.' Much of the land in the Klamath Reclamation Project is of
marginal quality, suitable only for forage crops such as alfalfa. The former lake
bottom of the Tule Lake division however, has been described as, "comparable in
richness to that of the Nile Valley.,,3 This idyllic agrarian corner of Northern
California and Southern Oregon was teaming with resentment and protest in the
spring of 1942.
In April of 1942, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) sent one of its best
troubleshooters, Senior Information Specialist George D. Dean, to the Klamath Basin,
I Gerald Nash., The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West. (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1999), 146.
2 George D. Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese
Reception Center near Tulelake, California" WRA, April 20, 1942.
3 Stan Turner, The Years of Harvest: A History of the Tule Lake Basin, (Eugene, Spencer Creek press
1987), 179.
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to investigate vehement protests to a proposed Japanese relocation center. Dean
spent only a few days in the Klamath Basin but he got to the crux of the situation
with great efficiency. In describing the people of the basin, Dean wrote:
They are sincere, hard-working, hard-drinking people. Sales of liquor in
adjacent Klamath County, Oregon, through state liquor stores are second in
the state only to those in Multnomah County, which includes Portland. Many
carry rifles constantly in the back of their automobiles to shoot jackrabbits or
ducks which abound in the area, or, as they frankly admit, to take care of any
emergency that might arise. They are exceedingly proud people, proud of
their homes and farms which are notably well kept, and particularly proud
that this is a 'white man's country.'
Dean was especially impressed by the support locals gave to the war effort. He
continued:
These people, too, are intensely patriotic, vitally aware America is at war.
They claim to have a larger proportion of the eligible population in the armed
forces than any other selective service district in the United States. This I
could not verify, but young men were conspicuous by their absence.
Being surrounded on all sides by mountains, they naturally are somewhat
provincial in their thinking. Nevertheless, on the whole they are a reasonably
intelligent people, talk straight from the shoulder, trust those who do likewise
and distrust brass hats, big shots and brain trusters."
Despite the patriotic bent that characterized the basin, Dean ferreted out a
huge source of resentment in the Tulelake area, associated with the establishment of
the reception center, which he described as "beet culture". The locals believed that
big Central California sugar beet interests were responsible for bringing the
unwanted Japanese Americans to the area as a source of cheap labor.
The Klamath Basin is potato and barley country. By the early 1940's,
Klamath Basin potatoes were famous in the principal cities of the West Coast for
their quality and versatility for baking, boiling, or frying. Potatoes produced by far
4 Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese Reception Center
near Tulelake, California," 4, 5.
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the most income of agricultural products in the area, and continue to do so to this day.
The 4200 foot elevation of the basin makes for warm days and cool nights during the
short growing season. Provided there are no killer frosts, always a possibility in the
Klamath Basin, the climate is perfect for spuds.
Barley was the principal grain crop in the Klamath Basin. The area is noted
for producing excellent brew barley with low protein content, the type of barley
prized in the brewing industry, which commands top prices. Most basin farmers
followed a simple two crop rotation pattern in their fields: potatoes one year and
barley the next. By the spring of 1941, this pattern had been followed in the Klamath
Basin for more than twenty years, and it proved especially successful in the rich
black soil of the former lake bed.
In the late 1930s, the Spreckels Sugar Company of Woodland, California,
hired Clark Fensler, a local homesteader and entrepreneur as a liaison to coordinate
experimental plantings of sugar beets in the Klamath Basin, and equally importantly,
to promote beets in the basin.' A World War I veteran, Fensler had come to the
Klamath Basin in 1928 from the Eugene, Oregon, area. In 1930, he registered in the
fifth homestead allotment for reclaimed lands of Tule Lake. With only twenty-four
farm units offered and 162 individuals making application, Fensler was one of the
lucky winners."
By 1941, Clark Fensler had become one of the most influential citizens in the
area. He was a sharp dresser, a wheeler dealer who hired out all the labor on his farm,
5 Ibid, 6.
6 Interview with Dick Fensler, Tulelake California, February 11,2007.
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drove the local school bus, and led the local American Legion chapter in parades. In
a recent interview, Dick Fensler recalled his father, "In 1938, Spreckels Sugar hired
my Dad as a 'field man.' His job was to drum up enthusiasm for growing beets, and
get some local growers to experiment with growing them in the basin, and oversee
the whole process. He also grew a few acres on our homestead, and I got stuck
working in the damn things.'"
The first trials of sugar beets in the Klamath Basin were very successful.
Both the sugar content and yield-per-acre of the basin beets were much better than
traditional beet growing areas of Califomia, Utah, Colorado and Idaho.8 The local
growers encountered difficulties however, overcoming a severe shortage of workers
willing to put in long hours in the beet fields. Dick Fensler recalled:
The problem with beets was finding labor to do the back-breaking work in
the field. In those days everything with beets was done by hand. Planting the
beets, thinning the beets, toping the beets before digging them. Then digging
them by hand and loading them on trucks. Everything done by hand. And it
took skill too, you had to know what you were doing. You could never get
enough good people to work in the beets. I was a pretty good specimen when
I was young. I had a scholarship to play football at Oregon State before the
war changed everyone's plans, but I wasn't tough enough to work in those
damn beets, not all day every day. Man, beets were back-breaking work."
Despite constant labor concerns, sugar beets proved to be profitable and plantings
increased. In the 1941 growing season, 984 acres of beets were harvested in the
Basin, still a very low acreage compared to roughly 15,000 acres of potatoes, but
nevertheless leading farmers in the area to conclude that sugar beets might
7 Ibid.
• Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in TuleLake Area to Japanese Reception Center
near Tulelake, California," 6.
9 Interview with Dick Fensler.
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eventually take over as the main crop in the Klamath Basin. Indeed, Spreckels Sugar
Company had plans for 2000 acres of beets in 1942, and indicated that if plantings
continued to increase, a refinery could be in the future for the Klamath Basin. Then
came the events of December 7,1941, and, as Dick Fensler put it, "everyone's plans
changed."
Following the U.S. declaration of war on the Axis powers, Dick Fensler and
his brothers were joined by young men from allover the country who answered their
nation's call. As a result rural America was faced with the prospect of a serious labor
shortage, compounded by the fact that good jobs quickly began to open up in defense
industries all along the West Coast. Suddenly, migrant workers who traditionally
followed the crops had job opportunities previously unimagined, making twice as
much money in one day than they could in a week of farmlabor.
As the spring planting season approached, Spreckels weighed its options.
Recognizing that sugar would be a vital food source for the war effort, Spreckels
estimated that the price of sugar would soar. The labor problem in the beet fields
however, was now magnified. Accordingly, during the first week in April 1942--
about the same time Milton Eisenhower was meeting in Salt Lake City with Western
Governors-- Clark Fensler traveled to San Francisco in his capacity of liaison for the
Spreckels Sugar Company. The smooth talking, enthusiastic World War I veteran
was able to get a meeting with another World War I veteran, Lieutenant General
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John L. DeWitt.1O Fensler pitched the merits of the Tulelake area for a prospective
relocation camp, including the availability of Bureau of Reclamation land. Although
the documentary record of this meeting is sparse, it is clear that he made a favorable
impression on the general and his staff who were looking for camp sites. Indeed,
Fensler hurried back home and called a meeting of beet growers and all those
interested, and announced that he had spoken to General De Witt and there was a
strong possibility of getting a camp in the area. He pointed out the imminent labor
shortage ahead, and stated that Japanese from the camp would be available for work
in the fields.
Not one to mince words, Fensler suggested that the group should adopt a
resolution favoring the project. The reaction of the group to the suggestion of a
Japanese interument camp in the area was, however, decidedly negative. Fensler's
hastily called meeting turned into a tense question and answer session. Homesteaders
fired questions at Fensler which he could not answer to their satisfaction. Caught off
guard, Fensler was put on the defensive by those in attendance who wanted to know
how many Japanese he was hoping to bring into the area. In fact, Fensler had no idea
as to the massive migration his proposal to the Western Defense Command had set in
motion, and he fumbled an arbitrary number of three to four hundred. Additional
concerns were raised: "How would they be guarded?" "Would they be permitted to
roam at will in the community?" "Would they work side by side with white
laborers?" "Would they be allowed to go into Tulelake and get 'liquored up'?
10. Dean, "Report on Attitude of Cuizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese Reception
Center near Tulelake, California," 8. Basin beets had to be hauled to the Woodland refinery, thus
cutting into the profit oflocal growers.
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"Would they be allowed to stay on and be eligible to apply for homesteads after the
war?" Backpedaling, Fensler promised that in a few days he would have an Army
officer in Tulelake to explain what a camp would entail.!'
News of a possible Japanese Reception Center and the true number of
Japanese a camp would involve quickly spread across the Klamath Basin. The
reaction to the idea of a large number of Japanese being forced upon the basin was
unanimously negative. Although word had leaked that the WRA was considering
commandeering Bureau Of Reclamation land ordinarily leased to local farmers for
the use of Japanese internees, no federal agency issued a statement regarding their
plans and inquiries elicited a reply of 'no comment' from the Army, the Klamath
Reclamation Project, and the WRA.
On April 11, 1942, a group of civic organizations including the local chapter
of the American Legion, and the chambers of commerce of Tulelake, Malin, Merrill,
and Klamath Falls held a joint meeting in Tulelake to discuss possible protest action.
The result was a resolution drafted to Western Defense Commander General John L.
DeWitt. "The resolution as ordered by the group Monday noon will point out that the
Tule Lake basin was settled by whites and has no orientals or negroes among its
residents," the Klamath Falls Herald and News reported. "It will voice the desire to
maintain the present character of the population. They also pointed out that
American-born Japs would be more apt to remain in the basin after the war.,,12
II Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lalee Area to Japanese Reception Center
near Tulelake, California," 8.
12 "Tulelake Chamber Draws Resolution in Opposition to Jap Evacuation Center," Herald and News.
April13, 1942.
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The final paragraph of the resolution requested that a substitute camp site be
established in a place known as the Madalin Plains, an area ninety miles south of
Tulelake. Truly in the middle of nowhere, the Madalin Plains would have fit the
pattern of the other relocation camps. General DeWitt however, had made up his
mind. There would be a relocation camp at Tule Lake. Local protest was to be
expected.
The Tulelake Chamber of Commerce petitioned their Congressman Harry L.
Englebright. Englebright passed on his constituents' protests to Secretary of War
Stimson who responded to the congressman by stating the position of the federal
govermnent in no uncertain terms. "The establishment of such projects will always
be the subject of well meaning objection wherever located," Stimson wrote. "Our
experience has shown that so rarely has any local group approved of the
establishment of the centers that it is impracticable and unwise to seek approval ...
In the National interest it is essential that relocation go forward without de1ay.,,13In
any case, by the time Englebright's protests reached Stimson on it was already much
too late.
Residents of the Klamath Basin had lost their brief attempt to thwart the
govermnent's intention to put a relocation center in the area. On April 17, 1942, an
article appeared in the Klamath Falls Herald and News, "The Tulelake Japanese
reception camp became an actuality Friday moming when purchasing agents visited
various wholesale lumber dealers in Klamath Falls and bought 100,000 feet of
13 Official correspondence, from Secretary of War Stimson, to California Congressman Harry L.
Englebright May 11, 1942, Reprinted in, Years of Harvest: A History of the Tule Lake Basin, (Engene:
Spencer Creek Press 1987) 256.
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lumber for immediate delivery to the campsite.v'" Not until the next day, after the
lumber purchase, did the federal government affirm that there would be a Japanese
relocation camp near the town of Tulelake. In a United Press dispatch, General
DeWitt officially announced what had become obvious, and that construction would
begin immediately. IS
Many people of the Klamath Basin felt the federal government had shown
them no respect. An editorial oil April 19 in the Herald and News addressed the
government's reticence to admit their intentions. "Reasons for official reluctance to
announce the Japanese camp at Tule Lake are not clear," the paper asserted. "In the
past week, there have been so many developments in evidence here that knowledge
of the general camp plans became public property, but still the various governmental
agencies which might give the official word kept mum." The Herald concluded with
the observation that, "It has evidently been decided that the location's desirable
features offset the objections raised here. Let's accept the decision in good spirit and
do our part. 16
Meanwhile, the government's plans for a relocation center moved quickly.
The sub-heading to The Herald and News article of April 18, confmning the
construction of the camp, read, "8000 Acres of Government Land Set For 10,000
Evacuees." Many homesteaders and other farmers in the area had leases on the
Bureau of Reclamation land which was now to be part of the relocation complex.
14 "Tule Lake Jap Camp Started: Lumber For First Unit Bought Here," Herald and News April 17,
1942.
I> "Jap Camp Building Starts As Anny Confirms Project," The Klamath News, April 18, 1942.
rs Editorial, Klamath Falls, Herald and News, April 19, 1942.
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"My uncle was one of the ones who had a lease on 140 acres in that area," remarks
Frances Frey, a lifelong resident of Tulelake. "He had arranged for financing and had
even paid for the lease when they took it away from him for the camp. It was a real
hardship to all the farmers in the area who lost their leases for the camp. And they
were damn mad. All that prime land just handed to the Japanese.v'"
At the time the government confirmed plans to put the center at Tule Lake,
local residents were certain the big sugar interests headed by Clark Fensler had "sold
the Army a bill of goods in order to get cheap labor into the district at the expense of
other settlers.,,18 General DeWitt and the former Agriculture Department
functionaries in the WRA had different plans for Tule Lake. DeWitt realized that a
camp at Tule Lake could be a huge contributor of fresh vegetables, not just for Tule
Lake, but for all the relocation camps. With convenient railroad connections
bordering the camp site, the set up was perfect for shipping fresh produce to all the
camps of the west. 19
The question of Japanese labor in the sugar beet fields which had caused such
a local outcry when suggested by Clark Fensler the first week of April 1942, was
made moot by General DeWitt. Early in the sununerof 1942, DeWitt declared that
there would be no outside employment of evacuees inside military zone 1. Evacuees
in the Tule Lake Camp could apply for a permit to travel inland to work in the sugar
beet and other fields in the interior west. However, since the center was within
17 Interview with Frances Frey, February 12,2007, Tulelake California.
18 Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese Reception Center
near Tulelake, California," 9.
19 DeWitt, Final Report, 263,264. In his final report DeWitt wrote: "there are approximately 7,400
acres in the tract. It is extremely fertile and raises bumper crops of garden vegetables."
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military zone 1 there would be no employment of evacuees in the fields around Tule
Lake.2o
DeWitt demanded that any work done by evacuees outside the center, such
as loading agricultural products at railheads, be accompanied by a special permit
issued by the Western Defense Command. Such permits, the general wrote, "must be
essential to the operation of the projects and involve meeting a current emergency.
Military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence of evacuees
from the area in which the work is to be performed.t''" Sugar beet fields immediately
disappeared from the Klamath Basin, and did not reappear for decades.
Because of the short growing season of the Klamath Basin, the general
assumption might have been that there would not be time for the Japanese evacuees
to grow crops in the 1942 season. However, given the quality and quantity of the
land, and the reputed expertise of the huge number of Japanese agriculturists soon to
be pouring into the camp, DeWitt and his staff were determined to recoup some
profit from the fertile soil of Tule Lake in the 1942 season. Regardless of success or
failure of vegetable crops in the first year, prospects seemed bright for vegetable
production, especially potatoes, in the subsequent years of the war.
At first glance it would seem that Clark Fensler's dollar patriotism had failed.
He lobbied the Western Defense Command to bring the camp to Tule Lake on behalf
of his employer Spreckels Sugar Company, to obtain skilled cheap labor. Now there
would be an immense camp at Tule Lake. Yet there would be no evacuee labor
20 Ibid, 242, 243.
21 DeWitt, Final Report, 243.
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outside the fields set aside exclusively for the camp. Moreover, Fensler's efforts had
led to an outcry of protest throughout the basin which was totally ignored by the
WRA and the Army. He was the subject of great resentment among the locals, and
his influence surely must have been at an all-time low. Right?
Wrong! It was time for a payoff, and Clark Fensler landed very much on his
feet. The April 18, 1942 article in the Herald and News in which General DeWitt
finally announced the construction of the camp, contained the sub-heading, "Fensler
Appointed." The article noted, "Clark G. Fensler, ex-service man and Tulelake
farmer, has been appointed third in command at the camp.,,22
Fenslers' appointment was purely ceremonial. He was not to have
responsibility for any of the day-to-day operation of the camp. He would show up for
photo opportunities and to glad-hand dignitaries visiting the camp, and he collected
his salary as a WRA employee. Fensler'sjob with Spreckels Sugar Company had
thus led him to a better job as a big shot in the huge Tule Lake Center, a post he
would hold until the camp closed. Many times over the next four years Clark Fensler
would be quoted by local newspapers on some aspect of the camp, and his picture
often appeared in the papers in conjunction with the camp. Clark Fensler was
responsible for bringing the Japanese Relocation Center to Tule Lake. He was
rewarded by the WRA with an important position. Dollar patriotism had paid off for
one Tulelake resident. Fensler was a big man with an easy smile. He was perfect for
public relations work, and resentment of Fensler soon subsided as locals resigned
22 "lap Camp Building Starts As Army Confirms Project," Herald and News, April 18, 1942.
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themselves to the reality of the camp. However, resentment of the camp, and the
West Coast Japanese evacuees, never subsided.
The locals in the South Valley were not surprised that Fensler was appointed
to an important post at the camp, regardless of the fact that he had no obvious skills
or experience which would render him qualified. "That's what we all predicted
would happen," George D. Dean quoted a local farmer as saying. "I guess it's okay if
he's got pull enough to swing it.',23
Construction of the camp got off to a terrible start. The third day on the job
camp engineers determined that the site selected was not suitable for the camp. Soil
condition and drainage were poor, and the site was moved approximately one and a
half miles to the northeast." The Army and the WRA wanted the camp completed in
one month, and already two days had been wasted.
Drawn by the prospect of instant employment at good wages, workers poured
into the area. A huge number of workers were required, and the work force on the
project ballooned to approximately 3,000 men at the height of construction. Local
farm workers, who could make twice as much hammering nails as they could
working in the fields, left their jobs with local farmers and went to work at the camp.
Plumbers and steamfitters, for instance, could make $198.42 per week if they worked
their full shift. As the Klamath Falls Evening Herald reported,
Gone to the Jap camp, has become the by-word with farmers in the south end
of the basin. Farm laborers are fading out of the spring seeding picture like
23 Dean, "Report on Attitude of Citizens and Officials in Tule Lake Area to Japanese Reception Center
near Tulelake, California," 10. Thinly veiled threats such as the one expressed by this anonymous
farmer were fortunately never carried out at Tule Lake.
24 "Jap Camp Moved to New Location," Evening Herald, April 21, 1942.
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fog before the sun. Potato sorting crews too are answering the call for help on
the government project and store managers are losing clerks. Farmers faced
with the necessity of irrigating land before seeding grain and potatoes are
running double shifts by themselves, chasing water night and day. Coupled
with the call to armed forces, defense work and federal projects, the drain on
farm labor in the basin is beginning to pinch.25
A windfall for workers was a hardship for most local farmers and business men,
fueling local resentment of the project.
The construction timeframe was staggering: one month to complete 1,200
units, each 100 feet long and 20 feet wide. Work soon reached a fever pitch, and in
late April a Herald and News headline read, "Jap Camp Construction Goes on 12-
Hour Day Schedule as Hurried Completion Sought." The article pointed out that
crews were already working eleven hour days and now would boost the already
frenzied pace by an extra hour a day.26 The workmen on the project may well have
deserved their pay packets. Spring in the Klamath Basin is in many ways the most
inhospitable season of the year, and many workmen from Southern California could
not take the cold wind which constantly blows from the southwest that time of year
in the Basin.27
Sprouting from the South Valley almost instantly, the camp consisted of one
and a half square miles of buildings, complete with WRA administration buildings,
civilian employees quarters, maintenance and warehouse buildings, a jail detention
25 "Jap Camp Causes Labor Shortage," Evening Herald, April 28, 1942.
26 "Jap Camp Construction Goes On 12 Hour a Day Schedule as Hurried Completion Sought,"
Klamath Falls Herald and News, April 30, 1942.
27 "Jap Camp Construction Goes on 12-hour Day ScheduJe as Hurried Completion Sought." Herald
and News, April 30, 1942. The Herald and News, article of April 30, staled that ''thus far
approximately 600 men have left the TuJe Lake job, most of them because of the heavy daily pressure
of II hours of steady work. Nearly 100 who quit the project were from southern California but found
the weather conditions too severe."
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center, fire hall, motor pool, hospital, and, of course, hundreds of barracks buildings
in the main compound for housing the Japanese internees." The main compound
consisted of seven wards, each divided into nine blocks. Each block held sixteen
barracks, a mess hall, recreation hall, men's and women's toilets showers and
laundry facilities.
The design of the camp was almost identical to that of the other relocation
centers. The barracks were the standard Army design. Each barracks building was
partitioned into five one-room apartments. One family would live in each of these
one-room habitations, with no running water and shared eating, toilet, shower, and
laundry facilities.
Astonishingly, on May 24 the camp was completed. "The possibility of
constructing over 1,000 buildings within 30 days' time was farfetched" opined the
Herald and News, "and yet, through perfect coordination of 3,000 men, including
engineers, administrative workers, carpenters and laborers, the job has been done. ,,29
Because the camp site was on Bureau of Reclamation land, the WRA and the Bureau
of Reclamation made the decision to name the site "Newell" in honor of the first
director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Frederick Haines Newell. The United States
Postal Service opened a branch there, and letters sent from the camp bore a "Newell"
cancellation stamp."
28 DeWitt, Final Report.266-277
29 "Tule Lake Project Amazing for Speed of Construction," Herald and News May 23, 1942.
3(J "Newell, Calif, New Address for Jap Camp Center," Herald and News. May 20, 1942.
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General DeWitt recorded 446 Japanese in residence at Tule Lake Relocation
Center on June 1, 1942.31 These first internees had arrived on May 27,1942, from
the Portland and Puyallup assembly centers to assist with readying the camp for the
mass of internees which would begin to arrive within the next few days. The
immense camp was impressive, but it was also bleak, barren, and spartan.
Surrounded by barbed wire fencing and guard towers, the area must have made a
sobering, even frightening first impression on the intemees when they disembarked
from their trains and busses.
Waiting to greet those first evacuees was acting Project Director Elmer
Shirrell. Shirrell had been on hand within a few days of the beginning of construction
of the camp, arriving in Tule Lake as a representative of the WRA on April 23,
1942.32 Shirrell was a graduate of the University of California. He was a veteran of
World War I, and, having served as head of the State Office of Veteran's Affairs, he
had experience in government bureaucracy. When he was hired by the WRA he was
working in the publishing business for Doubleday Doran & CO.33
The early months of the Tule Lake Camp were stamped by the influence of
Elmer Shirrell. Although many circumstances conspired to foment dissatisfaction at
31 DeWitt. Final Report. 375
32 The Tulean Dispatch. June 18, 1942. Shirrell had been appointed acting director of the camp; on
May 23, 1942, however, WRA director Milton Eisenhower named C. E. Ratchford project director.
This situation which must have rankled Shirrell, but it did not prevent him from performing his job
with great ability, compassion and evenhandedness. In a strange tum of events, C. E. Ratchford did
not make an appearance at TIlle Lake until June 18, weeks after the camp was established. Mr.
Ratchford declared that he found the project very interesting and "considering the progress that has
been made, I think it is grand." Rachford never assumed control of the camp from Shirrell. He only
stayed at Tule Lake for about a week and then he left the camp with a recommendation that Elmer
Shirrell be named permanent director, and disappeared into the WRA regional office in Denver.
Shirrell continued as acting project director until July 8, 1942, when he was named director by newly
~inted WRA National Director, Dillon S. Meyer.
3 The Tulean Dispatch. July 8, 1942.
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Tule Lake, very little negative sentiment has ever been expressed about Shirrell's
work. "His familiarity with the requirements of governmental bureaucracy, tempered
by church-engendered humanitarian concerns," recalled Dr. Harold Stanley Jacoby,
who worked under Shirrell at the Tule Lake camp as head of internal security,
"enabled him to give experienced administrative leadership to the project operations
without losing sight of the fact that we were dealing with people who were
hurting. ,,34
Shirrell greeted the first contingent of evacuees determined to work with
them to soften the impact of the bleak surroundings on the thousands of evacuees to
follow. Put simply, Shirrell insisted that arriving evacuees be treated with
friendliness and dignity. Starting on June 2, 1942, the main contingents of evacuees
began pouring into the Tule Lake Center. Through the months of June and July the
influx continued. By the first of July the population of Tule Lake was calculated at
9,040, and on August first it was an astonishing 15,023 persons.f
Working with the advance group, Elmer Shirrell set up an orderly system for
checking in evacuees. Each family was greeted by an evacuee from the advance
group, as they arrived. After a long and miserable journey, people were tired and
hungry. Accordingly, before they were assigned their quarters the new arrivals were
given breakfast. This simple courtesy is a good example of the management style of
34 Harold Stanley Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, (Grass Valley, CA: Comstock
Bonanza Press 1996), 19-20.
"DeWitt, Final Report, 375.
46
Elmer Shirrell, and not indicative of the typical relocation camp.36 Additionally, each
evacuee was given crude bedding consisting of an Army cot, straw filled mattress,
and wool blankets. The bleakness of the camp from the outside was intensified when
the evacuees saw the inside of their living quarters. The one-room apartments were
devoid of furniture. Not even the simplest of comforts were present; no chairs, no
tables, and only a single light bulb hanging on a cord from the ceiling. A coal heating
stove sat in the middle of the room. Bert Nakano, a young (Nisei,) a term used for
American born citizens of the United States, remembered his family's first day at
Tule Lake. "I'll never forget the sad expression on my mother's face when she first
set her eyes upon the barren tar-papered barracks ... the bare room with the pot-
bellied stove which would be our home for who knows how long. She tried her best
to hold us together as a family.,,3?
Notwithstanding the best humanitarian efforts of Elmer Shirrell, and the
goodwill of his staff and the first volunteer evacuees, a formula for resentment,
discord, tension, and controversy was built into the Tule Lake Relocation Center.
The great majority of evacuees who entered the camp in the first few weeks of June
were from the California assembly centers of Marysville, Sacramento, and Fresno.
Waiting to check them in were a volunteer staff from the Northwest, people the
Californians felt they had nothing in common with, and who had already taken the
36 Harold Stanley Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 22. See also The Tulean
Dispatch, July 8, 1942. In early May 1942, Shirrel1 spent about a week at Posten Relocation Center
Parker Arizona, which opened a few weeks before Tule Lake. Many of his ideas ahont how to treat
evacuees to lessen the impact of the camp came from observing mistakes made by WRA staff during
the opening of Posten.
37 John R. Ross and Reiko Ross, Second Kinenhi: Reflections on Tule Lake, (San Francisco, Tule Lake
Committee 2000), 33-38.
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choice housing and the best jobs, such as block managers, truck drivers, and clerical
workers.38 Hiroshi Kashiwagi remembered: "There was a block manager, who acted
as sort of a welcome committee and saw to it that we had bedding and all that. He
was a complete stranger, to us, he seemed a bit like authority. He would always be a
big boss there."
Although there was tension between Northwestern and California evacuees,
in several important aspects all evacuees who arrived in the first few weeks were
relatively fortunate. Not only were there still some good job opportunities, the early
arrivals got housing close to important facilities such as laundries, mess halls,
recreation halls, and toilets. Most importantly, the early arrivals found huge piles of
scrap lumber left over from the construction of the camp. During the first few weeks,
it was not difficult to find good lumber to build furniture, shelving and partitions to
make the extremely spartan housing much more comfortable. Indeed, during this
period, hundreds of evacuees poured over the piles of scrap lumber to find the most
satisfactory pieces. Using simple and limited tools, evacuees crafted an amazing
array of useful and handsome objects, making use of scrap lumber to produce
essential furnishings which became a source of pride and satisfaction for the
evacuees. Moreover, some of the work was so exceptional that it led to the first all
camp social function. When the quality of the furniture came to the attention of the
manager of the furniture department at Sears and Roebuck in Klamath Falls, he
convinced the giant department store to offer prizes for a display and contest of the
[mest woodwork of the evacuees.
"Ibid, 36.
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The first edition of the camp newspaper, The Tulean Dispatch, dated June 15,
1942, devoted the very first column to the woodwork display. According to the
Dispatch, the contest was a great success. The entries were classified into six
different divisions: tables, chairs, benches, chest of drawers, screens, and a
miscellaneous division. There was also a children's division. In an article on June 18,
The Tulean Dispatch published the names of the winners and summed up the event,
"this spectacular furniture exhibit that attracted the attention of virtually everyone in
the conununity and held them spell-bound with the beautiful pieces of furniture on
display. ,,39
Between June 18 and June 26, more than 4,000 evacuees arrived at the Tule
Lake Center from the Sacramento Assembly Center. Suddenly there was a shortage
of available scrap lumber. Coupled with the fact that the evacuees from the
Northwest had taken the best housing and jobs, the lack of good scrap lumber added
to the resentment of the latecomers. As the camp filled with internees, foraging for
scrap lumber became a full time occupation for many, especially unemployed
women. An editorial in The Tulean Dispatch admonished "colonists": "It is hard to
imagine that a group of Japanese people could be so selfish and so forgetful of their
dignity as they do in the lumber yard. But the scene is repeated day after day. It is
sickening to watch them 'go to town' like a pack ofwolves.''''o Project director
Shirrell finally limited access to the scrap-heaps to late afternoon and evenings, so
3. The Tulean Dispatch, June 18, 1942; Ibid, June 15, 1942.
'" Editorial Page, The Tulean Dispatch, July 8, 1942.
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that those with employment at the center, especially those working on the project
farm, would have an equal chance to forage.
Shirrell also promised that sufficient wood was on order for those who had no
partitions or scrap lumber to work with. Although Shirrell did put in the order on
June 25, and reordered on September 3, the promised lumber never arrived." If
residents wanted to buy lumber, however, there was no problem. Orders could be
placed with McCullum Lumber Company of Tulelake, and delivered directly to the
resident's "home.,,42 As the lumber dispute made evident, throughout the internment
experience, money, even just a little money, made life much more comfortable.
Similarly, residents at the Tule Lake Center could order goods from the
catalogs of retailers such as Sears and Wards. Simple items such as tobacco, candy
and soft drinks were available through camp stores, known as canteens. In light of
the fact that in 1942 a bottle of Coca-Cola and a Hershey Bar both cost five cents,
the volume of sales done in the canteens is staggering: residents spent between
$1,500 and $2,000 each day in the canteens.t' In fact, many Japanese Americans
dipped deeply into personal savings and some took out loans while in the camp."
41 The Tulean Dispatch noted on August 8, 1942, "an order for $15,000 worth of wall board and
lumber was placed four weeks ago and is expected to arrive any day." Adding insult to injury, on
October 5, 1942, the Dispatch pointed out that when and if lumber arrived it had to be used as
specified by the WRA.
4 The Tulean Dispatch, August 15, 1942.
43 Editorial, The Tulean Dispatch, July II, 1942. These estimates later proved to be much to low. An
August II article revealed that July canteeu sales totaled $74,000. The July II editorial also
admonished residents not to abuse the canteens by practices such as hoarding, reminding them the
canteen was for their convenience. They could have added huge profits as an equally important
function of the canteens.
44 "Preliminary Survey Of Resistances to Resettlement At The Tule Lake Relocation Center," WRA
Community Analysis Series No.9 June 23, 1943 JARCR/CU Box I, File 25.
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Despite the privations evacuees faced, area residents bitterly denounced the
Tuleans' consumption oflocal goods. Fitting into a pattern oflongstanding racially-
based animosity toward the internees, every time there was a shortage of a particular
product, some local would blame it on the Tule Lake Camp. In an August 1, 1942
letter to the editor of the Klamath Falls Herald and News, for example, a local
citizen bemoaned the lack of soda pop in local grocery stores, taverns, and
restaurants. "They all tell me the same story," he complained. "Two local bottlers
send the Japanese center at Tule Lake the pop and if and when there is any left the
Americans, who have been steady customers for years and years, get it.",15 The writer
concluded his bitter tirade with a dire prediction: "If this condition continues it will
wreck the people's morale that the Japs in this country get first choice and the rest of
us get' second choice.v"
To be sure, there was an element of truth in the complaints of the local
population, reflecting a simple matter oflogistics. When the West Coast Japanese
were rapidly moved into the fairly sparsely populated area of Northern California
and Southern Oregon, the new city of 15,00o-regardless of the fact that it was
behind barbed wire-put a strain on available goods and services. The camp was
consuming 1,500 gallons of milk per day, for instance, leaving area locals in short
supply of dairy products.
In an article which appeared in the Herald and News on October 14, 1942, a
prominent citizen called for an investigation of the camp, asserting that internees
., "Japanese Center Pointers," Herald and News, August I, 1942.
"Ibid.
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were living the high life, refusing to work and being pampered while local whites
were using ration cards. He claimed that although items like ham and bacon could
not be bought in the Klamath Basin, they were shipped to the camp by the
truckload.47 Moreover, Director Shirrell and his staff were accused oflax
management and allowing internees too much freedom. Not only were internees
supposedly being pampered by the WRA authorities, they were also accused of
serious law breaking and wrong doing. Project farm truck drivers were accused of
routinely exceeding the speed limit and thumbing their noses at white citizens.
There is no question that internees were guilty of one of the accusations
leveled against them by area locals. Workers on the project farm soon realized that
ducks and geese on the marshes around the Tule Lake Center were there for the
taking. Dissatisfied with the poor, inadequate food in the camp mess halls, and
enduring intensive labor with little financial compensation, for many internees
poaching an occasional fowl became a sort of sport. In fact, in early October, wildlife
officials sent a letter to director Shirell indicating that colony residents were
disregarding wildlife regulations, and warning that violators were subject to fine and
imprisonment." On October 5, the Tulean Dispatch reported that Federal Bureau of
Fish and Wildlife officials had arrested a number of colonists for killing geese and
ducks in violation of the law.49 The game-bird game was afoot. Fifteen more
colonists were found in violation of game regulations on October 21, and three days
47 "Newell Jap Center Conditions Flayed: Japanese Charged With Duck Fishing," Klamath Falls
Herald and News, October 14, 1942 .
.. "Colonists Cautioned Against Interference With Wildlife," The Tulean Dispatch October 2, 1942.
'9 "Arrested For Killing Birds," The Tulean Dispatch, October 5, 1942.
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later, five additional evacuees were arrested. 50One unfortunate pair of internees were
caught with two geese fully prepared for the barbeque.
The general public became aware of the poaching issue at the Tule Lake
Camp from the Klamath Falls Herald and News on October 14.51Executive secretary
of the California Fish and Game Commission George Miller, the Herald reported,
had it under good information that Japanese at Tule Lake were illegally snaring
ducks and geese, mostly at the project farm. The Herald and News article reminded
the public that the Tule Lake project was situated on reclamation land and game
birds were thus protected year round--even during hunting season. The Tule Lake
internees, the Secretary continued, were committing flagrant unsportsmanlike
violations such as snaring birds with fish hooks and traps.
Despite the combined efforts of the WRA and the Bureau ofFish and
Wildlife, poaching was so widespread that enforcement proved very difficult. "The
word gets around," Miller complained, "as soon as a game officer enters the area.,,52
The number of ducks, geese, and pheasants illegally consumed by internees is
anyone's guess. According to the recorded number of Japanese poachers caught,
however, we can assume that many internees supplemented their diet with a rustic
variant of duck a I 'orange, pheasant under glass, and roast goose. Not to mention the
pate de foie gras.
so"Wildlife Offenders Subject To Arrest," The Tulean Dispatch, October 21, 1942; "Five More
Colonists Arrested," The Tulean Dispatch. November 1, 1942.
" "California Game Chief Charges Violation OfFederaJ Laws," Herald and News, October 14, 1942.
" "Tule Lake laps Accused of Duck Fishing." Herald and News, October 14, 1942.
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Local animosity toward the poaching of water fowl by internees was part of a
larger cycle of resentment. Each perceived act of defiance by the internees became
proof to locals that they were disloyal. And each negative report in local and national
newspapers referring to the internees as "Japs" and describing them as lazy and
pampered and inferring they were stereotypically sneaky and unsportsmanlike-as in
the poaching affair-confirmed to the internees that they were not welcome in their
own country"
S3 "Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement at The Tule Lake Center," June 23, 1943,
JARCRICU Box I, File 27 WRA Community Analysis Section, Project Analysis Series 9. See also,
"The Significant Factors in Requests For Repatriation And Expatriation," April 19, 1944, JARCRICU
Box I, File 27 WRA, Community Analysis Section, Project Analysis Series No. 16.
54
Chapter 3
"Enlistees Must Work 8 Hours!"
Exactly when the leadership of the War Relocation Authority committed to a
full agricultural program at Tule Lake for the growing season of 1942 is not known.
The frenzied push to finish the camp and populate it with Japanese-American
agriculturists from California, however, was likely a result of that commitment. In
spite of his sympathetic and paternalistic attitude toward the evacuees, Acting
Director Elmer Shirrell knew that ultimately his performance at Tule Lake would be
judged by the success or failure of the project farm. And to keep enough people
working on the farm over the course of the 1942 growing season, Shirrell would
need every ounce of his ability to finesse WRA-internee relations, as well as nearly
all of the official powers of persuasion at his disposal.
Underscoring the significance the WRA accorded to agricultural production
at the Tule Lake Center, camp officials made a substantial investment in vegetable
seed in early June 1942, including a huge purchase of $80,000 in seed potatoes.'
Correspondingly, Shirrell sent as many of the first residents as he could to the farm
to prepare the soil for planting. By the mid-month, about 2,500 acres of prime black,
lake-bottom land was ready for planting. Facing the short growing season in the
Klamath Basin, it would take a great deal ofluck to plant vegetables, especially
potatoes so late in June, and have a decent crop to harvest in the fall. Time was of the
essence.
I The Tulean Dispatch, June 19, 1942.
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Accordingly, on June 19, Elmer Shirrell made a direct personal appeal to the
residents of the camp through an extra issue of The Tulean Dispatch, calling on
every able-bodied person sixteen years of age and older-and not working at another
job--to help with the planting. "We are trying to plant a potato and vegetable crop
for food for the colony," Shirrell informed internees. "The land is ready. We have
$80,000 worth of seed. We need laborers for the job of planting. Ifwe are to eat
fresh vegetables, we must have people to help plant them right now. A few days
delay means no crop because the growing season is so short at this 4,000 foot
altitude.,,2 It was a message that Shirrell would reiterate throughout the sununer and
fall of 1942: unless internees volunteered to work on the camp farm, there was a
strong likelihood that the Tule Lake Center would face food shortages during the
long, cold winter.
Accompanying Shirrell's appeal to evacuees' sense of duty to the Tule Lake
camp agricultural project, the camp director unmistakably sought to use his
administrative authority to coerce reluctant evacuees into the vast fields of the
project farm. On June 24, 1942, internees must have been shocked to learn that the
camp administration had decided that a levy of twenty dollars a month would be
charged to evacuees who did not join the WRA Work Corps. An additional twenty
dollar a month levy would be charged to each member of the offending persons'
2 Ibid.
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family.' Faced with this unexpected levy, few Japanese Americans were in a position
to defy the WRA by refusing to sign up for the Work Corp.
The true irony of the situation was not lost on the evacuees. Many had spent
their lives working in agriculture against staggering obstacles to carve out a place for
themselves in America. Now they were being held responsible for a farm which was
not their own, with Caucasian bosses whose experience in farming for the most part
paled against theirs, and they were asked to share their expertise and hard labor for
sixteen dollars a month. The alternative was a levy of twenty dollars a month for
every member of the family. Undoubtedly adding to the insult were the eleven guard
towers surrounding the vast fields.4
In the last week of June 1942, coinciding with the huge influx of evacuees
from the Sacramento Assembly Center, enough workers did show up on the project
farm to avert the disaster predicted by the WRA administration. Internees planted
1,057 acres ofHonschol barley, a variety suitable for both animal feed and malting,
208 acres of onions and 827 acres of potatoes, and smaller crops of carrots, lettuce,
turnips, peas, beets, and cabbages including nappa, a tasty variety of cabbage
particularly favored by Japanese people.'
3 The Tulean Dispatch, June 24, 1942: "In fairness to the community as a whole the $20 charge will
be levied against each person who is eligible for membership in the WRA Work Corps hut who
chooses not to join and thus not to contribute to community production and against each persons
dependents." The article also pointed out that "enlistment in the Work Corp is voluntary and simply
means that enlistee is willing to do constructive work for his community and country. In return for the
voluntary acceptance of these obligations, the WRA agrees to provide enlistees with an opportunity
for useful work and to supply both the enlistees and their families with adequate shelter, food,
education and health services."
4 Ross and Ross, Second Kinenhi, 72.
, The Tulean Dispatch, August 3, 1942.
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With the 1942 crop finally in the ground, WRA officials undoubtedly
breathed a collective sigh of relief. The work, however, had just begun; the crops
would need expert management and thousands of hours of labor to be successful.
The Klamath Basin is a desert, and irrigation is the life's blood of any agricultural
effort. Keeping the crops of the project farm properly watered was a full time job for
hundreds of workers, along with the intensive weed and pest management necessary.
Rising dissatisfaction with rations among evacuees working on the camp
farm, however, threatened the success of the year's harvest. Evacuees were expected
to work a full eight-hour day, five days a week along with a half-day on Saturday.
Most jobs were in the hot sun and labor intensive, and by mid-summer 1942, many
evacuees felt they were working on insufficient provisions." The light breakfast,
served before farm workers jumped on the trucks transporting them to the project
farm, was a particular source of dissatisfaction. Clearly aware of mounting tension
over rations, on August 12, Shirrell emphasized the WRA's largess; "there was
plenty of food in the city" the director told the camp newspaper, "and there was no
excuse for any residents to go hungry.'" Frustration nonetheless boiled over on
August 15, when a group of farm workers refused to board the trucks in protest of
being served tea and toast for breakfast.
Support for the spontaneous work stoppage quickly spread. Trucks loaded
with workers leaving for the farm were restrained by the strikers. After hasty
6 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 4042.
7 The Tulean Dispatch, August 12, 1942. Shirrell declared that the problem had beeu oue of
procurement mix ups which were a result of the huge influx of residents, food for 11,000 had been
ordered when actual numbers of residents were 15,000, and that the problems had been corrected.
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deliberations, a group of representatives informed the farm supervisor that there
would be no work on the project farm: workers were on strike! Meetings held with
the WRA administration that afternoon resulted in assurances of more and better
food in the mess halls. Indeed, seeking to diffuse the tense situation, the assistant
project steward emphasized to the Tulean Dispatch that "there is plenty of food for
everyone.t" Since the following day was a Sunday, farm workers reluctantly agreed
to go back to work on Monday, August 17. Other grievances went unresolved,
however, including payment of back wages (workers had received no wages--some
for two months' work) and clothing allowances.
The August 15 strike represented the first significant work stoppage at the
Tule Lake Camp. Equally significant, however, was the spontaneous mass meeting
of residents, held around an outdoor stage on the evening of Sunday, August 16.9
During the meeting, disgruntled farm workers attempted to gain support for a camp-
wide work stoppage. Pressed for such a commitment, the great majority of internees
recoiled in fear of FBI informants (inu) rumored to be in the crowd, who might
betray those who spoke up in support of a general strike to the authorities. Reflecting
a conservative unwillingness on the part of most Tuleans to coordinate a major
confrontation with the WRA, the meeting broke up without a consensus and with
hard feelings all around. IO In any case, the following morning the mess halls served a
hardy breakfast.
8 The Tulean Dispatch, August 15, 1942.
• Ibid, 42.
10 Ibid, 42. This is a classic example of the type of work done by Thomas's operatives in the camps.
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Over the summer of 1942, the crops of the project farm fared much better
than the evacuees. The growing season was one of the most perfect in Klamath Basin
history. There were no killer frosts which almost always threaten crops, especially in
late June. The summer was hot with characteristic cool desert nights, and warm
weather lingered into the fall, allowing crops to ripen perfectly. The WRA and camp
director Shirrell had taken a calculated risk in the spring by making a substantial
purchase of vegetable and grain seed. Given the quality of the soil and the expertise
of the work force, Shirrell hoped that the captive work force, so many of them Issei
farmers from California, could produce a crop on short notice and in short growing
days.
The 1942 harvest, however, far exceeded in tonnage and quality anything
which could have been reasonably hoped for. It was by all accounts a bumper crop.
On August 31, the Tulean Dispatch reported that large-scale marketing of vegetables
was underway, with a railcar of turnips shipped from the packing house to the Poston,
Arizona relocation camp. With construction of a second packing house nearing
completion, the Dispatch noted that within a few weeks, beets, peas, spinach and, of
course, potatoes would be marketed. I I Three days later, the Dispatch reported that
"huge quantities of produce were shipped to the Colorado River Basin projects
located in Parker and Gila River, Arizona.,,12
As early as September 29, with only a fraction of the crop harvested, The
Tulean Dispatch could thus report that "a huge pool of funds has accumulated from
II "Vegetables Shipped," The Tulean Dispatch, August 31, 1942.
12 "Farm Products Being Shipped," The Tulean Dispatch, September 3, 1942.
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the proceeds from the bumper crop.,,13 With the bumper crop going out of the project
fann at a handsome profit, Shirrell armounced that the daily food ration would be
raised from forty to forty-five cents per person. Surplus vegetables were being sent
to other relocation centers, Shirrell added, but "no vegetables would be sold on the
open market.,,14
As with spring planting, however, WRA officials were deeply concerned that
sufficient workers were not readily volunteering to work on the project farm during
the harvest. In addition to field workers, the packing sheds were short on manpower,
and even with modem equipment, the tremendous flow of produce was being
hampered. By early October, it was obvious that there was no chance that the bulk of
the huge bounty of vegetables could be harvested before the onset of winter froze
them in the ground.
Facing an impending fmancial disaster, the WRA initiated an increasingly
repressive campaign oflabor coercion. Shirrell explicitly warned workers against
absenteeism. "All workers" he told the camp newspaper, "are required to fulfill their
entire work quota ofhours."ls More significantly, the arrival of over 4,000 evacuees
to the Tule Lake Camp in late June, along with subsequent improvements in the
Center's infrastructure provided Elmer Shirrell with a larger, more manipulable labor
pool than had been available during spring planting. Accordingly, the director held
13 "Fann Funds Accumulate," The Tulean Dispatch, September 29, 1942. This article reminded
internees that the WRA was "authorized to dispose of by public or private sale, commodities
produced, the proceeds of which shall be deposited in a special fund and thereafter shall remain
available to the WRA." .
14 "Monthly Food Rations Raised," The Tulean Dispatch. August 28, 1942. Internees must have
scoffed at the nickel increase in food ration per day. Shirrell's statement that no produce would be
sold on the open market would later prove to be untrue.
""Enlistees Must Work 8 Hours," The Tulean Dispatch, August 29,1942.
61
an impromptu assembly at the recently opened high school on October 7. Citing the
"emergency," Shirrell made an impassioned appeal for students to put down their
books and report to the project farm to help with the harvest. 16
Three days later, 600 patriotic and eager high school students stormed the
project farm, representing slightly more than 25 percent of the center's high school
students. Taking no chances, Shirrell ordered the high school closed for the harvest
emergency. Teachers and assistants were sent to the fields with the students, to act as
foremen and timekeepers. With the fresh enthusiastic young work force harvest
production boomed. On the first day that the students worked at project farm, no less
than seven rail cars were sent out loaded with potatoes or beets, and men loading the
rail cars were reportedly bogged down by the pace of the harvesting. 17
For two weeks the high school students made good progress on the camp
farm, with 105 rail cars of vegetables leaving the project for destinations to the south
and east, and many more tons filling camp storage facilities.18 Adult residents,
however, especially parents of high school-age internees, were anxious for their
children to return to school. On Friday October 23, a committee representing parents
and other interested adults approached director Shirrell and asked that the high
school be opened on the following Monday.
With acres of vegetables still in the field, and in light of the cheap labor the
high school students provided-$12 a month on a pro rated scale-Shirrell rejected
16 "Students To Aid Crop Harvest," The Tulean Dispatch, October 7, 1942.
17 "600 Students Stonn Project Farm," The Tulean Dispatch, October 10, 1942.
I'"105 Carloads Produce Sent," The Tulean Dispatch, October 23, 1942. This number of railcar loads
represents over $100,000 worth of produce.
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the committee's request. Instead, underscoring the WRA's willingness to subordinate
its duty to public education to the exigencies of the harvest, the director offered the
representatives a clever compromise. If they could come up with seventy-five
volunteers to replace the high school kids on the farm, the school would open on
Monday. In other words, Shirrell sought to displace responsibility for coercing
internees into working on the harvest; by using the empty classrooms as a form of
leverage, the director attempted to induce concerned students' relatives to work on
the WRA's behalf by pressuring fellow-internees to volunteer for fieldwork.
When Monday arrived, however, the high school students were back at the
farm bright and early. The call for seventy-five volunteers to take the place of the
youths and allow them to go back to school had come up short. As a result, the high
school students devoted yet another week to the project farm, Finally, with the end of
the harvest in sight and a huge bounty of vegetables already shipped or safely in
storage, the project high school reopened on Monday, November 2. Having saved a
huge percentage of the 1942 crop and secured hundreds of thousands of dollars in
profits for the WRA, the students received about nine dollars each.
Undoubtedly, the administration would have liked to keep the high school
students on the farm until every last potato was harvested. Only the rising tide of
protest among the adults in the project forced director Shirrell to allow the students
to return to their formal education. After years of accusations that Japanese fanners
were not "playing fair" in California by working their wives and children in the
fields--while Caucasian fanners were forced to hire workers at prevailing wages-s-a
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profound irony permeated the agricultural project at Tu1e Lake, as it was the
Japanese American adolescents who stepped in and saved the harvest for the bu1ging
coffers of the WRA. Already feeling betrayed and powerless, the closing of the high
school deepened the sense of alienation that filled the Tu1e Lake Center.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the high school students, WRA officials
estimated that the inunense harvest wou1d last until mid-November. A survey taken
on November 2 indicated there were still one hundred and forty acres of potatoes,
along with thirty acres of beets, forty acres of turnips, sixty acres of carrots, thirty
acres of parsnips, forty acres of cabbages, 2500 tons of rutabagas, many acres of
celery, and various other vegetables yet to be harvested. Alarmed by the acreage yet
unharvested, the WRA promptly appealed for fifty more farm workers, and the farm
placement officer threatened residents that unless a sufficient labor force cou1d be
marshaled, the administration would close the high school again."
Responding to the WRA's appeal, in a shameless display of grandstanding,
the entire staff of The Tulean Dispatch jumped on the truck to the project farm for
one day of harvesting. Not surprisingly, the effort was announced in an article on
November 6, followed by a bubbly article two days later in which members of the
staff of twenty four related their enjoyment at working in the countryside."
More significantly, one hundred volunteers from the recreation department
appeared at the farm on the morning of November 11. The mercury had dropped to
19 "50 More Fann Workers Needed," The Tulean Dispatch, November 3, 1942.
2. "We're Rolling Up Our Sleeves," The Tulean Dispatch, November 6,1942; "We're going to see
that our little brothers and sisters have plenty to eat this winter" in ibid; "Dispatch Staff Digs Potatoes
And Likes It!" in ibid, November 9, 1942.
64
nine degrees Fahrenheit that morning, but the weather stayed fair for another week
and with the help of the "rec" department, the last of the crop was harvested and
safely moved into storage.i'
Throughout the fall and winter of 1942, the two packing sheds of the project
worked full time, sending out railcars loaded with fresh vegetables. First the early
vegetables, including beans, Chinese cabbage, lettuce, green onions, radishes,
rutabagas, spinach, Swiss chard, beets, and turnips were shipped to the relocation
centers and sold on the open market. Potatoes were run through the packing shed
directly from the field as orders came in. The bulk of the potato tonnage was put in
storage units to be used by the center and shipped to other centers and sold on the
open market as orders came in.
In addition to vegetables, the Tule Lake Relocation Center was also involved
in animal husbandry. In the fall of 1942, while farm crews were harvesting the crops
of the vast fields, workers installed two key elements of the project, both on a huge
scale. Starting the last week of September and the first week in October, pigs and
chickens became part of the project. On September 28 and 29, 560 pigs arrived at
pens prepared for the operation, making Tule Lake the only WRA center with pigs.22
The rule Lake chicken operation was massive, covering the equivalent of three city
blocks with twenty coops two hundred feet long and two brooder houses of the same
length. In fact, with 45,000 chickens, the poultry farm was one of the largest in the
21 "Cold Hits Colony," The Tulean Dispatch, November II. 1942; "Rec's Aid In Harvest," in ibid,
November 11, 1942.
22 "560 Hogs Arive Here," The Tulean Dispatch. October 2, 1942.
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west. Project chickens produced 1,500 eggs a day and 9,000 pounds of meat a month.
The primary diet of both pigs and chickens was grain raised on the project farm. 23
Although start up costs for the chicken and pig projects were substantial, after
the massive 1942 harvest, the WRA did not lack venture capital. Looking at revenue
from potatoes alone, each railcar that left the project loaded with potatoes held
between $1,000 and $1,200 worth of produce at prevailing pricea/" In 1942, the Tule
Lake Center took a bounty of potatoes off the 827 acres devoted to the tuber. At 400
hundredweight bags per acre, a modest estimate oftonnage, the value of the potato
crop alone was approximately one million dollars.f Further, if the mess halls
averaged serving each resident of the Tule Lake Center eight ounces of potatoes a
day, 75 acres of potatoes would have been more than enough for the needs of the
camp for one year.
In late October of 1942, Shirell invited a group of representatives from the
Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce to visit the camp, with the intention of
discrediting rumors that the Tule Lake Center pampered internees. Undoubtedly
cognizant of the racial animosity that pervaded the area, Shirrell demonstrated to his
guests the restrictive conditions under which the internees lived their day to day lives.
The director pointed out that with few exceptions the Japanese were confined to the
boundaries of the camp, and were monitored by troops with the aid of vehicles and
seven watchtowers with powerful searchlights. Japanese who were allowed to cross
23 "Poultry Plant Will House 40,000 Hens," The Tulean Dispatch, November 4, 1942.
24 "Potatoes: Russet Burbanks, $3.25-$3.35 CWl,US No 1" Herald and News, Nov 11, 1942. A railcar
loaded with one bundred pound burlap sacks of potatoes beld 360 sucb sacks.
2S The exact number using the $3.25 price per cwt, is $992,400.
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the adjacent railroad tracks to work at the pig farm, poultry farm, and vegetable
processing sheds were always under guard. In response to complaints that internees
were seen driving farm trucks on the highway at high speeds and thumbing their
noses at locals they met on the road, Shirrell admitted that it was necessary for truck
loads of workers and produce to travel on the highway to and from the units of the
project farm and the processing sheds. Shirrell pointed out that a private road was
under construction, however, which would make travel by internees on the public
highway unnecessary.
Chamber representatives also had the opportunity to engage Shirrell in a
question-and-answer session regarding the camp, and the director was queried about
rumored labor problems at the camp-particularly on the project farm. Shirrell
acknowledged that labor problems were not uncommon at the center. Obscuring his
own consistent efforts to use administrative authority to coerce evacuees into
working on the project farm, Shirell informed the group that he had absolutely no
authority to force anyone onto the project farm.26
Similarly, when the group questioned Shirrell about vegetable sales from the
project farm, the director asserted that although most of the produce was sold to the
other relocation centers, a very few surplus vegetables were being sold on the open
market. Shirrell was vague when pressed for statistics on produce sales, maintaining
that sales were handled from an office in San Francisco, and that he was not familiar
with the numbers. The director's vague response was at least partially disingenuous;
26 "Partial Report Made on Chamber Probe Of Condition at WRA Tule Lake Center," Herald and
News, October 22, 1942.
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after a season of constantly pressuring internees to work on the project farm, director
Shirrell may not have known the specifics of outside sales, but he was certainly
aware of the huge financial success of the season.
The significance of the Tu1e Lake Center farm was perhaps most clearly
revealed during a three-day farm conference held at Tule Lake from October 21-23,
1942. Along with three regional directors of the WRA, the directors ofrnarketing
and production traveled from Washington D. C. to Tu1e Lake, where they inspected
the project farm and discussed problems facing agricu1ture at the Tu1e Lake Center.
Oblivious to the internees' rising dissatisfaction with the WRA's coercive labor
policies, the visiting officials generated four conclusions for the 1943 growing
season: a) continue producing food to keep the center as close to 100 percent self-
sufficient as possible; b) continue to produce staple crops to supplement the other
relocation centers; c) sell on the open market, and, most importantly; d) expand the
project farm with additional acreage.27 Thus, after a season of turmoil, living in a
concentration camp, laboring on land to which they could claim no ownership, and
securing huge profits in which they could not share, internees would be expected to
produce even more in the corning year.
27 "Farm Confab Makes Plans," The Tulean Dispatch, October 23, 1942.
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Chapter 4
A Question of Loyalty
As the tumultuous year of 1942 came to a close the evacuees could look back
on the first half year at the Tule Lake Center with relief that they had survived the
poor living conditions, and perhaps with a degree of confidence that conditions
would steadily improve. Although the hundreds of evacuees who labored so
successfully on the project farm from the spring through the harvest were not
rewarded monetarily for the profit their labor produced, at the very least it would
seem they deserved a well earned rest before repeating the process in 1943. The early
months of 1943, held something quite different in store for the residents ofTule Lake.
This chapter discusses a questionnaire developed by the WRA and the War
Department early in 1943. The Loyalty Registration, as it came to be known, would
bring more trauma to the residents of the Tule Lake Center than any issue faced in
the first six months. Few residents would go unscathed and the very nature of the
center would be changed by a question of loyalty,
According to WRA national director Dillon Myer the relocation centers were
meant to be temporary stopovers as West Coast Japanese were granted permanent
leave and relocated to communities east of the prohibited West Coast zones. Myer
assumed relocation would be the answer to the Japanese problem in America.'
I "Summary Notes on Segregation Conference ofWRA Officials," Denver Colorado, July 26-27,
1943. Transcribed by WRA, JARCRlCU, Box II, File I.Myer and his staff reiterated their belief in
relocation many times. See also, "Partial Report Made on Chamber probe of Center," Klamath Falls
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Believing that West Coast Japanese had failed to assimilate into American culture
because they lived in tightly knit self sustaining enclaves, relocation through
permanent leave would disperse the Japanese population into new communities
where they would be forced to assimilate into American society. Myer and his staff
believed that permanent relocation would be vastly preferable to life in a relocation
project.'
The pilot program of the relocation policy was the seasonal harvest leave
granted to internees in the summer and fall of 1942. In an arrangement made early in
the spring of 1942, with western sugar beet growers, a substantial number of
internees left the permanent centers to help with the harvest in the western states
outside the Western Defense Command-designated military restricted zones.
Although enjoying a degree of mobility denied the majority of internees, Japanese
Americans who left the Tule Lake Center to help with the harvest nonetheless faced
significant challenges. "Our grand abode looks like something out of the Kentucky
hills," wrote Ted Shigeno from Corvallis, Montana. Like most Japanese working
outside internment camps, Shigeno endured privation as well as frequent racial
animosity from area residents. There was, "No running water, no electricity, no sink
Herald and News, October 14,1942. Tule Lake director Shirrell defines Tule Lake as a "Relocation
Project" in his interview with representatives of the Klamath Falls Oregon Chamber of Commerce.
2 The Relocation Program: A Guidebook/or the Residents 0/ Relocation Centers. (New York: Ams
Press, 1975 [1943]). Reprint of the 1943 edition published by the WRA. In this pamphlet distributed
to all the relocation centers, Myer made his opinion on relocation clear. "In normal American
communities you will have a far better opportunity than in the relocation center to develop the kind of
home and family life you really want," By late summer of 1942 the WRA had developed a specific
application procedure for permanent leave from the Centers.
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in the kitchen and no bathing facilities." Shigeno continued, "we were welcomed
with open arms at church, but were tossed out of a couple restaurants.t"
Despite the trickle of internees leaving projects for permanent relocation, by
the fall of 1942 Myers' coveted permanent relocation policy had met with very
limited success. Nothing about the program worked smoothly. Inparticular the
process of application for permanent leave was extremely cumbersome. First,
applicants had to have a legitimate job offer on the outside and living
accommodations arranged in their new destination. They were then submitted to an
exhaustive loyalty investigation by the FBI, involving a detailed report on the
applicants' actions in the relocation center and a signed affidavit affirming his or her
loyalty from the Project Director. Approval for each application was granted or
denied by National Director J. Edgar Hoover, then confirmed by Western Defense
Command headquarters," Not surprisingly, the lengthy interim from application to
approval-the process routinely took three months to complete-s-often resulted in
lost job opportunities.
Not fully aware of resistance to permanent relocation, Myer made a short
visit to the Tule Lake Center in October of 1942 to promote the WRA leave program.
He announced that all colonists could obtain indefinite leave and that, "we expect
many of the colonists within the center to plan on going outside."! Myer cautioned
applicants to be patient with the WRA. "This type of leave includes both citizens and
3 "Evacuees Having Differing Opinions of Treatment," Herald and News. September 30, 1942. See
also: "Varied Reports Made in Letters by Farm Workers: Wages, Living Conditions, Experiences,
Related," The Tulean Dispatch, October 14, 1942.
4 Jacoby, TuleLakefrom Relocation to Segregation, 61-64.
, "Myer Explains New WRA Policy," The Tulean Dispatch, October 12, 1942.
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aliens; the applicants must be cleared through the office of FBI and the Record
Office of the WRA.,,6
Myer was determined to liberalize the permanent leave program. A method
had to be found to make it easier for loyal internees to gain quick approval of leave
applications. He got his chance to streamline his permanent leave system through an
alliance between the WRA and the War Department. Inthe summer of 1942, a
change in American military policy began to evolve. After Pearl Harbor most
Japanese Americans in the military were summarily dismissed with no specific
reasons offered, and thrown into the camps. Apparently the government felt no
explanation was necessary. All potential Nisei draftees were classified IV-F, a
category normally used for the physically unfit. InJune of 1943 Assistant Secretary
of War John McCloy informed Secretary of War Henry Stimson of a survey which
indicated there were twenty-one thousand Japanese Americans of draft age who
could be made eligible for military service." Employing an outrageous stereotype,
McCloy commented to the effect that Japanese Americans would make good troops
because of the fanatical, fatalistic Japanese warrior philosophy. However, it was the
propaganda and public relations value of Japanese troops which was most appealing
to Stimson and the War Department began to look seriously at forming an all
Japanese combat unit."
Dillon S. Myer was thrilled with the idea of forming a Japanese-American
military unit, and quick to point out that potential soldiers were not the only
6 Ibid.
7 Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy, 140.
• Ibid, 140
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individuals languishing in the camps. Thousands of Japanese not eligible for the
military could be employed in war production jobs outside the camps if a method
could be developed for quickly determining the loyalty of each Japanese individual.
Stimson concurred with Myer's assessment, and by January 1, 1943, the WRA and
the War Department had agreed upon a joint plan to administer a loyalty registration
of every Japanese evacuee over the age of seventeen. The registration would consist
of two loyalty questionnaires, one for 21,000 male Nisei citizens, and one for the
estimated fifty seven thousand other residents of the camps above the age of
seventeen. Only the 3,396 individuals who had already applied for repatriation to
Japan would be excluded from the Registration. Obviously the individuals who had
applied for repatriation had sealed their fate on the disloyal side.9
When plans for the Registration became known at the Western Defense
Command in San Francisco the engineers of the evacuation program were outraged.
General DeWitt thought the Registration would ask the embarrassing question, "Why
if Japanese Americans were loyal enough to serve in the army wouldn't they also be
loyal enough to live on the West Coast?" Colonel Bendetsen thought it was fine to
employ loyal Japanese in defense industries and the military. However the idea of
determining loyalty by a questionnaire was ridiculously simplistic to Bendetsen. He
felt undesirables would simply lie on a loyalty questionnaire, and loyalty should
continue to be determined from intelligence-data. 10
'Ibid, 138; Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 53-83.
10 Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy, 140. On the subject of an all Nisei combat unit Bendetsen
stated: "I see no objection to raising a combat team. I think it would be a ten-strike on the
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Notwithstanding the protests of the Western Defense Command, the joint
plan of the WRA and the War Department went forward quickly. Newspapers at the
relocation centers carried an announcement by Secretary of War Henry 1. Stimson
on January 30, 1943, entitled, "Nisei were once again eligible to join the U.S.
Army."!' The paper reported that the new program. of the War Department included
a provision for all 'loyal' individuals of Japanese ancestry to contribute toward
winning the war through employment outside the camps in war production, as well
as military service. Dillon Myer also offered his congratulations to the internees of
the relocation camps. "I find deep satisfaction in the announcement today by
Secretary of War Henry 1. Stimson. This announcement makes January 29, 1943 the
most significant date in the last ten months for persons of Japanese ancestry in the
United States.,,12
The residents of the relocation camps became aware of the registration
program. on February 4, when the news broke that plans for an Army Nisei combat
unit had been finalized. The War department had organized ten such recruiting teams,
one for each of the relocation camps. Army recruiting personnel composed of a
lieutenant, two sergeants and a corporal would be arriving at the centers to formally
announce the mission of the new combat unit, the Tulean Dispatch reported. The
international relations side. As far as a contribution to the winning of the war is concerned, I don't
think it amounts to a hill of beans either way and I'm sure nobody else does."
II "Nisei May Now Join U.S. Army: Stimson Issues Order, Program Enables Jobs in War Production"
The Tulean Dispatch. January 30, 1943.
12 "Significant Date," The Tulean Dispatch. January 30, 1943.
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Nisei who wished to volunteer for service while the recruiting personnel were
present would have the opportunity to do SO.13
A second article in the Dispatch announced that a general registration of all
evacuees 17 or more years of age would start the following week at all relocation
centers. The registration consisted of two questionnaires, one for Nisei men qualified
to volunteer for military service, and one for all other evacuees over the age of 17,
including all first generation Japanese immigrants known as IsseL14 According to the
immigration laws of the time Issei were not eligible for citizenship in the United
States. The objective of the registration was to speed up the leave program by
obtaining clearance on a large number of employable loyal evacuees before they
applied for leave.
The questiounaire for non-Nisei male internees was titled, "War Relocation
Authority Application for Leave Clearance." The logic of the title was obvious to
National Director Myer and the WRA. However, to the residents of the camps, many
who feared relocation and had no intention of leaving, the title Application for Leave
Clearance was the first confusing step in the loyalty registration."
The two almost identical registration questionnaires were long and
complicated, consisting of thirty questions about everything from the number of
relatives the individual had in Japan to what he or she liked to read. The critical
13 "Anny Combat Team Plans For Nisei Are Completed," The Tulean Dispatch November 4, 1943 .
•4 "General Registration Will Begin Next Week," The Tulean Dispatch November 4, 1943.
15 Michi Weglyn, Years Of Infamy The Untold Story Of America's Concentration Camps (New York:
Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1976), 136.
75
loyalty questions were numbers 27 and 28. For Nisei men qualified to volunteer for
military service the questions read:
27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on
combat duty, wherever ordered?
28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America
and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or
domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the
Japanese emperor, or any foreign government of organization?
For non-Nisei over the age of 17 the questions read:
27. If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you
be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?
28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America
and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or
other foreign government, power or organization?
The loyalty questions were seen as improper and unfair by both Issei and
Nisei evacuees. Question 28 asking Japanese nationals to forswear all allegiance to
the country of their birth and swear unqualified allegiance to a country where they
were systematically barred from citizenship was problematic to the Issei. Those who
answered yes would be without a country. Those who answered no would be deemed
disloyal to America. Question 27 asking "Would you be willing to volunteer for the
Army Nurse Corp," was especially confusing to Issei men. Why would they want to
volunteer for a women's branch of the military? Many Issei parents were dubious
about the War Department's change of heart regarding military service for the citizen
Japanese. The Issei were terrified their sons were going to be sacrificed in suicide
squads to spare Caucasian troops.l"
16 Ibid, 141
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Nisei men were also shocked by the questionnaire. Had they not already
shown tremendous loyalty by submitting to relocation in the camps? Just as with the
Issei men. question 27 caused confusion for Nisei men. Many assumed that
answering yes to question 27 was tantamount to volunteering for the Army.'? They
also could not be sure of the consequences of a no answer on question 27. Could a
negative reply put them at the head of the list for the draft? In every camp the Nisei
men were extremely bitter about having only one right restored, the right to go into
harm's way for the country which had destroyed the dreams of their parents. If they
did volunteer or were drafted, what would become of their Issei parents? Would they
be allowed to stay in the camps or would they be permanently relocated to some
ghetto to end up destitute and despised? Moreover, in the first few months of the
permanent relocation program, there was no support system for evacuees leaving the
centers for cities to the east. Any individual or family who applied and was granted
permanent leave was on his own in a strange often hostile environment, unless he
had friends or relatives near and in a position to help."
Only a very small percentage of evacuees were in favor of the registration.
Michi Nishiura Weglyn was a teenager when her family was relocated into the
camps. She recalls in her powerful 1976 book Years of Infamy, "Patriots who
roundly cheered the development were vastly outnumbered, and in centers where
I7 Ibid, 138.
18 See The Relocation Program: A Guidebook For Residents of Relocation Centers, In the winter of
1943 the WRA began to set up field offices in principal Mid-Western and Eastern cities, (Chicago,
Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, Cleveland, New You) to assist internees out on permanent
relocation.
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feelings ran high, those who volunteered did so secretly, fleeing the camps in the
dead of night.,,19
Although residents of all the relocation centers shared apprehension of
permanent relocation, resistance to the program was particularly strong at Tule
Lake.20 Tule Lake was overwhelmingly made up of rural agriculturists from central
California, with the core consisting of first generation (Issei) Japanese inunigrants,
whose opinions were crucial in developing the general attitudes of the community.
Most of the Issei had come from very humble origins in Japan, and had come to
America planning to amass a small fortune and return home to establish prosperous
farms in their native villages. Few achieved their dreams of quick prosperity, and
most settled into cultural enclaves and established families through marriage with
younger women often imported as picture brides.
After decades of hard work and sacrifice, the Japanese Americans' relocation
constituted a devastating economic reversal, and the idea of a new start as a low-
level employee in a community to the east held no appeal for most Issei. Indeed, to
many internees it seemed ridiculous for an elderly rural person to take an urban job
and thus confront language and cultural barriers as well as isolation from his
community. To the majority of rural California Issei, urban centers like Chicago or
Kansas City seemed like the end of the world, and until the WRA allowed the
19 Ibid, 136.
20 "Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement At The Tule Lake Relocation Center." WRA
Community Analysis Section, June 23, 1943, JARCRlCU, Box 19, File 11.
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Japanese to return to their fanns--a relatively short distance south-the internees
were determined to stick it out at Tu1e Lake."
The registration began at the ten relocation centers amid anguish and debate
on how to respond to the critical loyalty questions. However in camps where
residents felt less threatened, and a positive interaction between Caucasian staff and
evacuees existed, registration progressed more smoothly, and a much higher
percentage of positive responses were recorded.22 The recruiting teams sent to the
camps hammered home propaganda that this was a golden opportunity for the Nisei
demonstrate their loyalty. The recruitment drive in the camps which was intended to
produce 3,000 volunteers cou1d only muster 1,181 volunteers for military service.r'
A stark contrast can be seen in Hawaii, where 10,000 Nisei gratefully living in
relative freedom, and eager to show their loyalty, rushed to volunteer.i"
In the camps where resistance to the registration was strongest the Proj ect
Directors were instructed to threaten inmates with severe penalties of up to twenty
years in prison fines of $10,000 under the Espionage Act for interfering with the
registration. Project Directors were also given permission to remove trouble makers
disturbing the registration process, often mistakenly removing individuals without
any evidence of wrongdoing." Through these strong arm tactics registration was
21 Ibid, 6.
21 Ibid, 145. Weglyn also points out that camps farther to the east, such as Minidoka in Idaho, Topaz
in Utah, and Amache and Rohwer in Arkansas, removed from the racial hostility of the West Coast
registered in a more orderly manner. Also see Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 70-
79; Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 53-83.
23 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 61.
24 Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 144.
2S On February 28, 1943 federal agents removed 28 persons from the two Gila Arizona, camps Butte
and Canal.
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completed on schedule at nine of the ten relocation centers. An aggregate of 10"10of
the residents of the camps where registration was completed on schedule, answered
no to one or both of the crucial loyalty questions."
Indeed Tule Lake was the sole camp not to complete the registration on
schedule. Tule Lake was in a state of flux in the winter of 1943. An article appeared
in The Tulean Dispatch on December 21, 1942, indicating that Project Director
Elmer 1. Shirrell would leave the project on December 27, to become head of the
WRA Private Employment Division in Chicago." Regardless of the battles of the
first year at Tule Lake, Shirrell was extremely personable and generally admired and
trusted by the evacuees. The Dispatch article noted the emotional and reciprocal
tributes made by evacuees and Elmer Shirrell. "During the past week many farewell
dinners in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Shirrell have been given by various organizations
in the Project." The Dispatch continued, "When he spoke at dinner about his
impending departure from the project where he resided ever since the first volunteer
contingent arrived in late May, he lost control of his emotion and could not hold
back tears when he bid farewell.,,28
Shirrells' successor, Harvey M. Coverley, left the regional office of the WRA
to take the job at Tule Lake. Uulike Shirrell who spent considerable time in the
evacuee living area visiting with residents, Coverley was formal and distant in his
26 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 79. See also, Thomas and Nishimoto, The
Spoilage, 62-63. In The Spoilage, arguably the definitive stody on the loyalty registration, Thomas
and Nishimoto use bar graphs to show the percentages of yes and no answers at the various camps.
27 "Shirrell To Leave December 27 For Position Of Evacuee Employment Head," The Tulean
Dispatch December 21, 1942.
28 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation 10 Segregation, 74. Jacoby states, "It was generally felt that
regional and national offices considered him (Shirrell) too soft as an administrator."
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dealings with the Japanese, and preferred to administrate the camp from his Office.29
CoverJey's first statement on the camp in The Tulean Dispatch was simply to
recognize the advanced agricultural development and general superiority of the
equipment such as trucks and farm implements. He did not mention the residents
themselves.f
When the registration program was announced on February 4, 1943, Tule
Lake residents began frenzied efforts to obtain solid information regarding exactly
what they were registering for. Representative internee groups such as the
Community Council and Planning Board bombarded Project Director Coverley with
questions. CoverJey deferred to Assistant Project Director J. O. Hayes, who had just
returned from a registration orientation conference in Washington D.C. Incredibly,
Hayes could add no details on the upcoming registration. Interviewed by The Tulean
Dispatch, Hayes sidestepped the issue of registration, declaring that further
clarification would be announced by the Army recruiting team due to arrive at the
center on February 6.31 A rumor spread in the camp that Hayes had not attended any
of the meetings in Washington D.C., instead spending his time in the capital looking
for a job in some other federal agency.32
The Army recruiting team eventually arrived on February 9. The next day
just 24 hours before the registration was scheduled to begin, hastily organized
29 Ibid, 74.
30 "TuIe Lake Project Most Advanced In Physical Aspect-Coverley," The Tulean Dispatch. January
5, 1943.
""Anny Combat Team Plans For Nisei Are Completed: Recruiting Personnel To Arrive On Project
On Feb 6, Hayes Reports," The Tulean Dispatch February 4, 1943.
32 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 73. According to Jacoby, Hayes was
disgruntled by not being named Project Director at Tule Lake.
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meetings between the recruiting team and various evacuee groups proved
unsatisfactory in clarifying the ramifications of the registration. The recruiting team
stuck to a predetermined script, emphasizing the 'golden opportunity' the registration
provided for evacuees to get out of the relocation camps and show their loyalty to
America. Inonly a few of these meetings did the recruiting team accept questions
from the evacuees. Only standardized, anticipated questions, practiced in the
recruiting team script, were answered. Once again important questions were left
unanswered. Most importantly, the evacuees wanted a straight answer on the
consequences of yes and no responses to the loyalty questions.f
The Issei population at Tule Lake was the most confused segment of the
population. They requested a special public forum to discuss matters of intense
personal importance to the Issei population. Project Director Coverley made a
monumental error by refusing the request with an offhand comment that the loyalty
decision was a private matter." Coverley's lack of tact, sensitivity, or understanding
of evacuee apprehension was typical of his management style. The issue was not
complicated in Coverley's assessment; the evacuees were required to register and
regardless of their answers they were going to register. The Issei were left feeling
humiliated, frustrated and angry. Evacuees were forced to formulate their own
answers as to what they were registering for and why it was considered necessary.
The overwhelming sentiment of the center, articulated in dozens of informal
3J Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 73; Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 146; Jacoby, Tule Lake From
Relocation to Segregation, 74.
" Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 146.
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discussions throughout the camp, was that the registration was another injustice
forced upon them.35
Registration also exacerbated divisions within the Japanese-American
community. The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) came in for extreme
criticism at Tule Lake. The JACL had always been unpopular at Tule Lake by the
majority of the internees, especially the Issei. This deep-seated resentment went back
to the decision to relocate West Coast Japanese. The JACL had advocated the
measure as necessary for national security and safety of the Japanese population.
JACL members had also been prominent at Tule Lake from the opening of the camp.
The first group of 446 volunteer evacuees from the Northwest who came to facilitate
the opening of the center was predominantly JACL members." The JACL came out
early in favor of the loyalty registration, and advised that eligible young citizens
volunteer for the Army. JACL members were labeled as "Inu" (a term that literally
means dog in Japanese but in camp jargon stood for "rat fink" and "stool pigeon.")
In short JACL members were seen as collaborators with the War Department, the
WRA and especially the camp edministration." Battle lines were being drawn at
TuleLake.
Undeterred by rising tension among the internees, Coverley was determined
to make a good showing of his first important assignment at the Tule Lake Center.
Notwithstanding the confusion and mishandling of the issue, the loyalty registration
was on the agenda of the WRA the War Department. In a letter to the project
" Ibid, 146·150.
36 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 73.
37 "Planning Board Probes JACL," The Tulean Dispatch. February 8, 1943.
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directors, Dillon Myer gave instructions that registration was to become the "No 1
priority." The National Director also reminded project directors to announce
"registration is compulsory.,,38 Coverley decided the first step in facilitating the
registration was to close the project schools for the duration of the registration
process. High school teachers were assigned along with their assistants to administer
the registration questionnaire." The administration estimated schools would be
closed about one week.4o
The Tulean Dispatch printed a registration supplement to the February II
issue of the camp newspaper. Rudimentary hypothetical questions were fielded with
more of the vague, autocratic answers evacuees had become familiar with. For
example, one question asked, "Who must register?" Evacuees had known for at least
a week that every resident over the age of 17 was required to register. Another
question fielded by the Dispatch was: "Why must we register?" The answer:
"Because the Washington officials have issued instructions that registration is
compulsory, except for those who have requested repatriation."?' Residents were
also informed of their paper work obligation in no uncertain terms.
All male citizens 17 years and up will ftle two copies of forms DS8 and 304A
two copies ofWRA 126A, and four copies ofWRA 26. All male citizens
38 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 58. The National Director also asked Project Directors to
make it clear to evacuees that "we are not going to force people to relocate when they do not want to
be relocated" This statement would later prove to be a lie for some evacuees and problematic for
others, for instance evacuees who answered yes at Tule Lake and refused to leave when Tule Lake
became the segregation center for "disloyals." See Also: "Mass Registration Begins in Project," The
Tulean Dispatch. February 8,1943.
" "Mass Registration Begins In Project: Everyone Over 17 to Register," The Tulean Dispatch,
February 11, 1943.
40 "Schools Will Close During Registration," The Tulean Dispatch, February 8, 1943.
41 "Registration Rules: Please Keep This For Your Information," The Tulean Dispatch, February II,
1943 Supplement Underline added.
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between the ages ofl7 and 37 will fill out two copies ofform DS8 165 and
DSS 154 when they are interviewed by the Army representatives at the offices
established by them. All female citizens and alien males and females over 17
years of age will file four copies of WRA form 26.42
Registration began on schedule on February II, 1943.43 At breakfast on that
moming, in the blocks where registration was to commence, the two teachers
assigned to administer the questionnaire announced the names of evacuees expected
to register that day. After breakfast the two teachers and their aides, were waiting at
those predetermined block manager's offices to register the residents.44
The administration's logistics acumen could not substitute for the negative
manner in which the administration interacted with evacuees on the registration.
Indeed, by all accounts, the registration was a disaster. Seemingly everything that
could go wrong did go wrong. Resistance at Tule Lake far surpassed any of the other.
centers: in fact only at Tule Lake did resistance to the registration manifest itself as a
collective movement. 45 With the influential Issei leading the way, resistance to the
registration was widespread and well organized. Whole blocks vowed to stand
together in refusal to register. Many evacuees rushed to request repatriation. One
block conducted a poll in which the majority voted to sign up for repatriation. Tule
Lake residents were not going to commit in writing to a questionnaire they did not
fully understand.46
42 "Mass Registration Begins In Project," The Tulean Dispatch February II, 1943. Underline added.
43 Ibid .
.. Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 74.
"Ibid, 72; Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 134-155.
46 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 77-83.
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The administration responded by bombarding evacuees with propaganda in
The Tu/ean Dispatch to the effect that the registration was a good thing for them no
matter what their status." After three days very few evacuees had come forward to
complete the registration questionnaire. Furthermore resistance was not breaking
down as it did in the other camps, rather at Tule Lake resistance was becoming more
entrenched by the day. After a week the WRA knew Tule Lake was a serious
problem. Project Director Coverley took to appearing at the mess halls during the
lunch meal, escorted by Army officers to read off the names of draft age men due to
register. To stem the tide of residents applying for repatriation to avoid the loyalty
registration, the administration announced in an extra edition of The Tulean Dispatch,
"All citizens, both male and female, 17 years of age and over, must register whether
or not they have or intend to apply for repatriation.v'"
Stepped up pressure from the WRA and the War Department, which had
broken flimsy resistance at the other centers, seemed to strengthen internees resolve
at Tule Lake. WRA National Director Myer announced in The Dispatch, that Section
35 of the United States Code provided for a fme of $10,000 and or ajail term of not
more than 20 years for willfully obstructing recruitment or registration at the
center." Corresponding with Myer's announcement on February 18, an Army
47 "Sgt. Tsukahara Hopes Many Serve: Says Anny is Educational," The Tulean Dispatch, Feburary 12,
1943. Tsukahara was the Japanese American sergeant at Tule Lake as part of the recruiting tearn. He
painted a rosy picture of Anny life. See also: "Resettlement Plans Are Culminated By Mass Sigb-
Up." The Tulean Dispatch, February 12, 1943.1n this article the WRA continued to show
misunderstanding for the resettlement issue. They were under the impression that the great majority of
evacuees would rather be on the outside in some Eastern city.
4& "Citizen Repatriate Registration," The Tulean Dispatch, February 20,1943.
4. "Registration Penalty," The Tulean Dispatch, February 18, 1943.
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representative, Major Marshall, arrived at the project from Washington D. C. Major
Marshall had orders to get the center into compliance with the registration."
Marshall launched into a nasty attack of the residents of the Tule Lake Center.
He framed the situation bluntly and tactlessly, saying in effect that Japanese at the
center had a choice to make. They could stand with the United States or against it.
The registration, he emphasized, was not a debatable matter. "The residents do not
have a bargaining position with respect to it. Those who refuse to register will have
no complaint if such refusal is taken as ipso facto proof of disloyalty."sl The Major
added that if the residents ofTule Lake could not meet the government halfway on
the registration program, and in fact worked to defeat the program, public opinion
could well turn against them and become hostile. The Major sununed up his tirade
against the residents by reminding them they were totally isolated in their
intransigence. "1 am advised by Washington that registration has been completed at
some centers and that the others are more that halfway completed. Only at Tule Lake
do residents have the false and misleading idea that they can treat registration on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis."s2 After the events of the past year, the threat of a hostile
American Caucasian public held no terror for the evacuees, and only served to
remind them, especially the Issei farmers from central Califoroia, they did not want
to go out into the public.
'0 "Registration Is Clarified: Army Major Says Choice Must Be Made," The Tulean Dispatch,
February 18, 1942.
" "Major Says Defeat of Program Could Create Hostile Public," The Tulean Dispatch, February 18,
1942.
'z "Registration is Clarified," The Tulean Dispatch, February 18, 1943.
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This ploy by the WRA and the War Department to bring in a big gun to
intimidate evacuees into complying with the registration and affirming loyalty to the
country resulted in the opposite effect at worst and no positive effect at best. Every
day in February seemingly brought another crisis at Tule Lake. Each event served to
galvanize the residents' resolve. On February 19 after another day in which the great
majority of those scheduled for registration failed to appear, a delegation of thirty-
four Nisei from Block 42 marched to the administration building to present a petition
demanding the right to apply for expatriation. 53 As a crowd of Block 42 residents
gathered behind them, officials met the young men outside the administration offices,
and refused to take applications for expatriation. Administration officials attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade the young men to register, and finally the entire crowd
dispersed without further incident. Once again Project Director Coverley proceeded
in a tactless manner. The next day the young men whose names were on the petition
were notified they were expected to register inunediately. Backed by the entire Block
none of the young men came forward to register.
Harold Stanley Jacoby, chief of internal security at the Tule Lake Center
remembered subsequent events in his 1996 memoir.
Feeling that such an open flouting ofa 'legal order' should not be ignored,
the administration made arrangements for a risky, ifnot dangerous, operation
designed to arrest and remove the offending individuals from camp. On
Sunday afternoon, a platoon or two from the military police company were
trucked in and deployed around Block 42, while my two Caucasian internal
security assistants and I moved through the block to arrest the offenders. We
encountered no difficulty from either the crowd that gathered or the young
men. The latter were all packed up and quite ready to be arrested and
transported as local heroes. A self-appointed body ofIsseis stationed
"Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 77. Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation 77.
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themselves between the assembled crowd and the soldiers to discourage any
demonstration by the crowd. 54
Obviously Jacoby had misgivings about the operation and felt fortunate that the ill-
advised move had not gotten out of hand. He knew, however, there would be serious
consequences from the unnecessary show of force he concluded, "My associates and
I completed our work by loading the 'prisoners' onto the trucks for their triumphant
ride; the military police withdrew in orderly fashion, and the potential danger was
averted. But the operation did not go unnoticed.?"
By calling in the military Harvey Coverley lost any chance for retaining
control of the Tule Lake Center. Coverley set a fateful precedent by sending in
heavily armed soldiers to apprehend thirty-four seventeen and eighteen-year-old
boys. No one at Tule Lake Center would forget the events of Sunday evening,
February 21,1943.56 The arrests sent the camp into a panic. Many saw it as a
challenge and vowed never to register. Immediately petitions were circulated calling
for a general strike. At an emergency meeting of the combined Evacuee Planning
Board and Camp Council, cooler heads prevailed regarding a strike. The respected
members of the two representative groups concluded that a general strike would
likely have disrupted any semblance of normal life left in the center. A delegation
was appointed to negotiate with the Director for the release of the thirty-four
l4 Jacoby, 78.
" Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 77-79. See also, "15 Tuleans Are Sentenced To
Isolation Camp In Utah," The Tulean Dispatch, April 3, 1943. In a sort of kangaroo trial presided over
by Project Director Coverley, he sentenced 15 of the origina134 boys to banishment at Moab Utah
Isolation Camp. Some came back to Tule Lake When It became the Segregation Center.
se Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 147-152.
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unfortunate young men, and equally importantly to establish some sort of a working
relationship with the administration. 57
With one last opportunity to negotiate for a measure of cooperation from the
evacuees, Coverley chose to dig in his heals. Inmeetings with the delegation
Coverley refused categorically to release the arrested young men. The delegation
asked for guarantees there would be no more arrests; Coverley again refused. The
delegation proposed a mail-in registration to avoid the pressure from all sides caused
by the public registration process. Coverley would not consider any measure other
than the exact registration procedure prescribed by the WRA and the War
Department. After all, the director reasoned, reports were coming in from all the
other centers that registration was almost complete. 58 Tule Lake would be expected
to fall in line just like all the other centers. Finally the delegation suggested the
registration should be postponed until things calmed down in the camp. With Tule
Lake already falling behind by the day, this suggestion was probably the most
unacceptable to Coverley. Faced with the administration refusal to negotiate on any
of these issues, the delegation along with all the members of the Planning Board and
Community Council resigned their positions in protest. 59
Injust seventeen days between February 4 and February 21, Tule Lake had
undergone a transformation from a peaceful camp into "a seething cauldron of angry,
" Ibid.
sa "Registration at 2 Centers Near Finish," The Tulean Dispatch, February 18, 1943; "Jerome Sign-Up
Is On Schedule," The Tulean Dispatch, February 20, 1943; "83% Complete At Minidoka," The
Tulean Dispatch, February 25, 1943.
" Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 78.
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frightened, and intimidated people.',6() Sadly, Tule Lake became the scene of mob
violence as JACL members and others identified as pro-administration or moderates
were singled out for beatings by roving youths/" Evacuees withjobs in the
administrative area quit showing up for work for fear of being labeled collaborators.
The administration led by the hard nosed if not draconian Coverley countered with
more arrests of suspected trouble makers, and pressure on all segments of the
population to submit to the registration.
In the midst of this uproar, on February 23, his fourth day at Tule Lake,
Major Marshall made one important clarification for Nisei men of draft age, which at
least increased the number of registrations. As Army representative, Marshall posted
a mimeographed statement in the mess halls on the meaning of a yes and a no answer
for men of draft age. "Those who answer no to questions 27 and 28 cannot anticipate
that the Army of the United States will ever ask for their services.',62 Nisei men, who
had refused to register as a protest against the possibility of being drafted while
behind barbed wire, now realized they would be exempt from military service by
answering no to the loyalty questions. Therefore protest could be logged by
answering no, and punishment for refusing registration could be avoided. Many
Nisei stepped forward to register with negative answers to the key loyalty questions.
The registration process at Tule Lake, projected by the administration to take
about ten days, painfully dragged through March, as Project Director Coverley
60 Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 148.
" "13 Removed From Colony For Beatings," The Tulean Dispatch March I, 1943: "Thirteen Young
colonists were removed from the project Friday to await trial for perpetrating or attempting to
r:erpetrate beatings upon other colonists."
2 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 80.
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postponed the deadline several times in an attempt to pressure evacuees into
complience/" Finally on April 7,1943 registration ended at Tule Lake. By that time
Coverley had arrested more than 140 residents who were treated like criminals in
various states of confinement, including isolation pens, FBI camps and deserted CCC
camps. In spite of the arrests and pressure nearly 3,000 evacuees at Tule Lake,
mostly Issei, refused to register/"
At Tule Lake the percentage of male citizens (Nisei) refusing to register or
giving nonaffrrmative answers was high at 49 percent. The percentage of male
citizens giving no answers to the key loyalty questions at all the other centers was
relatively high at 25 percent. However, the astounding statistic is among the Issei.
The percentage of Issei men registering no answers at all the other centers except
Tule Lake was a mere 4 percent. At Tule Lake almost half, 42 percent of Issei men
either refused to register or registered with no answers.65 By the statistics we can
clearly see the influence of the Issei at the Tule Lake Center on the registration issue.
This group predominantly made up offarmers from central California had lost
everything as a result of relocation. In the first year at Tule Lake they were forced to
work harder than evacuees at other centers, doing the farm work they were sent there
to do. The statistics from the registration suggest that Issei at Tule Lake were utterly
disgusted with the United States. They were bitter and afraid of the outside.
63 "Citizen Registration Period Is Extended Until March 10: Special Concession Made To Give
Everyone Opportunity To Sign-Up," The Tulean Dispatch, March 2, 1943: "Those who have not
registered by that date will be considered as having violated the orders of the War Departmeot and the
War Relocation Authority and subject to such penalties as may be imposed." See also, "Alien Sign-
Up Sked For Wednesday," The Tulean Dispatch. March 2, 1943.
64 Weg1yn, Years of In/amy, 151.
65 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 62-63.
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Importantly, they knew they were as close to home at Tule Lake as they were likely
to be for the duration of the war. The final total for all evacuees at Tule Lake, male
and female 17 years of age and older, was 42 percent either answering no or refusing
to register.
From the time the registration officially closed on April 7, three months
would pass before the Tuleans learned the meaning of their responses on the loyalty
registration.i" Throughout the traumatic registration episode residents of the Tule
Lake Center, the Tuleans, continued to report to the packing sheds, pig farm and
poultry operation. Shipments of fresh vegetables continued to leave the camp bound
for the open market and the other relocation centers, procuring huge profits for the
WRA. No concession was ever made for the internees ofTule Lake because they
were turning in an unprecedented profit. In fact, residents of Tule Lake were treated
with perhaps the least consideration regarding the registration/"
As the first week of April came to a close, the camp began to calm down
considerably from the traumatic days, weeks and finally months of the registration.
Coverley and the WRA administration had no intention of killing the goose that laid
the golden egg. Regardless of their negative responses or refusal to register, it was
time for evacuees at Tule Lake to return to the project farms. Early crops such as
barley needed to be planted as soon as possible. The rich black soil needed
preparation for the vegetable crops. Taking into consideration the late start in the
66 "Segregation To Begin In September: Program For All Relocation Centers, To Segregate On "Basis
Of National Loyalty Or Sympathy," The Tulean Dispatch, July 12, 1943.
67 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 53-83. Thomas and Nishimoto break down the registration
camp by camp. In all centers the registration was bandied more skillfully than Tule Lake.
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spring of 1942, WRA administrators dared to expect more acreage in production the
second year. To produce tonnage similar to the astounding crop of 1942, a good deal
ofluck would again be necessary. Luck notwithstanding, the project farms would be
a site of continuous activity for the next seven or eight months.68
The second week of April evacuee farm workers returned to the fields of the
project farm. According to the camp newspaper, they returned with greater
enthusiasm than the year before.69 Perhaps the registration had been such a strain that
evacuees were glad to lose themselves in the hard work of the spring season on the
project farm. Perhaps the fact that they had done the job once before and knew what
to expect, and what was expected of them, gave the Tuleans confidence they could
handle the labor intensive demands of the farm. With no knowledge of the
consequences of the registration, perhaps some of the Tuleans possessed the attitude
that they could show their loyalty by their effort on the project farm.
Regardless of the reasons for their diligence, when the spring planting came
to an end in 1943, the project farm included the same variety of crops as the spring
before. The only difference between the two plantings was in acreage. The 1943
planting included an astounding 2,900 acres, 400 more acres in production than the
2,500 acres of 1942.70 Through the spring and summer of 1943 the Tuleans tended
the crops with characteristic skill. There is no record of discord in the fields of the
vast project farm in the summer of 1943. The Old Tuleans as they would come to be
68 "Occupational Survey Of Project Residents," A Tule Lake Interlude, May 27, 1943. Of the
~proximately 6,000 evacuees employed in the center 40"... worked in agriculture.
6 "Harvesting OfYegetables Begin On Project Farm,' The Tulean Dispatch, July 21,1943. Page 1
70 Ibid.
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known might not have worked with such sincerity if they had known what was in
store for the Tule Lake Center.
The crops of the project farm in the second season were destined to become
the legacy of the Old Tuleans. In the first year at Tule Lake they endured trying
conditions, and attempted to improve living standards in the camp through hard work
and reasonable interaction with the administration. When they clashed with the
administration they stood up for their rights with civility using law-abiding means.
The nature of the Tule Lake Center was in for a transformation.
Based on responses to the registration, a second forced relocation was in store
for the West Coast Japanese. Many of the residents who had participated in the
agricultural project at the Tule Lake Center were spending their last months at the
center in the summer of 1943. Over half of the 15,000, evacuees at Tule Lake would
leave for other destinations before the cold weather of late fall and early winter.
Corresponding with the exodus from the center was a migration of evacuees to the
center, as Tule Lake transformed into the segregation center for disloyal Japanese.
Chapter five recounts the tragic history of the segregation episode.
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ChapterS
Segregation: The Automatic Choice of Tule Lake
From the beginning of the indefinite leave program, National Director Dillon
S. Myer and the WRA were under fire. Many individuals in government and the
private sector were strongly against the leave program under any circumstances, and
they vehemently complained of lax judgment by the WRA in sending Japanese out
into the American public. In particular, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was certainly
not in favor of approving leave for Japanese Americans of questionable loyalty. The
autocratic director gave orders to agency personal to be especially thorough in
adjudicating applications, resulting in a mere trickle of citizens leaving the camps.'
After the trauma of the loyalty registration all the camps experienced a period
of welcome tranquility.' Myer had embraced the loyalty registration as an
opportunity to speed up the permanent relocation program, and to identify the loyal
Japanese from the disloyal. However registration did not serve to quiet criticism of
Myer's vision of relocating the great majority ofloyal Japanese from the camps.
When the results of the registration were made public there was an outcry in
Congress regarding the 'mass disloyalty' demonstrated by a large percentage of
evacuees. Myer and the WRA were accused of being "soft-on-Japs.t"
1 Hayashi, Democratizing The Enemy, 146-147.
2 Ibid, 148. Hayashi refers to this time as the "Quiet Period."
s Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 151. See also, The Segregation Program; A Statement for Appointed
Personnel in WRA Centers. WRA August I, 1943. Japanese-American Relocation Centers Records,
Cornell University Box 20, File 2.
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InMay of 1943, the United States Congress held hearings convened by
Congressman Martin Dies of Texas. Dies was Chairman of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, and the committee wanted explanations regarding the high
number of disloyal responses to the registration, and low number of Japanese citizens
volunteering for the military. Dillon Myer was subjected to a rough grilling in
hearings scrutinizing WRA programs, Many outrageous claims came out of the
inquiry, including that spies and saboteurs had been approved for indefinite leave by
the WRA. Myer took "soft-on-Jape" criticism personally, and rejected accusations
forcefully.
The chief investigator for the Committee on Un-American activities Robert E.
Stripling made the unfounded accusations involving spies and saboteurs. Myer
responded: "This statement reveals a complete ignorance of the manner in which this
agency is conducting its program. No evacuee is permitted to leave a center if there
is any indication that he would in any way endanger the national security." Myer
continued, "The statements of Mr. Stripling have the effect of misleading the public
on an important principle of democracy.?" Regardless of Myer's indignation, the fact
remained that in the spring of 1943 West Coast Japanese were discredited and
demonized even more emphatically than the year before. Bashing the incarcerated
Japanese population remained a source of political hay for government officials.s
Dillon Myer and a few social scientists working for the WRA were among a small
4 "Myer Refutes Statement That Spies, Saboteurs Released," The Tulean Dispatch June 10, 1943.
'Weglyn, Years o/Infamy, 153. Weglyn uses Senator A. B. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky, as an
example. Chandler went on a fact finding trip to five camps and declared that both Issei and Nisei
would "commit almost any act for their Emperor, and 60 percent of them are disloyal."
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minority of Americans who realized after one year that the relocation of West Coast
Japanese was a mistake. Most of the individuals in this group opposed relocation
from the start.
In a May 28, 1943 article published in The Tulean Dispatch, Myer was
quoted as saying, "administration has been difficult, and many loyal citizens have
been embittered by what they consider unfair treatment." Myer continued,
"establishment of relocation centers was a mistakel'" Myer's statements indicate that
he realized, in most cases where individuals responded to the loyalty registration in
the negative, treatment of the West Coast Japanese after Pearl Harbor had fostered
this so-ccalled disloyalty.
Notwithstanding his degree of enlightenment relative to the era, Myer's
sympathy lay squarely with the great majority of Japanese who were able to swallow
their pride and cooperate with the WRA throughout the relocation experience,
including the loyalty registration. Eighty-six percent of Japanese had in fact
answered yes to the key questions. Myer believed the eighty-six percent who
affirmed their loyalty should be relocated into the American public. With the Dies
Committee breathing down his neck, Myer was aware that in order to save the leave
program, something definitive had to be done to placate Congress, government
agencies, and the American public regarding the loyalty issue.
In May of 1943 amidst the backdrop of Dies Committee sensationalism,
Myer quietly summoned the Project Directors from each of the ten centers to
Washington D. C. Although many aspects of the WRA program were undoubtedly
6 "Establishment ofWRA Centers Mistake-Myer," The Tulean Dispatch. May 28, 1943.
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discussed, Myer brought the Project Directors to Washington for one main purpose.
He announced that because of developments including the results of the loyalty oath
and Dies Committee investigations, the WRA would undertake a program to isolate
the disloyal Japanese from the loyal.' No formal plans for the program were
discussed at the May conference, and importantly, Myer's decision on segregation of
disloyals was not made public. Directors returned to their projects knowing only that
there would definitely be a segregation program," Myer assigned top WRA
employees to the task of making arrangements for implementing the program.
Coincidently, on May 28, 1943 when Dillon Myer made his conunents to the effect
that the relocation was a mistake, details were being sorted out for an even more
repressive segregation center for those deemed disloyal.
On July 6, 1943 Myer was back testifying before the House Sub-conunittee
investigating the WRA, the alleged disloyalty of the Japanese, and the relocation in
general. Under another tense session of questioning from California Representative
John M. Costello, the chairman of the sub-conunittee, Myer became annoyed and
bluntly accused the House Un-American Activities Committee and its investigations
of accomplishing nothing but, "stirring up public hatred."? He pointed out further
that the world was watching and the conunittee was providing the enemy with
7 "Summary Notes on Segregation Conference of WRA Officials," Denver Colorado. July 26-27,
1943, JARCRlCU, Box 11, File I, page 1.
8 Ibid.
9 "Myer Says Committee Stirs 'Public Hatred' Segregation Asked," The Tulean Dispatch, July 10,
1943.
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material which might be used to convince the people of the Far East that, "the United
States was undemocratic and is fighting a racial war.,,10
Myer then changed gears by announcing that plans were virtually completed
for segregation of evacuees on the basis of national sympathy or loyalty. Myer told
the committee, "Segregation wilI be undertaken for the purpose of promoting
harmony in the centers and to facilitate the program of outside relocation for loyal
citizens and law-abiding aliens now in relocation centers,"!' With extraordinary
speed the Senate passed a resolution on the same day, asking the President of the
United States to instruct the WRA to, "segregate those evacuees whose loyalty to the
United States is questionable or who are known to be disloyal from those whose
loyalty has been established, for the purpose of establishing additional safeguards
against sabotage by such persons.?"
On July 20, 1943, Tule Lake Center Director Harvey M. Coverley announced
Dillon Myer had informed him by telephone call that Tule Lake had been designated
as the center to which evacuees considered disloyal to the United States would be
assigned.f Detailed information on the segregation program was lacking. Coverley
cautioned evacuees not to accept rumors, and to be patient until more information
to Ibid.
II "Program For All Relocation Centers, To Segregate on 'Basis Of National Loyalty Or Sympathy,'"
The Tulean Dispatch. July 12, 1943.
12 Ibid. Reasons for Segregation given by Myer of the WRA and the United States Senate were
contrasting to say the least.
13 "rule Lake Designated For Those Considered Disloyal: Announcement Made By Director Myer,
Detailed Information Still Lacking; Project Directors To Meet For Discussion," The Tulean Dispatch,
July 20, 1943.
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was available. Coverley pointed out that on July 26-27 a WRA conference would be
held in Denver to finalize procedures for carrying out segregation. 14
Dr. Harold Stanley Jacoby, head of internal security at Tule Lake Center,
remembered viewing the announcement with dismay. "For Tule Lake this would
mean that the so-called 'loyal Americans' would be the ones who would have to
move," Jacoby recalled, "which would mean in effect that the very ones who, under
the most trying conditions were willing to put their loyalty 'on the line' would be the
ones who would suffer the requirements of another move."IS Jacoby traveled with
Harvey Coverley to the Denver conference as a representative of the Tule Lake
Center. Jacoby was determined to, "seek that some other center than Tule Lake be
designated as the segregation center, but when we arrived in Denver we found the
die had already been cast. There was no way that Tule Lake could escape its fate.,,16
Indeed, Dillon S. Myer opened the conference on segregation with
straightforward remarks. "There are two or there points that should be made clear.
There is no argument whether we are going to do the job in spite of the fact that it
may cause many heartaches and that we may have in certain spots even more
emotion than we had during the Registration.t''" Although Myer acknowledged that
it was impossible to anticipate all the problems which were bound to arise, he
expressed confidence in the ability of the assembled staff to work through any
situation. Myer then sealed the fate of the Tule Lake Center. "After weeks of effort
14 Ibid.
15 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 82.
16 Ibid, 83.
17 Myer, "Summary Notes on Segregation Conference of WRA Officials."
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by various WRA personnel, it has been definitely decided that Tille Lake will be the
segregation center. ,,18
Myer gave, "four good reasons for choosing Tille Lake.,,19 First, as one of the
largest centers, with a capacity of fifteen or sixteen thousand, Tule Lake was big
enough to house Japanese Americans considered disloyal. Second, Tille Lake was
within the evacuated area and therefore more difficult for evacuees to relocate from.
Both are logical enough reasons for choosing Tille Lake as the segregation center but
not especially compelling. Other centers were as large or nearly as large as Tille
Lake and location within the evacuated area seems the least important factor.
Manzanar was also within the evacuated area.
The third and fourth reasons for choosing Tille Lake were the most important.
Tille Lake, Myer asserted, "has the possibility for agricultural production to take care
of not only that Center but to help provide food for other centers as well. Because
relocation will not be permitted, there will be need for keeping evacuees busy."zo
Considering the fact that in 1942 the Tille Lake project farm raised a variety of crops
worth over one million dollars, for Dillon Myer to categorize Tule Lake as having
the 'possibility of agricultural production' is utterly ludicrous. The work of the
Tuleans on the project farm was unique, ifunderappreciated, among the ten
relocation centers. Obviously Tille Lake was a valuable asset because of its huge
agricultural production, an asset the WRA naturally wanted to protect by continuing
to provide a large captive work force for the project farm. Even more acreage was
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
'0 Ibid.
102
ripening beautifully in the summer of 1943. Already in late July evacuees at Tule
Lake were enjoying early vegetables.i' Finally Myer offered his fourth reason for
choosing Tule Lake. "It appeared. as a result of the registration that more evacuees
would necessarily remain at Tule Lake than at any other center.',22 From the WRA
perspective it seemed only logical to send perceived disloyals to the site of the
greatest initial concentration of evacuees who refused to register or answered no to
the loyalty questions. Statistics regarding the percentage of evacuees refusing to
register or responding negatively on the loyalty registration conveniently pointed to
Tule Lake. However, the Tuleans who answered the loyalty questions with negative
responses, or refused to register, did so for specific reasons which differed greatly
from many of the segregates soon to be pouring into the Tule Lake Center. The
WRA created the segregation center without considering the many diverse reasons
for choosing "disloyalty."
After Myer's opening remarks the conference broke up into committees to
discuss and come to decisions regarding the various and complex issues associated
with implementing the segregation program. Of all the issues the conference faced,
the most important questions were, "Whom are we going to segregate, and how do
we determine who falls into those groupS?,,23The formula which resulted from the
conference divided evacuees to be segregated into three categories. The first group
21 "Harvesting Of Vegetables Begins On Project Fann," The Tu/ean Dispatch, July 21, 1943. "After
many months of cultivation planting, hoeing and irrigation the vegetable fann began its harvest this
week." Two of the crops taken at this early date were potatoes and peas, providing a delicious classic
American dish 'New Potatoes and Peas.'
22 Myer, "Summary Notes on Segregation Conference ofWRA Officials."
2J Ibid. .
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designated for segregation was labeled the Repatriates and Expatriates. They
included aliens and citizens who asked for repatriation or expatriation, and had not
withdrawn their request before June 1, 1943. This group had no recourse in terms of
any appeal process. They were automatically ticketed for Tule Lake.
The second group was dubbed the Registrants. This group included all those
scheduled for segregation as a result of their responses during the loyalty registration.
The Registrants were further broken down into four different categories:
a Those who refused to register at all-virtually none at any project except
Tule Lake.
b. Those citizens or aliens who answered "No" to the loyalty question, No. 28.
c. Those who wrote a qualified answer, neither "Yes" or "No" which required
interpretation.
d. Those who did register but refused to answer question 28.24
Evacuees who fell into one of these four categories would be given a hearing before
a Board of Review on segregation at their relocation center. Hearings were to
determine if the person knew the consequences of his answers on the loyalty
registration. Did he understand the questions? Did he know what he was saying?
Most importantly, did he still feel that way?
The third group was listed simply as All Others. This group included
evacuees with some adverse intelligence reports filed against them, including those
who had been denied leave clearance. This group was to be handled on an individual
basis, at the discretion of the project director." Project Directors had authority, based
on the hearings, to recommend placement of the individual to the Washington D. C.
Office of the WRA. The National Office then made the ultimate decision whether the
24 Ibid.
2S Ibid.
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evacuee would stay in the center and be eligible for relocation or be sent to the
segregation center."
At the end of the meeting Myer chaired a question and answer session with
project directors to address their concerns. Some of the questions put to the National
Director were ridiculous and amusing. Regarding qualified answers to question 28, a
project director asked Myer, apparently in all seriousness, "What if the answer
written after 28 is 'No and I certainly hope Japan wins the war tomorrow.' Is that a
negative or qualified answer?" Myer responded, "Clearly that is a negative answer.
Merely because words are added does not mean it is a qualified answer.,,27 Other
questions and observations of individual project directors were more thoughtful and
logical. One project director noted that in his center he knew of evacuees who were
loyal to the United States, and either answered no or refused to register as a protest.
"He knew what it meant but he did it as a protest because he felt the evacuation was
unfair. Said 'no' merely as a protest. When asked if he was willing to change his
answer he said, 'no I want the protest to stand.' He is not loyal to Japan but he is
unwilling to change his answer." Myer replied emphatically, "If the answer stands as
'no' he goes to Tule Lake. He can find a better way to protest if that is what he wants.
If he stands on 'no' he goes to Tule Lake.,,28 Here we see an example of the side of
26 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 16. Of course ifhe the individual was already at Tule Lake he would stay there. This question
could well have been asked by Tule Lake Project Director Coverley since Tule Lake was the only
center where evacuees refused to register in significant numbers. See also, "Studies of Segregates At
Manzanar," WRA Community Analysis Section. Oetober26, 1943, JARCRlCU, Box II, File I. This
situation occurred many times during the hearings. Evacuees professed loyalty to America but insisted
that the answer stay NO. The standard comment summing up the hearing by the recorder was,
"Protest against abridgment of citizenship rights. Recommend Tule Lake"
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Dillon Myer that could be extremely inflexible. Myer had very little patience with
evacuees who chose to persist with no answers.
In a seeming contradiction, Myer displayed compassion by stressing the point
to the project directors that it would not be the practice of the WRA to break up
families involuntarily. Therefore family members who answered the loyalty
questions with a 'yes' would be allowed to follow their immediate family member
who said 'no,' to Tule Lake. Children under the age of sixteen would generally have
no choice, and would be required to follow their parents. Children sixteen and older
could decide for themselves whether to follow their parents to Tule Lake. Myer also
stated that no evacuee would be forced to leave Tule Lake when the camp became
the Segregation Center, regardless of their responses to the loyalty registratiou/"
Project directors and delegates left the two day Segregation Conference on
Wednesday July 28, 1943, with the responsibility of deciding the complicated issue
of who should go to the new Tule Lake Segregation Center. After the time of calm
following the registration, the subsequent hearings conducted at the various projects
served to bring the whole painful episode back into prominence. The difference was,
now the consequences of maintaining negative responses were clearly defined.
The hearings present a vivid picture of the family and personal conflict the
issue produced among the evacuees, and many were filled with emotion. The
recorder often noted tears on the part of the evacuee being interviewed, as he or she
29 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 104 Thomas and Nishimoto offer that Myer wanted to
reward "loyal" Tuleans by giving them a choice. Administrators at Tule Lake were ordered to exert
pressure on loyal Tuleans to leave. However, avoiding organized resistance among the loyals to
relocation was imperative.
106
painfully related the individual situation and choice" The hearings, held to ascertain
whether or not the evacuees still held to their pro-Japan stance, served as a forum for
evacuees to express their true feelings to the authorities, many for the first time. For
example, one young man who was the only member of his family of five to answer
no to the loyalty questions, was asked if he wished to change his answer. "No, I'll
keep it the same," he replied. "I was born in America and raised here. 1have never
seen Japan. I thought I was an American. But I'm not an American. I'm a Jap.
Otherwise, why would I be in here? Read the newspapers. All you see is that a Jap's
a Jap and all that stuff.,,31 This young man's disillusionment with the country of his
birth was typical of many evacuees who refused to change their answers.
The hearings generally resulted in evacuees professing no loyalty to Japan,
and no hope, or intention of pursuing a future in Japan. As historian Michi Weglyn
described the process in her 1976 work Years of Infamy, "Impassioned outbursts
against a country which had jailed them, slandered them, and stripped them of their
rights had little to do with the evacuees' disloyalty to America or loyalty to
Japan .. .It was a registering of grief, disappointment, anger and sometimes rage
against what they considered disloyalty on a mammoth scale-America's disloyalty to
them.',J2 After such outbursts the WRA employees conducting the interviews would
affirm that they realized the individual was angry. The overriding issue, however
was whether or not the internee was loyal to the United States.
'0 Studies of Segregates At Manzanar, WRA Community Analysis Section October 31,1943,
JARCRICU Box 11, File I.
3lWRA Community Analysis Notes January IS, 1944, JARCRICU Box 1, File 31.
32 Weglyn, Years of Info my, 157.
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Evacuees overwhelmingly chose to let their answers stand as no. The
hearings failed to produce a significant number of evacuees who agreed to change
their answers on the loyalty questions to yes, and the hearings actually resulted in a
higher number of evacuees than anticipated requesting transfer to Tule Lake.
Although segregation broke up families, many families with mixed answers on the
loyalty questions decided to stay together by all following "disloyal" family
members to Tule Lake. Requests for repatriation and expatriation, mostly from
Manzanar, continued to increase, resulting in a steady flow of new evacuees into
Tule Lake, further complicating the situation, and seriously overcrowding the new
segregation center.33
Many evacuees chose the new segregation center because they felt there
would be substantial advantages. The prospect of employment and a safe haven for
the duration of the war were strong pulls for evacuees from other centers to choose
"disloyalty." The WRA announced in the summer of 1943, that it intended to
severely cut back on employment at the relocation centers. As usual Tule Lake was
the exception. The Segregation Center would continue to offer employment for those
willing to work on the huge project farm. The fact that agriculture at Tule Lake
required many hundreds of workers was well publicized, in effect rewarding the
"disloyal" with jobs." The Old Tuleans foresaw even more substantial advantages to
remaining at Tule Lake. After making their living conditions as comfortable as
possible, they would not be required to move either to another center or to the
33 "The Significant Factors In Requests For Repatriation And Expatriation" WRA Community
Analysis Section, Project Analysis Series No. 16. April 19, 1944, JARCR/CU, Box I, File 27.
34 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage,I03.
108
outside, for the duration of the war. Many Old Tuleans sought to maintain the
stability afforded by the project farm or in related agricultura1 operations.
The transition ofTule Lake to the segregation center was well underway by
the first week in September 1943. Changes in the physical plant and camp
administration were moving rapidly. A new eight foot high "manproof" fence
surrounded the center. The military guard was increased from approximately two
hundred men to full battalion strength, and new housing was built for eight hundred
more military personnel, and half a dozen tanks were lined up outside the fence in
full view of the residents."
The oppressive prison-like atmosphere at the revamped segregation center
reflected the attitude of the newly appointed Project Director Raymond R. Best.
Immediately following the conference in Denver, Dillon Myer appointed Best to
replace Harvey Coverley as project director. When he got the call to Tule Lake, Best
already had extensive experience in WRA administration. However until he went to
Tule Lake, where he would remain for the life of the center, Best had constantly been
on the move from one job to another. He had spent time as project director at three
different relocation centers. Most recently Best was working as director at Leupp,
Arizona Isolation Camp, one of two centers in the west set up to house
"troublemakers" sent from the relocation centers/"
3S Ibid, 106.
36 "Best Greets Residents; Center Policies Told To Combat Spreading Of Unfounded Rumors," The
Tulean Dispatch. August 4, 1943. In his remarks to the Tule Lake community regarding the upcoming
segregation Best assured evacuees, "no major changes in policy have been contemplated."
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In a twist of fate, evacuee Harry Ueno was transferred from Leupp Isolation
Center to Tule Lake soon after the camp became the Segregation Center. Ueno knew
what to expect from Raymond Best. He recalled his 'run-ins' with Best at Leupp.
"When I was at Leupp I fought with Best for my rights. I had so many arguments
with him. One time, he told me, 'Harry, this is Leupp, it's wide open country,
nothing but sage brush. If anything happened to anybody they would never find them
in a million years.' Ueno went on to further describe the sadistic bent to Best's
personality. "Then he started scare tactics, you know right by the side of the building,
target shooting. I knew what he intended, mental torture.',37 It is safe to say that
Raymond Best's performance at Tule Lake would make him one of the individuals
most hated by the evacuees. Best also raised the ire of the more liberal-minded
civilian employees at Tule Lake. He told Chief of Internal Security Harold S. Jacoby
he intended to disband the Evacuee Warden Corp, a group Jacoby had taken great
pride in forming and leading. Best would beef up the internal security force
considerably with professionally trained law enforcement people." Harold S. Jacoby,
along with several other WRA workers, turned in their resignations before the
transition to the Segregation Center was complete.
Agriculture at Tule Lake had always been a source of contention between the
administration and the old Tuleans. However in the weeks prior to segregation, hard
37 Harry Ueno, quoted inRoss and Ross, Second Kinenhi, 97.
38 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation To Segregation, 85-86. Jacoby recalled that Raymond Best
accepted his resignation unhesitatingly. Jacoby would accept a job offer from the first Tule Lake
Project Director, Elmer Shirrell, inChicago with the Chicago Japanese Resettlement Office, where
Shirrell was Director. Jacoby's memoir expresses no regret that he left Tule Lake when he did. See
also: "Internal Security," The Tulean Dispatch. October 16, 1943.
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work and tranquility carried the day. The second harvest was in full swing well
before the transition from relocation to segregation. In the fall of 1943, vegetable
shipping started earlier than the year before. The early spring planting gave the crops
plenty of time to ripen to their full potential. The packing sheds had already sent out
forty-two railcar loads of vegetables to different relocation centers by the end of the
first week of September 1943, ironically including, potatoes to Minidoka Idaho
Relocation Center, located in the heart of "Famous Potato" country.39 The packing
sheds at Tule Lake were much improved from the first harvest. Both units were now
highly automated state-of-the-art facilities including box makers capable of turning
out shipping crates at an astounding rate. Each packing shed employed over one
hundred skilled men and women, many of whom had been employed in vegetable
packing concerns in Califotnia before the war.
As the transition to the Segregation Center drew near, skilled packing shed
workers, scheduled to leave Tule Lake, often worked side by side with people who
were staying at the project, and new workers set to take the place of "loyals" leaving
Tule Lake, were trained and proficient before anyone moved. Unlike the packing
facilities, the project farm was not nearly as well prepared for the transition to
segregation. There was plenty of work on the project farm in the fall of 1943, just as
the year before the farm needed any and all able-bodied harvesters.'" The transition
from relocation would accentuate the usual manpower shortage on the project farm.
39 "Tule Lake Packing Shed Scene Of Much Activity," The Tulean Dispatch. September 7, 1943.
40 Ibid.
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The migration commenced on September 13, 1943, with train loads of
"loyal" Tuleans leaving the Tule Lake Center. The record shows that slightly more
than six thousand evacuees left the center over the following week. Approximately
six thousand "disloyal" Tuleans stayed at Tule Lake. Estimates vary considerably on
how many technically "loyal" Tuleans stayed at the center." Many "loyals" rejected
administrative pressure to leave and were allowed to stay at Tule Lake. Often they
simply did not show up for their scheduled evacuation, hiding out until the train they
were supposed to be on was gone. Apparently they were happy to hide out as long as
possible. The administration announced on September 23, 1943, that all colonists
including those remaining in the center were required to be fingerprinted and
photographed at once, and pre-segregation records were considered invalid.42
Beginning September 18, "disloyal" evacuees started arriving at Tule Lake.
Over the next month the segregation center grew to 18,000 residents, making Tille
Lake by far the largest camp. According to the WRA, when the migration was over,
10,500 men, women, and children had moved to Tule Lake.43 Although the events
leading up to the migration were extremely emotional for the evacuees, the actual
movement was carried out without Incident."
The new residents from the nine other camps recognized immediately that
agriculture at Tule Lake was the only aspect which was more developed than their
41 Jacoby, Tule Lake From Relocation to Segregation, 85. Jacoby puts the number of loyal Tuleans
staying at the center at 2500. See also, Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 104. Thomas and
Nishimoto place the loyals staying at around 1100.
42 "Colonists Remaining Must, At Once Be Photographed and Finger-Printed," The Tulean Dispatch,
September 25, 1943. The discrepancy in numbers ofloyal Tuleans remaining comes because some old
Tuleans never submitted to this documentation.
43 "WRA Tule Now Houses 18,000; 73,000 In Other Centers," The Tulean Dispatch October 4, 1943.
44 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 84-112.
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former centers. In fact, according to the transferees, Tule Lake lagged behind in
living accommodations, sanitary conditions and food quantity and quality.
George Kunitani was a community leader from Jerome Arkansas Relocation
Center, he was elected spokesman for the Jerome contingent. In a letter to a
Caucasian WRA employee at Jerome, Kunitani related his first impressions ofTule
Lake. "The conditions existing at this center are a mystery to me ... There is a definite
clean-up job to be done and I think the newcomers will do the work. Condition of the
shower-rooms and toilets are beyond words ... The over-crowdedness of this center
should be cared for as soon as humanly possible. It was really a crime to induct so
many people without proper facilities." The WRA administration at Tule Lake also
did not inspire a feeling of well-being in the new residents. Kunitani continued his
letter with a description of his first meeting with Raymond R. Best:
On my second day here I went to see Mr. Raymond R. Best, the Project
Director. My skepticism about Mr. Best lies in the fact that he does not seem
to understand the Japanese at all. ..He certaiuly has left us with an
unforgettable bad impression when he started his conversation by saying "I
don't recognize any group activity, I don't care what you have done in the
past, but as far as this center is concerned you shall represent no group or
groups of people; I am not interested in your demands." Imagine, a project
director speaking in that tone!! We went there to meet him, not to make
demands or even a request. It was very rude of him to receive us in that
marmer.
The intransigence of the project director was just one of the obstacles the
newcomers to the center faced. The transferees quickly realized they were at an
obvious disadvantage to the Old Tuleans. The Old Tuleans had the best of everything
in the center. Of course, since most had been at the center for well over one year,
45 "Letter From a Evacuee Newly Arrived in Tule Lake," Community Analysis Report No 34, October
15,1943, JARCRlCU, Box 7, File I.
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they had the preferred housing. Adding to the consternation of the transferees, after
the loyals relocated from Tule Lake, and before the transferees began to arrive, an
interim of one week, the Old Tuleans stripped the vacated rooms of shelving,
partitions and furniture, leaving the transferees with bare, ransacked apartments. The
Old Tuleans also controlled the good jobs and supervisory positions in the center.
Most importantly, the transferees became aware that the majority of the Old Tuleans
did not share many of the transferees zeal for Japan. Included in this group were the
"loyals" with important supervisory positions they refused to relinquish through
relocation. Many of the Old Tuleans were also on good terms with the administration.
Although loyals did not publicize the fact that they had said yes to the loyalty
questions, it did not take long for the truly disloyal transferees to identify the
so-called fence-sitters and loyals in the center.
Animosity between transferees the Old Tuleans was immediate. Many
transferees had nothing but disdain for what they saw as the Ole Tuleans spineless
pro-administration attitude. The transferees noted the overstocked canteens
combined with poor food in the mess halls, and the poor facilities in general. In short
they had no respect for the Old Tuleans, who realized equally quickly that this new
group was going to be hard to handle.46 For their part the Old Tuleans saw many of
the transferees as dangerous hot-heads.
46 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 226-235. Thomas and Nishimoto break down the evacuees
into three basic categories. I. Those who were aggressively even fanatically loyal to Japan. 2. Those
who were undecided in their loyalties and were waiting to decide until the war was over. Known as
fence-sitters, many were attached to the United States and American culture. 3. Those who had no
attraction for Japan and preferred the prospect of a future in America. This group was overweighted
with the Old Tuleans.
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In fact, it was the Old Tuleans who were totally unprepared for the challenges
of segregation. They were entrenched in camp hierarchy because of their longevity.
They were not organized to repel a group of young men determined to organize the
camp in a conservative movement to pursue Japanese values in order to better adjust
to a future in Japan." Informants imbedded in the camp reported, "The transferees
also quickly assumed leadership in the promised pursuit of the Japanese way oflife.
Japanese language schools sprang up in different parts of the proiect.?" This and
similar cultural initiatives were accompanied by unsubtle pressure on the Old
Tuleans to participate in pursuing Japanese culture in the center.
It did not take long for the militant transferees to initiate a concerted agenda
of non-cooperation in the center. Random acts of vandalism became common.
Windows were broken in camp establishments with which the transferees had
grievances such as the Housing Office and canteens. This sort of rowdyism was
totally unknown at the Tule Lake Center before segregation.
The combined effect of misguided WRA policy and serious divisions within
the Japanese Community led to rapidly escalating tension between the hugely
disparate factions and the WRA administration. Serious trouble at the Tule Lake
Segregation Center was inevitable. These developments were not what the vast
majority of Old Tuleans envisioned when they resolved to stay at the center. Indeed,
they were trapped in a frightening position along with loyals who had accompanied
family members to Tule Lake, "The changes in Tule Lake Center have been so
47 Ibid, 111.
.. Ibid., 226.
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radical that my interest in residing here no longer prevails," a young woman in the
Old Tulean group remarked in her diary entry dated November 3, 1943. "I'm now at
a loss as to why I did not leave during the train movements. It is best to play safe and
keep one's mouth tightly sealed.'.49
•• WRA Community Analysis Section Project Analysis Series No. 14 March 27, 1944, Page II,
JARCRlCU, Box I, File 26.
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Chapter 6
The End of Agriculture
It took just one month from the arrival of the first transferees for a crisis to
develop at the new segregation center. Nonetheless, the callous actions of the WRA
administration and in particular the local Project Director: Raymond R. Best, served
to bind the evacuees in a common cause, at least in this instance. Not surprisingly,
the crisis involved the agricultoral project at the center.
The Tule Lake Segregation Center was created with no consideration for the
diverse reasons internees chose the stigma of "disloyalty." With segregation Tule
Lake held a more heterogeneous population than any of the original relocation
centers, which had been filled, as much as possible, with people from the same or
neighboring locations on the West Coast. This was especially true of Tule Lake
Relocation Center with its predominant population of Central Valley farmers.
Decisions to transfer to Tule Lake were, for the great majority, based on factors
which had nothing to do with affinity for Japan. The prospects of keeping the family
unit together, employment, and not being forced to relocate into the hostile American
public were strong magnets pulling evacuees to Tule Lake. Reduced to the lowest
common denominator, a desire for inunediate security was the overriding factor in
choosing Tule Lake. Certainly this is also true for the Old Tuleans who chose to stay.
In fact, the new segregation center had a population as diverse in its attitudes as any
relocation center. The important difference at Tule Lake was the presence of a much
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larger population of individuals brought together from all the centers, who possessed
strong positions of affiliation with and support for Japan.
The significant change in personnel caused by the transition from relocation
to segregation center at Tule Lake resulted in a setback in the harvesting pace on the
project farm. After an excellent start to the season, six thousand "loyals" had left the
center at a critical time in the harvest. Accordingly, the first priority of recently
appointed Project Director Raymond Best was to send able-bodied men to the fields.l
The project farm required hundreds of new workers. The situation was simple: if the
transferees were not willing to go to work on the farm, crops would be left in the
field.2
The vast influx of new arrivals allayed WRA officials' fears, however, and
by the second week in October the work force at the project farm was reasonably
stable. Over 1,000 workers were piling into the trucks headed for the fields every
day.' The packing sheds were handling all the produce delivered with expert
efficiency. The camp newspaper ran an article featuring the impressive packing shed
operation. "As truck loads of fresh, crisp vegetables arrive they are unloaded by men
and washed and trimmed by women who are experts. Next the vegetables are packed
and rolled along automatic rollers to refrigerated railway cars.?" Employment at the
I "Are You Doing Your Bit?" The Tulean Dispatch. September 23, 1943. In an interview on the
harvest situation Best remarked "The response has been deemed inadequate."
2 "Manpower Shortage Hits Project Farms," The Tulean Dispatch, September 25, 1943.
3 WRA Community Analysis Series No. 14 March 27, 1944, Page 10, JARCR/CU, Box I, File 26.
4 "Packing Shed Depot For Vegetables," The Tulean Dispatch, October 5, 1943.
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packing sheds had always been a source of pride for internees skilled and fortunate
enough to work there.
Harvest work on the project farm, however, was no more harmonious than it
had been the year before. Workers were not satisfied with working and living
conditions, and bitterly complained about the food in the mess halls. Most
distressingly, the center mess halls were not getting deliveries of camp-produced
food products, including pork, chicken, and eggs. Vegetables served were said to be
inferior in quantity and quality. The finest produce, internees grumbled, was shipped
through the packing sheds. Finally, workers' safety, both in the fields and packing
sheds, was also a consideration. Farm work is notoriously dangerous, and internees
routinely performed dangerous tasks for the sake of expediting the harvest.
Within a matter of weeks, such considerations prompted many segregates to
question the worth of harvesting vegetables for eight cents per hour. Work crews,
strongly influenced by activist transferees, began quietly organizing-informally
electing representatives to lodge formal complaints with the administration. Before
any formal complaints had been registered, however, on October 15, tragedy struck.
After another inadequate noon meal, farm workers were in a particularly surly frame
of mind. S As they piled into trucks returning to the fields for the afternoon harvest
session, a guard at the front gate held up the convoy for a minor bureaucratic
'Thomas and Nishimoto. The Spoilage, 115. See also WRA Community Analysis Series No. 14
March 27,1944, pages 11-16, JARCRlCU, Box I, File 26. This report, although written from the
point of view of the WRA, gives a good explanation of farm worker grievances. See also Weglyn
Years Qflnfamy, 160.
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technicality," Although some workers returned to their lodgings and refused to report
for the afternoon session, most returned to the trucks transporting them to the fields.
At about 1:30 in the afternoon, a truck carrying twenty-nine workers tried to pass
another truck also loaded with workers. The passing truck, apparently going too fast,
hit the soft-shoulder and overturned, pinning several internees to the ground and
seriously injuring numerous others. Internees from the second truck ran to the
accident and frantically worked to free the trapped men. One man, 53-year-old
Tatsuto Kashima, originally from San Francisco, and a recent transferee from Topaz
Utah Relocation Center, died of chest injuries shortly after the accident,"
The tragedy plunged Tule Lake into a situation similar to the registration
episode, where every day seemingly brought a new crisis. After the accident the farm
workers returned from the fields to the center, and the recently appointed
representatives of the work crews met to discuss the situation. For many internees,
Tatsuto Kashima's death brought their sinunering anger at the conditions at Tule
Lake to a boil. Making matters worse, rumors quickly spread that the driver of the
truck in the accident was only sixteen years old-too young and irresponsible, many
internees complained, to be transporting workers perched precariously on a flat-bed
6 Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage. 114.
7 "Farm Accident Is Fatal To Topazan," The Tulean Dispatch, October 16, 1943. A total of 12 were
hospitalized. Four were in critical condition, but all survived.
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truck. The workers' safety had been ignored, resulting in a horrifying tragedy, and
many internees believed that the WRA was to blame.8
That evening, farm workers and particularly the group of representatives
dispersed to their various mess halls, resolved to hold broader elections within each
block. These block delegates would form the official group of representatives to
present complaints to Project Director Best.9 The first action of the representative
body, chosen in block elections on October 17, 1943, was to dub themselves the
"Daihyo Sha Kai." a Japanese term which loosely translated means 'Representative
Body.'10 Inreality, the Daihyo Sha Kai was heavily weighted with activist pro-Japan
transferees, who immediately began compiling a list of complaints against the WRA,
including "broken-down plumbing in the latrines, overcrowding, scarcity of jobs, and
above all, deficiencies in food supplied to the mess halIS."l1 The meeting concluded
with the appointment of sub-committees to study such problems, and report back to
the Daihyo Sha Kai at a later date.
The tragic farm accident became the watershed event for the political
direction the center would take for the remainder of its troubled existence.V The
leaderless Old Tuleans lost influence very quickly. The newcomers who formed
Daihyo Sha Kai came together at Tule Lake from the other relocation centers where
they had been leaders of small minority groups. They felt sincerely that they were
• WRA Community Analysis Series No 14. March 27,1944, page 6.Thomas and Nishimoto, The
Spoilage, 119. Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 115; Weglyn, Years of lrfamy, 116. The driver
was later identified as being nineteen years of age.
'WRA Community Analysis Series No 14. March 27, 1944, Page 6.
10 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 119.
II Ibid, 119.
12 Ibid, 118.
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qualified to lead the people at Tule Lake as a whole since the minorities they had led
before were now the majority at the Segregation Center. The existence of hundreds
of Old Tuleans, and hundreds of transferees who came to Tule Lake for many
diverse reasons, belied the radicals' assumption that registration and segregation had
brought together a majority of like-minded Japanese-Americans. However, the
leaders who emerged at Tule Lake in the fall of 1943 were experienced in the politics
of the relocation centers. They were men who had held a measure of influence at
their respective camps. They knew how a camp was organized, and how to locate the
points of dissatisfaction at the new segregation center and capitalize upon them to
establish a following. 13
Camp Director Ray Best had ears and eyes throughout the camp, as well as
extensive dossiers on many of the transferees, and he knew almost instantly the
makeup of the Daihyo Sha Kili.14 As a WRA report on the aftermath of the death of
Kashima succinctly stated, "The group of leaders, dominated if not totally composed
of hot-headed men, worked carefully. They seized on the death of the farm worker as
something with broad popular appeal.,,15 Indeed, for several days after the truck
accident no one reported for work. Daihyo Sha Kai had declared an informal
moratorium on the harvest while they formulated their preparations for the public
13 WRA Project Analysis Series No. 14 March 27, 1944, Page 7. "Important men were from Jerome,
Poston, and Heart Mountain." One man from Poston had been a leader of a general strike In 1942.
14 WRA Project Analysis Series No. 14 March 27, 1944, page 7. This report Slates that activities of the
leaders of Daihyo Sha Kai were well known before they arrived at Tu1e Lake.
"WRA Community Analysis Series No.14 March 27, 1944, page 9.
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funeral and decided upon the proper approach to make to the Project Director
regarding necessary improvements at the center.
Like his predecessors, one of Best's primary goals was to oversee the
successful harvesting of the vegetable crop. Using the The Tulean Dispatch, Best
issued a strong warning to farm workers: "In the immediate situation the entire farm
crop needs to be harvested. These are vegetables that the residents of Tule Lake will
be eating this winter. The crop will not be lost... The situation is the responsibility,
pure and simple, of the residents ofTule Lake Center.?" Not surprisingly, Best did
not to mention the profits at stake for the WRA. The Director concluded with a
deadline. "If farm workers are not interested enough to send official spokesmen to
the administration by 8:33 A.M., October 21st, it will be necessary for the WRA to
request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees.',17
Failing to elicit any response from his ultimatum in the Dispatch, Best issued
an appeal for any representative committee to discuss the problem. The members of
Daihyo Sha Kai were looking forward to clashing heads with Best. They had one
priority, however, which they determined must come before any negotiations: a
public funeral for their fallen comrade. Indeed, many people in the center wanted to
pay respects to the man who had become a symbol of their maltreatment at the hands
of the United States, the WRA, and the camp administration.
Representatives had initially approached Best about using the outdoor stage
for the event, scheduled for October 23. Best had given a terse verbal confirmation.
16 "Crop Must Be Harvested," The Tulean Dispatch, October 20, 1943.
17 Ibid.
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After receiving no cooperation on the harvest matter, Best formally withdrew his
permission for the public funeral on October 22. "In reply to your request to use the
outdoor stage for funeral purposes," he informed internees, "my final answer is that
no public funeral will be allowed at this time. For your information funerals will be
held in the customary locations as they have since the opening of this center.,,18
Rather than intimidate a resistant work force, Best's reversal served to bind
the evacuees in a common sense of persecution by and hostility for the
administration. Capitalizing on the outpouring of animosity, the Daihyo Sha Kai
went ahead with the public funeral, and brazenly vowed to run out any Army or
WRA representatives who showed up. Two thousand residents attended the funeral
held on the outdoor stage, and a group of tough young men-said to be from Jerome
Arkansas Relocation Center-manhandled a Reports Officer sent by the project
director to take photographs, destroying his camera and throwing him out. The
prestige of the Daihyo Sha Kai soared. 19
The Daihyo Sha Kai was ready to send a negotiating committee to meet with
the project director to begin working out problems in the camp by October 26. The
sub-committees had made reports on the various grievances which were now well
known, and which never seemed to improve. Everyone realized evacuees had only
one bargaining chip, although it was a strong one. The WRA needed the residents of
Tule Lake Segregation Center to harvest the vegetables of the project farm.
18 WRA Community Analysis Section March 27, 1944, page 4. Funerals had always taken place at the
camp cemetery whether Christian or Buddhist.
19 Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage,123.
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Accordingly, in the meeting with Best the farm situation took center stage.
The committee chided the Director for his "inhuman attitude" regarding the recent
funeral. Best dismissed the charge and claimed that residents had been pressured into
attending the public funeral." Best steered the discussion to the vegetables still
waiting to be harvested. Again he made his point clear. "I am going to sell this crop.
There is a war on. There is a food shortage. We are going to salvage this food. 1 am
going to sell it to the government." Later, Best became more civil, offering that
"there is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We are going to make
this as decent a place as we can make it. ,,21 The committee left the meeting feeling
they had made their points well, and that Best had been, for the most part, receptive.
The committee reported to Daihyo Sha Kai that progress had been made in
the meeting, and there was a strong possibility of returning to work soon on the
project farm. They were totally unaware that two days before, on October 24, Best
had quietly made arrangements to import harvesters to replace the idle work crews at
Tule Lake. With more than $500,000 worth of vegetables still in the field, Best was
taking no chances.22 He announced on October 28 that, "due to failure offann
workers to report for work, they have been terminated as of October 19."23 The
implication was unmistakable: Daihyo Sha Kai had been trumped; the internees had
lost their ouly bargaining chip.
20 Ibid, 125. Best further pointed out, he did not believe the committee represented the whole camp.
21 Ibid, 127.
22 Myer, WRA Advance Release, November 13, 1943, JARCR/CU, Box II, File 2. In this release to
the press Myer stated that, "Faced with the onset of winter and the possibility oflosing approximately
$500,000 worth of vegetables, the WRA immediately began recruiting loyal evacuees."
23 Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage, 128.
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Adding insult to injury, the segregates subsequently learned from camp
newspaper articles that the strike breakers were "loyals" from other relocation camps,
and would receive the prevailing wage of one dollar per hour rather than the current
rate of eight cents per hour. In other words, in only two days they would earn as
much as the segregates had made in a month/"
For the Old Tuleans, in particular, news of Best's decision must have
generated bitterness and perplexity. As in 1942, the crop in the field in the fall of
1943 was the result of hard work done by the Old Tuleans, who had never shared in
the financial windfall from the harvest. Now men who had nothing to do with
establishing the huge agricultural operation at Tule Lake were going to harvest crops
for a decent wage. Moreover, although there was a good deal of support for Daihyo
Sha Kai among the Old Tuleans, many would have undoubtedly chosen to join the
new workforce on the project farm for a dollar an hour. The increasingly radicalized
situation at Tule Lake, however, made any perceived act of collaboration with the
WRA extremely dangerous. Even if they had been given the opportunity to work on
the harvest, the Old Tuleans would have been labeled traitors by the Daihyo Sha
v .25sxu.
On October 30, three hundred "loyal" harvesters arrived by train. They were
housed in tents set up near the fields well out of sight of the Tule Lake Center.
Naturally, this development was distressing to the entire center. News of the arrival
24 WRA Community Analysis Section March 27,1943 Page IS.
zs Celia S. Deschin, Tule Lake Science in Inaction, Journal of Education Sociology (February 1948),
368-381. Deschin refers to some of the activists as "disturbed."
126
of the "loyal" harvesters was not nearly as worrisome, however, as the next
revelation to hit the center. On the same day the harvesters arrived, evacuee
warehouse workers discovered that Caucasian employees had raided the center's
food supply, transporting a significant quantity of staple foods to the project farm for
consumption by the new work force.26 Warehouse workers reported that not only
were staple items taken from the warehouse, including one hundred and twenty sacks
of rice, and fifty cases of milk, but luxury items reserved strictly for Caucasian staff
were also missing. The battle to improve both the quantity and quality of food in the
mess halls had been constant for the entire history of the center's existence. The idea
that scabs were taking food from the center, and eating better than the Tule Lake
evacuees ever had, infuriated internees, and hatred for Raymond Best intensified.27
Daihyo Sha Kai stationed men at the warehouses to watch for movement of food to
the "loyal" camp.
On the morning of November 1, word spread throughout the center that WRA
National Director Dillon Myer had just arrived to inspect the newly segregated
center." Apparently, Myer had no idea of the hornet's nest he was entering, or the
level of hatred in the center for Project Director Best. The Daihyo Sha Kai quickly
determined that they should force a meeting with the National Director, combined
with a show of solidarity in the center. At the noon meal in the mess halls,
representatives of Daihyo Sha Kai announced that Myer was going to make a speech
26 WRA Community Analysis Section, March 27, 1944.
27 Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage. 13I. Items such as cases of canned pineapple were missing.
28 Dillon S. Myer WRA Advance Release November 13, 1943 JARCR/CU Box I I File 2.
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to the center, and all residents should go to the administration building immediately
after lunch. By 1:30 pm a huge crowd. estimated at between five and ten thousand
evacuees completely inundated the area around the administration building. Myer
and Best and various WRA staff were effectively trapped inside the building."
A young man approached Myer and Best requesting a meeting with a
committee of seventeen men representing Daihyo Sha Kai. Under the circumstances,
the two men were in no position to refuse. The tense meeting that followed lasted for
two and a half hours. The Daihyo Sha Kai committee railed agaiust conditions in the
center, and demanded that Raymond Best be dismissed as project director. Most
important on the list of complaints was the termination of farm workers, their
replacement with "loyal" strikebreakers and the use of evacuee food to feed them.
The Daihyo Sha Kai expected Myer to demonstrate sympathy for the
miserable situation perpetrated by Project Director Raymond Best. Surely the
National Director was not aware of what was going on at Tule Lake. After all,
Myer's first directives regarding segregation were to the effect that it was not to be
undertaken as a punitive measurer" However, the radicals found Dillon Myer to be
on exactly the same page as Raymond Best. Myer professed complete agreement
with Best regarding measures the Project Director had taken over the previous ten
days. Under tremendous pressure, with a huge seething crowd of agitated Japanese
29 Myer, WRA Advance Release, November 13, 1943. Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage, 131.
Weglyn, Years of Infamy. 162. All the chroniclers of this episode agree the Daihyo Sha Kai was well
organized for this confrontation with the National Director, including young men distributed among
the crowd to keep order and prevent evacuees from leaving the demonstration early. They also had a
public address system rigged to keep the crowd informed, and to receive the promised address from
Myer.
'0 Summary Notes on Segregation Conference July 26-26, 1943 Page 2.
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surrounding him, Myer showed steely resolve in his support for Best. He is quoted
by Thomas and Nishimoto from the minutes of the meeting, as saying: "We are
going to take care of the harvesting of the crop ... You folks did not want to do it so
we arranged to have it done,"!' At another point Myer fired back at the committee, "I
have never taken any action under threat or duress. ,,32At yet another point Myer
expressed his belief that the committee did not represent the true feelings of the
majority of the center. When questioned about food leaving the center for the "loyal"
harvesters while the mess halls continued to serve inferior meals, Raymond Best put
the matter simply and clearly. "It is our property and we are accountable for that
property. We will do what we want with it.,,33
Early in the afternoon, when it became evident that some sort of showdown
with agitated residents was eminent, Best contacted the commander of the military
garrison stationed outside the center. Lieutenant Colonel Vern Austin ordered the
garrison to quietly prepare to enter the Center at a moment's notice. The garrison
was not unfamiliar with the possibility of a scenario which would involve the
military entering the camp, and the events of November 1, became, in effect a
practice run for the garrisoa."
When the meeting between the Daihyo Sha Kai and the WRA Directors
finally broke up, the huge crowd remained in full force around the administration
building, The Daihyo Sha Kai had not gained one meaningful concession from the
31 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 134. From the minuets of the November 1, 1943 meeting.
"Ibid, 135.
33 Ibid,135. For the next thirty months of the center's existence Best was denounced for his actions.
'4 Myer, WRA Advance Release, November 13, 1943.
129
intransigent administration. The committee asked National Director Myer to address
the crowd which had waited so patiently. Daihyo Sha Kai had tricked the residents
into the show of solidarity by announcing that Dillon Myer was going to speak to the
center, which in fact was untrue. Myer had no plans to make any public remarks.
Myer, still unflappable, indicated he would be happy to make a few remarks.
Myer told the crowd he had met with the delegates and heard their concerns. He
expressed his confidence in Project Director Best, and concluded by saying the
center should continue to cooperate with the administration in settling all problems.
Prophetically, Myer added that if the residents did not want to deal peacefully with
the WRA they would have to deal with someone else."
Regardless of his coolness under pressure, Myer must have breathed a huge
sigh of relief as he left the area the next day to catch the train in Klamath Falls. Ifthe
National Director was not shaken he was the only one not experiencing unease.
Certainly every WRA employee involved in the proceedings of the day before was
shaken. Several employees resigned. Myer authorized building a restraining fence
around the administration building which was undertaken immediately." Myer was
aware that the radical element at the new segregation center was likely to cause more
problems. Tu1e Lake was no longer a stable center where evacuees could be counted
on to do their jobs and, for the most part, keep their mouths shut.
The events of November I caught the attention of the media. The Christian
Science Monitor reported on November 4, 1943, "Clark Fensler, head of the citizens'
"Myer, WRA Advance Release, November 13,1943.
3. Ibid.
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committee of the WRA, said four Caucasian employees ofTule Lake Center were
held prisoner by the Japanese for several hours. Mr. Fensler declared the WRA had
not called for Army assistance and said residents feared the Japanese might attempt
to break out of the camp. ,,37
Although it is true, Caucasian WRA employees caught in the administration
building were deeply frightened, it is somewhat amusing, and not surprising, that the
bombastic Clark Fensler, who was not at the center on November 1, 1943, was quick
to denounce his employer for not calling in the Army. In the same article in the
Christian Science Monitor, National Director Myer flatly denied Fensler's
allegations that there was any need to call in the Army, saying the Japanese had
gathered to hear him speak, and the gathering was peaceful." Edgy residents of the
area, including Mr. Fensler, would not have to wait long for Project Director Best to
call in the Army. The showdown on November 1 did nothing to ease tension at Tule
Lake Segregation Center. The evacuees had gained nothing from the confrontation
and the "loyal" strikebreakers were steadily harvesting the crops of the project farm.
Three days after the futile meeting with Myer and Best, the Daihyo Sha Kai
held a meeting on the evening of November 4 to decide the next course of action to
be taken. Suddenly, a young evacuee ran into the room and breathlessly reported
that WRA officials were transporting food supplies from the warehouser" The
'7 "Californians Claim Seizure By Japanese," The Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1943,
transcribed by WRA, JARCRlCU, Box 20 File 2.
'·Ibid.
39 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage. 142. See also WRA Community Analysis Section March 27,
1944, Page 17.
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committee told the youth to calm down and to return to the warehouse and document
what foodstuffs were being taken out.
The young man did not follow orders. He picked up several mends on his
way back to the warehouse and then brazenly confronted the WRA employees. Noise
of the row quickly drew additional internees, and the group grew to around two
hundred. As the crowd swelled, the internees became more and more confrontational.
Camp residents sought to keep trucks loaded with food from leaving the center, and
clashes broke out with WRA staff including Internal Security men on patrol. As the
internees' collective rage reached a crescendo, someone shouted that they should
attack the Camp Director. The group of young men, many now armed with baseball
bats and two-by-fours, thus converged on Best's residence with cries of "Get Best!"
and "Take Best!" The Project Director immediately called in the Arrny.40
In the mayhem that ensued, several rioters were hospitalized with severe
injuries. Miraculously, no one was killed in the melee. The rioting evacuees were
quickly subdued by well-armed troops, who entered the camp on foot and injeeps
with mounted machine guns. In a rather gratuitous show of force, the ancient tanks
also rumbled into the ceeter." Oddly enough, the members of Daihyo Sha Kai had
been engrossed in discussion and were unaware of the riot until it was allover. In
fact, because of the immense size of the camp, the great majority of the residents of
'" Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage. 144.
4' "Army Takes Over To Quell Foment At Japanese Camp," The Christian Science Monitor
November 5, 1943, JARCRlCU, Box 20, File 2. The newspaper reported twenty evacuees were hurt
and five hundred were rounded up and questioned.
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the center had no inkling of the events of the evening, and were shocked to learn the
following morning that the Army was in control.?
On November 13, 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Austin declared martial law at
Tule Lake Segregation Center. The Army was in total control of administration.
Daihyo Sha Kai insisted upon continuing the work stoppage at the center. The center
was plunged into a period of idleness and impoverishment from which it would
never emerge.V For the next two months Lieutenant Colonel Austin held control of
Tule Lake. Even when martial law was finally lifted and the WRA was returned to
administration, the reality that the Army was just outside was not lost on the
segregates.
Finally, late in the winter of 1944, a compromise was worked out between the
segregates and the administration to resume employment of evacuees at the center.
Spirits were buoyed by the prospect of work on the project farm in the spring. Many
segregates had chosen Tule Lake because of the opportunity of employment on the
project farm. On March 16, 1944 an article in the camp newspaper, recently renamed
The Newell Star, outlined plans for the project farm in 1944. Although reduced in
acreage by almost two-thirds, the farm would still be comprised of more than one
thousand acres.44 This plan proved to be overly optimistic. On March 23,1944,
National Director Dillon Myer made his first visit to the Center since the traumatic
events of the fall. In an interview with a reporter for The Newell Star Myer was
4'lbid .
•, "Tule Lake Case Placed In Hands Of Washington," The Christian Science Monitor, November 24,
1943, JARCR/CU, Box 20, File 2.
44 "Fann Program Drafted," The Newell Star, March 16, 1944.
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asked about employment policy relative to the huge population of the center. Myer
replied, "In general, employment policy will be the same. There will be some
curtailment in the farm operations, because of the past incident. The farm operation
will be on a basis of self-sufficiency".4S Inother words, the large-scale agricultural
project at Tule Lake was finished.
Accordingly, the WRA offered very few employment opportunities on the
greatly diminished project farm. Of 822 residents of the center who applied for
agricultural employment, on April 20, the Fiscal Section reported a mere 113
residents employed on the camp farm.46 This number was about the same as the
number of employees necessary to run just one of the two packing sheds at the height
of the agricultural operation at Tule Lake, and less than 5 percent of the number of
workers employed in agriculture during the two previous years. The farm workers
managed to plant just 185 acres of vegetables in 1944, a far cry from the 2,500 acres
of 1942, and 2,900 acres of 1943.47 Similarly, in 1945 the center again cultivated
only 197 acres of vegetables."
After the traumatic events of the fall of 1943, the WRA and National Director
Dillon Myer were not willing to make the commitment in money and labor necessary
for the agricultural project of the first two years at Tule Lake. The residents of the
center suffered from the loss of employment the project farm provided. At the height
.5 Myer visits Center, The Newell Star, March 23, 1944.
46 "Fann Wod<:Preferred According To Survey," The Newell Star, April 13, 1944. "Fiscal Section
Reveals SOli Colonists On WRA Payroll," The Newell Star Apri120, 1944.
""185 Acres planted Says Fann Head," The Newell Star April 27, 1944 .
•, "Vegetables 97 Acres Planted in 4 Weeks," The Newell Star May II, 1945. This article indicated
another 100 acres of potatoes was yet to be planted.
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of the project farm operation, 40 percent of the work force at Tule Lake was
involved in agriculture. In the final two years of the project farm, with a teaming
population of over 18,000 residents, many desperate for work, and 5,011 employed
in the center, only around 2 percent of those with jobs were employed in agriculture.
A social scientist working for the WRA filed a report on conditions at the
center in December of 1944. "Because of the curtailment of work following the
upheaval, too many residents have nothing to do. It is my opinion that if every able-
bodied man and woman were given some kind of job, there would be less chance of
internal strife and people would be happier." The analyst further noted: "Because of
the intense hatred toward the administration, anyone seen with or talking to a hakujin
(Caucasian) is looked upon with suspicion. The gap of understanding between the
administration and the colony is wide.'.49
In fact, by the middle of June 1944, Tule Lake Segregation Center had
deteriorated into a reign of terror. The increasingly powerful Daihyo Sha Kai began
labeling anyone who opposed them as Inu. Beatings of anyone suspected of being a
collaborator with the administration became common. Thomas and Nishimoto quote
a member of Daihyo Sha Kai as stating: "The Japanese know they are helpless.
Naturally, the only thing they can think of doing is get back at those who spy on
them. I think the beatings will keep on going for quite a while. The administration
listens to the Inu and not the others. So such things happen. ,,50
49 WRA Community Analysis Section, Report on Adjustment to Tule Lake December 20, 1944,
JARCRICU Box I, File 31
'" Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage, From the Field Notes ofan Informant, June 17, 1944.
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Of all those who suffered from the situation which developed at Tule Lake
over the last two years of the camp's existence, no group suffered collectively like
the Old Tuleans. The original residents who stayed at Tule Lake lost more than
anyone through segregation. The Old Tuleans stayed at Tule Lake because of their
overriding desire for security. They intended to continue to do their job, wait out the
war, and return home. Instead, the last two years at Tule Lake were a struggle to
avoid being singled out for punishment by the militants in control. The Issei resented
being ordered about by brash young militants they did not even know. However, they
were afraid of causing more strife in the center and of being labeled lnu through any
association with the administration." As the strength of the militants grew over the
tragic death of the farm worker, they influenced a few Old Tuleans to work with
them. However, the Old Tuleans were never part of the inner circle and never trusted
by the militants.
The Old Tuleans had come in for abuse by the transferees from the start.
They were blamed for the poor facilities. Militants claimed the original residents had
lacked initiative in obtaining improvements in the camp. Along with controlling the
best jobs and housing, the Old Tuleans were accused of being on friendly terms with
the administration and, worst of all, of not being truly disloyal. Their status plunged
from the highest level of camp hierarchy to the bottom. One Old Tulean remarked to
a WRA social scientist: "Anything can happen in this dump. It's as bad as being in
'1 WRA Community Analysis Section March 27, 1944, Page 11, JARCUICU Box 1 File 26.
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Germany. You wonder why you were born. These guys believe in Gestapo methods.
You gotta be alert of what you say, and on top of that you gotta give them respect.,,52
One Old Tulean who had managed to retain a good deal of influence was
Takeo Noma, the general manager of the canteen enterprises. Noma had been
prominent in resisting Daihyo Sha Kai. The canteen system handled huge sums of
money, and accusations were made that Noma was siphoning WRA profits to private
accounts including his own, those of certain WRA officials, and his brother's, who
also worked in the canteen enterprises. 53Rumors spread that Noma had made his
fortune and was scheduled to leave the center soon. He was declared Public Inu
Number One by Daihyo Sha Kai. As he was walking to his residence on the evening
of July 3, 1944, Noma was attacked by unknown assailants and stabbed through the
neck by a sharp object, probably a pair of scissors. He fell on the porch of his
brother's apartment and died instantly. The assassins dispersed into the night and
were never found. 54
The shocking murder of Noma was openly approved by Daihyo Sha Kai. In a
statement dated July 20, 1944, a member of Daihyo Sha Kai praised the assassination:
"The killing ofT. Noma was a blessing to the residents. I have yet to see anyone who
really feels sorry for him, other than those of his immediate family. Never have I
seen such pleasant reactions to a murder in all my life. Several others are said to be
52 WRA Community Analysis Section March 27, 1944, JARCUICU Box I File 26
ss Thomas and Nishimoto The Spoilage, Page 270. The canteens reported sales of over $110,000 for
the month of Nov emher 1943.
54 Ibid, 271
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in line for the grave and their deaths violent as they may be, will be openly rejoiced
by the residents. ,,55
In the final two years of its existence, Tule Lake continued to descend further
into frightening anarchy. Under pressure from the militant element in the camp a
large majority of evacuees were forced to renounce their American citizenship. In the
end Tule Lake is a tale of two camps. First it was the camp of coerced labor on the
huge project farm and related agricultural projects, and later it became the Tule Lake
Segregation Center where terror reigned.
55 Ibid. 272
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Conclusion
In the panicked atmosphere after Pearl Harbor, fear of Japanese sabotage
fused with economic opportunism and latent racism to make the extreme measure of
removing all Japanese from the West Coast an acceptable-and, in many instances,
popular-initiative for much of the Caucasian American population. Coinciding
directly with swift military gains made by the Japanese Army, many Americans
worried about a Japanese invasion on the West Coast of the United States.
Heightening such fears, newspapers printed unfounded reports of sabotage activity
by West Coast Japanese. As the winter of 1942 progressed many groups called for
ousting West Coast Japanese, including economic interest groups who coveted
Japanese Americans' property, such as the Salinas Vegetable Grower-shipper
Association. By the end of year, nearly every law enforcement organization and
chamber of commerce on the West Coast was calling for removal of the Japanese
population.
Under the guise of military necessity Lieutenant General John DeWitt,
commander of the fourth Army headquartered in San Francisco, and Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, convinced President Franklin Roosevelt to issue Executive
Order #9066. As a result, virtually all of the 110,000 Japanese American citizens and
resident aliens living on the West Coast were interned in a temporary assembly
center by June I, 1942. Nearly all of the sites selected by the army and the War
Relocation Administration (WRA) for permanent relocations centers were, built in
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the most barren wastelands of the American West. Places that remain, for the most
part utterly uninhabited to this day. From Poston in the Arizona desert, to Heart
Mountain in arid Wyoming, the relocation camps were virtually identical, differing
only in size. One camp, however, proved a significant exception: Tule Lake,
California, located in an immensely fertile agricultural region. With wartime prices
for foodstuffs soaring and overseeing a readily-available pool of captive labor, the
WRA quickly recognized a unique potential at Tule Lake for large-scale commercial
agricultural production.
Indeed, in the first two years, the widespread labor coercion at Tule Lake
camp, where the evacuees devoted long hours to a vast commercial agriculture
project for minimal compensation was unique among the ten internment camps. In
the spring of 1942 internees at Tule Lake planted 2,500 acres of vegetables and grain,
including 1,057 acres of barley, 208 acres of onions, 827 acres of potatoes, and
smaller crops of carrots, lettuce, turnips, peas, beets, and cabbages. Despite almost
constant controversy and hardship in the first year, including administration threats
of fee assessments for those who would not work, as well as disgruntled evacuees
working in the fields on inadequate rations, internees at the Tule Lake Center
harvested more than a million dollars worth of grain and vegetables at a substantial
profit. Moreover, vegetables grown at Tule Lake supplemented the mess halls of all
the other centers at a time when fresh vegetables were in short supply.
In an attempt to speed up and increase the number of Japanese Americans
leaving the camps for permanent relocation, and to supply the military with Japanese
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American troops, the WRA and the War Department jointly undertook a loyalty
registration in the winter and spring of 1943. The loyalty questionnaire which each
Japanese citizen and resident alien over the age of 17 was required to fill out was
meant to be a mere formality. For many internees at Tule Lake, however, the
registration created confusion, resentment, and insecurity, and half of all evacuees
over 17 years of age refused to affirm loyalty to the United States government.
Despite the fiasco of the registration, the WRA had confidence that the
residents of the Tule Lake Center-who came to be known as the Old Tuleans--
would return to the fields of the project farm in the spring. No one responsible for the
camp's administration suggested cutting back on the windfall agricultural project. To
the contrary, the prevailing sentiment of the WRA was more, more, more! The Old
Tuleans responded loyally, with 2,900 acres of vegetables and grain in production in
1943, and another excellent crop, regardless of the fact that almost half of all
Japanese Americans and aliens declared "disloyal" were residents ofTule Lake.
Notwithstanding the excellent harvest at Tule Lake, WRA National Director
Dillon S. Myer, under pressure from both the government and the private sector,
made the decision to segregate all those who refused on the loyalty questionnaire to
affirm loyalty in the United States. They were given a chance to change their
responses on the key loyalty questions. If their answers remained "No, No" they
were declared "disloyal," and sent to a new segregation center. In choosing Tule
Lake for the segregation center, Dillon Myer intended to supply the vast fields and
related divisions of the project such as the packing sheds and railroad loading docks,
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with unlimited labor. Myer and the top functionaries in the WRA failed to recognize,
however, the relative nature ofloyalty and disloyalty among internees, especially at
TuleLake.
By transferring internees from each internment center to Tule Lake, the WRA
created a camp more diverse than any other center. Included among the transferees
was a minority of militant pro-Japan activists determined to advance a highly activist
agenda. Immediately recognizing the fundamental role of agriculture in the
exploitative relationship between the WRA and internees at Tule Lake, such activists
and their supporters among the population of Old Tuleans made curtailing the
longstanding pattern of labor coercion on the project farm a central goal. For his part,
WRA Director Myer failed to recognize the intractable tension created by selecting
Tule Lake as the destination for "disloyals" while simultaneously attempting to use
internee labor to generate yet another bumper harvest.
The tragic death offarm worker Tatsuto Kashima on October IS, 1944 led
directly to the rise to power of the radical element of the evacuees, and subsequently
to the end oflarge-scale agriculture at Tule Lake. In the eyes of many evacuees,
Project Director Raymond Best put more value on vegetables than on the tragic loss
of a human life. When Best refused to sanction a public funeral, residents of Tule
Lake were appalled, and, momentarily united by the radical internee group Daihyo
Sha Kai, evacuees resolved to continue with the public funeral in defiance of the
administration. Best responded by countering defiance with vindictiveness, ordering
"loyal" Japanese American workers to be transported to Tule Lake from other
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centers to harvest the remaining vegetables and paying them substantially higher
wages than internees at Tule Lake bad received in the previous two years.
National Director Myer got his rude awakening regarding the true situation
developing at Tule Lake when he spent the excruciating afternoon of November I,
1943, meeting with members of Daihyo Sha Kai, surrounded by thousands of
segregates coerced into a show of solidarity. On that day, which he referred to the
subsequent spring as "the past incident," Myer abandoned the huge agricultural
commune that bad characterized Tule Lake in the first two years. The WRA would
cut their losses and salvage what vegetables the "loyal" workers could harvest.
Underscoring the dramatic shift, only three days after the fateful meeting the Army
was in control of the camp. Tule Lake bad become, in a very short time, a center too
volatile and dangerous to justify the investment necessary to manage the massive
agricultural project.
Ironically, Myer emerged from his experience during the relocation years
with his reputation intact. In fact, during his lifetime he occupied a place of virtual
reverence in the "loyal" Japanese American community. In May of 1946, just two
months after the Tule Lake Segregation Center finally closed, the Japanese-
Americans Citizens League held a banquet in Myer's honor. He was presented with a
citation describing him in heroic terms:
American and champion of human rights and common decency whose
courageous and inspired leadership as National Director of the War
Relocation Authority against war hysteria, race prejudice, and misguided hate,
as well as economic greed draped in patriotic colors, contributed mightily in
convincing the American Government and public at large that Americans of
Japanese ancestry and their resident alien parents were, and are, loyal and
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sincere Americans worthy of every right and privilege of the American
heritage.'
In his 1971memoir, Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the
War Relocation Authority During World War IL Myer implied, in a fanciful
recounting of events, that primary responsibility for the decision to undertake
segregation, should not fall upon him. "On May 31,1943, we called all project
directors to Washington D.C.," he recalled. "After a thorough discussion the
directors were unanimous in their recommendation that we proceed with a mass
segregation program. Because I did not feel that I could ignore their unanimous
judgment I capitulated, although reluctantly.t'[ Put simply, the historical record does
not sustain Myer's attempt to distance himself from responsibility for segregation. In
his memoir Myer indicated that he recognized faulty logic contributed to the
situation which developed at Tule Lake, although he did not take personal
responsibility: "There was a tendency in the WRA to assume that the segregation
center and other centers would be more harmonious communities after the separation
had been completed. This was true of nine centers, but not ofTule Lake.,,3 Not of
Tule Lake, indeed! The Tule Lake Segregation Center failed to bring together a
group oflike-minded evacuees or any semblance ofhannony. By his actions at Tule
Lake, Myer affirmed that his advocacy and sympathy extended primarily to "loyal"
Japanese Americans. Evidence uncovered in this thesis indicates that Myer's
IDillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority
During World War II, (Tucson, University of Arizona Press 1971) 342.
2 Ibid, 76 The idea that Myer brought the project directors to Washington D.C. for a vote on
segregation is ridiculous.
3 Ibid, 77.
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performance as National Director of the WRA should be reassessed, regarding the
director's less than magnanimous treatment of "troublemakers" such as individuals
who protested conditions in the camps, and "disloyals" who refused to affirm loyalty
in the U.S.A., particularly at Tule Lake, for reasons which had nothing to do with
pro-Japan sentiment.
No WRA official including Myer ever lamented publicly the loss of large
scale agriculture at Tule Lake. In fact, the unique nature of the Tule Lake Center as a
huge agricultural center has been all but lost to history. Although historians have
noted that all the centers had agricultural projects, no other camp had a farm
operation comparable to Tule Lake. Indeed, of the nine other centers, only Heart
Mountain in Wyoming had good potential for agriculture. The growing season was
very short, however, and the center was only able to supplement its tables with
project-grown vegetables, gladly accepting shipments of vegetables from Tule Lake.
Minidoka, Idaho produced chicken meat and eggs but no vegetables to speak of."
The Arizona centers of Poston and Gila River were plagued with high alkali content
in the soil and vegetable production was disappointing. In the first year at Poston, a
sizable investment in tomatoes failed, as many acres of plants died in the fields.
Granada, Colorado had similar soil problems, while Manzanar in Owens Valley,
California, suffered from a lack of water. At the Topaz Center in Utah, write
historians Girdner and Loftis, "Even the Japanese could not grow anything except
4 Girdner and Loftis, The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World
War u, (London: Macmillan, 1969),233.
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morning glories." By contrast, the Arkansas camps of Rohwer and Jerome were in
wooded swampland and subject to excessive heat and unpredictable rain. Only at
Tule Lake did the ideal conditions of rich black soil, abundant water for irrigation,
and a population of evacuees with the necessary expertise and sincerity come
together to make the desert bloom for two years, and to supply a steady stream of
railcars filled with fresh crisp vegetables to all the other centers.
The last of the ten relocation centers to close, the Tule Lake camp remained
occupied by Japanese Americans until March 1946. In subsequent years, most of the
camp buildings were sold, mainly to local homesteaders, and moved by truck to
farms and ranches in the area. Today, all that is left to identify the location of the
huge camp is a small historical marker, placed by the state of California at the side of
Highway 139, adjacent to the site of the camp. The plaque reads:
Tule Lake was one often American concentration camps established during
World War II to incarcerate 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, of whom
the majority were American citizens, behind barbed wire and guard towers
without charge, trial or establishment of guilt. These camps are reminders of
how racism, economic and political exploitation, and expediency can
undermine the constitutional guarantees of United States citizens and aliens
alike. May the injustices and humiliation suffered here never recur."
Poignant words, indeed. They tell us nothing, however, of the unique nature of Tule
Lake among the ten relocation centers located throughout the west, or of the
struggles waged in the five years of its existence.
5 Ibid, 232.
• California Registered Historical Landmark No. 850-2.
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